Speculative ticketing is the practice of selling an option to maybe buy a popular ticket (often at an insane price) before the ticket goes on sale. You may not realize you are not buying a real ticket, although these tickets often come with fine print, and as Tom Waits tells us, the large print giveth and the small print taketh away.
There is an effort going on to specifically ban speculative ticketing at the state level which I applaud as I think speculative ticketing should be a crime. One reason I think this is because I think it already is a crime in most if not all states and possibly under federal law as well.
Think about it–do you think that if you before Blackstone and said to Sir William, My Lord, the defendant sold me a famous cow he didn’t own at a price he invented and promised to deliver the cow on law day. He took my money but delivered no cow (or delivered a different and unfamous cow). And the defendant said, perfectly legal My Lord.
What do you think My Lord Blackstone would say?
What would Billy do?
I don’t think the English common law would have just let the defendant walk out without at least compensating the buyer. Therefore, there’s probably a case that can be made out of existing law for selling stolen or counterfeit goods, or a host of other common law derivatives that would violate the charter of the land.
So as we try to get specific legal action to deal with speculative tickets, let’s not allow the lobbyists for Stubhub to negotiate the punishment that they want rather than the punishment that already applies under existing state civil or criminal law.
Ek’s New Iconography: Will the real Daniel Ek please stand up?
MTP readers will no doubt remember when Daniel Ek refused to be deposed in the latest Nashville case against Spotify for copyright infringement (Eight Mile Style). He eventually was deposed where he tried to say that he had no first hand knowledge of the facts or publishing practices at Spotify. Others did that for him after they got finished peeling his pears.
Ryan Hogg, writing in Fortune, published what I can only think is a puff piece on Ek trying to pass him off as a man of the people with a management style of just one of the team. Worth over a billion dollars and controlling voting stock.
And then there’s this:
What is Spotify’s contractual basis for their modernized free goods program?
There’s been a lot of discussion about Spotify’s new “modernized” free goods program aka Track Monetization Eligibility. It does raise the question of how they are getting away with this. Free goods, after all, were based on contract terms that the artist got to negotiate (and which, by the way, was passed along to songwriters through the artist’s controlled compositions clause for anyone not on a pure statutory rate and still is.
Who agreed to this? And why aren’t they stepping forward to claim their genius?
The MLC announced it was auditing 49 users of the blanket mechanical license, a massive undertaking. This announcement sent me back to the audit provisions of Title I of the Music Modernization Act to review what the role of the auditor actually is for audits of music users by the MLC as opposed to audits of the MLC by copyright owners. As often happens when reviewing little-used code sections that abruptly become important, I was reminded of a couple nuances that were obviously flawed when drafted. The key nuance is how can a royalty examiner be looking for overpayments against the interest of the party that hired her but still be independent?
How qualified is qualified?
The first issue is with the definition of a “qualified auditor”, a glitch that I’ve harped on a few times. The term “qualified auditor” comes up in two different contexts in the MMA–first, a qualified auditor who prepares the MLC’s audited financial statements. The definition of qualified auditor is in 17 USC § 115(e)(25) as “an independent, certified public accountant with experience performing music royalty audits.” The reason why this term is a drafting error is two fold–first, you don’t need a CPA to conduct music royalty audits and there is nothing on the CPA licensure exams that requires any knowledge of “music royalty audits.” Second, you do need a CPA to prepare audited financial statements if the books are maintained according to generally accepted accounting principles particularly if a financial audit requires an opinion as an attest service, but that role does not require knowledge of royalty audits. So the defined term has an internal contradiction.
The Gaap, ruler of 25 legions of spirits from the Munich Manual of Demonic Magic grimoire
Not only is the definition hinky but it’s common knowledge (outside of the Imperial City, I guess) that many if not most royalty auditors are not CPAs. (There’s also a long-standing assumption among artist lawyers when this concept comes up in record or publishing deals that a CPA requirement for audits is intentionally punitive. The assumption is that CPAs charge more making the cost of auditing more burdensome (therefore less likely to happen), which remains to be proven but is pretty widely accepted.) So the definition should be limited to requiring a CPA for the MLC’s audited financial statements and the common alternate definition of “experienced royalty auditor” for the audit clauses. But let’s put that to one side.
Overpayments and Independence
The MMA rule for auditing digital music providers states:
The qualified auditor shall determine the accuracy of royalty payments, including whether an underpayment or overpayment of royalties was made by the digital music provider to the mechanical licensing collective, except that, before providing a final audit report to the mechanical licensing collective, the qualified auditor shall provide a tentative draft of the report to the digital music provider and allow the digital music provider a reasonable opportunity to respond to the findings, including by clarifying issues and correcting factual errors.
Realize that the MLC and the services monitor payments and make frequent adjustments to royalties (which may be reflected on your royalty statement if you can find them). That’s different than an auditor who works for a client going and seeking out an overpayment as part of their audit report. Relieving the auditor of this conflict does not preclude the service from claiming an overpayment which is an ongoing part of invoicing (see, e.g., 37 CFR §210.27(d)(2)(ii)). You would not be creating a windfall for the party receiving the overpayment.
I would interpret the statute as not requiring the auditor to seek an additional overpayment not previously invoiced, but rather confirming the accuracy of any adjustments made for overpayments or underpayments already reflected on the statements that are the subject of the audit. That’s quite a different thing.
What makes an auditor independent is that they do not have a conflict of interest as to their client, in this case the MLC. The royalty auditor is intended to be an advocate for their client (who pays them) and they are hired to look for ways that the other side has failed to account to their client properly to their client’s disadvantage. Improper payments are most commonly underpayments, i.e., the music user has failed to pay all that the client is entitled to receive. Royalty statements are regularly recalculated for a host of reasons in the normal course of business without regard to the presence or absence of any audit. This is not to say that somehow the MLC (and eventually the copyright owners) get some kind of windfall because the services missed something if any auditor is not seeking out an overpayment. That’s particularly true since there will likely be multiple sets of eyes on the field work and draft audit report. And trust me, they will all be trying to find somebody else’s mistake.
Or said another way, copyright owners don’t receive a windfall that was somehow missed by the largest corporations in commercial history who can determine what floor of which building you are on at what time of day at what address, e.g., sporting goods or children’s toys, so they can serve ads to your phone. Are we really worried about these little lambs getting lost in the woods?
@Helienne Explains the EU’s Cultural Protections Against Streaming Monopolists
We were lucky to get an interview with ESCA President Helienne Lindvall about the European Parliament’s report on cultural protections against streaming monopolies. This is a very important development and something we could use in the United States where this focus is sadly lacking.
@MikeHuppe Made an Important Comment on AI Justice for Creators
SoundExchange CEO Mike Huppe’s comment on AI justice is welcome from a rights platform.
Spotify has announced they are “Modernizing Our Royalty System.” Beware of geeks bearing “modernization”–that almost always means they get what they want to your disadvantage. Also sounds like yet another safe harbor. At a minimum, they are demonstrating the usual lack of understanding of the delicate balance of the music business they now control. But if they can convince you not to object, then they get away with it.
Don’t let them.
An Attack on Property Rights
There’s some serious questions about whether Spotify has the right to unilaterally change the way it counts royalty-bearing streams and to encroach on the private property rights of artists.
Here’s their plan: Evidently the plan is to only pay on streams over 1,000 per song accruing during the previous 12 months. I seriously doubt that they can engage in this terribly modern “stream discrimination” in a way that doesn’t breach any negotiated direct license with a minimum guarantee (if not others).
That doubt also leads me to think that Spotify’s unilateral change in “royalty policy” (whatever that is) is unlikely to affect everyone the same. Taking a page from 1984newspeakers, Spotify calls this discrimination policy “Track Monetization Eligibility”. It’s not discrimination, you see, it’s “eligibility”, a whole new thing. Kind of like war is peace, right? Or bouillabaisse.
According to Spotify’s own announcement this proposed change is not an increase in the total royalty pool that Spotify pays out (God forbid the famous “pie” should actually grow): ”There is no change to the size of the music royalty pool being paid out to rights holders from Spotify; we will simply use the tens of millions of dollars annually [of your money] to increase the payments to all eligible tracks, rather than spreading it out into $0.03 payments [that we currently owe you].”
Yep, you won’t even miss it, and you should sacrifice for all those deserving artists who are more eligible than you. They are not growing the pie, they are shifting money around–rearranging the deck chairs.
Spotify’s Need for Living Space
So why is Spotify doing this to you? The simple answer is the same reason monopolists always use: they need living space for Greater Spotify. Or more simply, because they can, or they can try. They’ll tell you it’s to address “streaming fraud” but there are a lot more direct ways to address streaming fraud such as establishing a simple “know your vendor” policy, or a simple pruning policy similar to that established by record companies to cut out low-sellers (excluding classical and instrumental jazz). But that would require Spotify to get real about their growth rates and be honest with their shareholders and partners. Based on the way Spotify treated the country of Uruguay, they are more interested in espoliating a country’s cultural resources than they are in fairly compensating musicians.
Of course, they won’t tell you that side of the story. They won’t even tell you if certain genres or languages will be more impacted than others (like the way labels protected classical and instrumental jazz from getting cut out measured by pop standards). Here’s their explanation:
It’s more impactful [says who?] for these tens of millions of dollars per year to increase payments to those most dependent on streaming revenue — rather than being spread out in tiny payments that typically don’t even reach an artist (as they do not surpass distributors’ minimum payout thresholds). 99.5% of all streams are of tracks that have at least 1,000 annual streams, and each of those tracks will earn more under this policy.
This reference to “minimum payout thresholds” is a very Spotifyesque twisting of a generalization wrapped in cross reference inside of spin. Because of the tiny sums Spotify pays artists due to the insane “big pool” or “market centric” royalty model that made Spotify rich, extremely low royalties make payment a challenge.
Plus, if they want to make allegations about third party distributors, they should say which distributors they are speaking of and cite directly to specific terms and conditions of those services. We can’t ask these anonymous distributors about their policies if we don’t know who they are.
What’s more likely is that tech platforms like PayPal stack up transaction fees to make the payment cost more than the royalty paid. Of course, you could probably say that about all streaming if you calculate the cost of accounting on a per stream basis, but that’s a different conversation.
So Spotify wants you to ignore the fact that they impose this “market centric” royalty rate that pays you bupkis in the first place. Since your distributor holds the tiny slivers of money anyway, Spotify just won’t pay you at all. It’s all the same to you, right? You weren’t getting paid anyway, so Spotify will just give your money to these other artists who didn’t ask for it and probably wouldn’t want it if you asked them.
There is a narrative going around that somehow the major labels are behind this. I seriously doubt it–if they ever got caught with their fingers in the cookie jar on this scam, would it be worth the pittance that they will end up getting in pocket after all mouths are fed? The scam is also 180 out from Lucian Grange’s call for artist centric royalty rates, so as a matter of policy it’s inconsistent with at least Universal’s stated goals. So I’d be careful about buying into that theory without some proof.
What About Mechanical Royalties?
What’s interesting about this scam is that switching to Spotify’s obligations on the song side, the accounting rules for mechanical royalties say (37 CFR § 210.6(g)(6) for those reading along at home) seem to contradict the very suckers deal that Spotify is cramming down on the recording side:
Royalties under 17 U.S.C. 115 shall not be considered payable, and no Monthly Statement of Account shall be required, until the compulsory licensee’s [i.e., Spotify’s] cumulative unpaid royalties for the copyright owner equal at least one cent. Moreover, in any case in which the cumulative unpaid royalties under 17 U.S.C. 115 that would otherwise be payable by the compulsory licensee to the copyright owner are less than $5, and the copyright owner has not notified the compulsory licensee in writing that it wishes to receive Monthly Statements of Account reflecting payments of less than $5, the compulsory licensee may choose to defer the payment date for such royalties and provide no Monthly Statements of Account until the earlier of the time for rendering the Monthly Statement of Account for the month in which the compulsory licensee’s cumulative unpaid royalties under section 17 U.S.C. 115 for the copyright owner exceed $5 or the time for rendering the Annual Statement of Account, at which time the compulsory licensee may provide one statement and payment covering the entire period for which royalty payments were deferred.
Much has been made of the fact that Spotify may think it can unilaterally change its obligations to pay sound recording royalties, but they still have to pay mechanicals because of the statute. And when they pay mechanicals, the accounting rules have some pretty low thresholds that require them to pay small amounts. This seems to be the very issue they are criticizing with their proposed change in “royalty policy.”
But remember that the only reason that Spotify has to pay mechanical royalties on the stream discrimination is because they haven’t managed to get that free ride inserted into the mechanical royalty rates alongside all the other safe harbors and goodies they seem to have bought for their payment of historical black box.
So I would expect that Spotify will show up at the Copyright Royalty Board for Phonorecords V and insist on a safe harbor to enshrine stream discrimination into the Rube Goldberg streaming mechanical royalty rates. After all, controlled compositions are only paid on royalty bearing sales, right? And since it seems like they get everything else they want, everyone will roll over and give this to them, too. Then the statutory mechanical will give them protection.
To Each According to Their Needs
Personally, I have an issue with any exception that results in any artist being forced to accept a royalty free deal. Plus, it seems like what should be happening here is that underperforming tracks get dropped, but that doesn’t support the narrative that all the world’s music is on offer. Just not paid for.
Is it a lot of money to any one person? Not really, but it’s obviously enough money to make the exercise worthwhile to Spotify. And notice that they haven’t really told you how much money is involved. It may be that Spotify isn’t holding back any small payments from distributors if all payments are aggregated. But either way it does seem like this new new thing should start with a clean slate–and all accrued royalties should be paid.
This idea that you should be forced to give up any income at all for the greater good of someone else is kind of an odd way of thinking. Or as they say back in the home country, from each according to their ability and to each according to their needs. And you don’t really need the money, do you?
By the way, can you break a $20?
The NO AI Fraud Act
Thanks to U.S. Representatives Salazar and Dean, there’s an effort underway to limit Big Tech’s AI rampage just in time for Davos. (Remember, the AI bubble got started at last year’s World Economic Forum Winter Games in Davos, Switzerland).
Chairman Issa Questions MLC’s Secretive Investment Policyfor Hundreds of Millions in Black Box
As we’ve noted a few times, the MLC has a nontransparent–some might say “secretive”–investment policy that has the effect of a government rule. This has caught the attention of Chairman Darrell Issa and Rep. Ben Cline at a recent House oversight hearing. Chairman Issa asked for more information about the investment policy in follow-up “questions for the record” directed to MLC CEO Kris Ahrend. It’s worth getting smart about what the MLC is up to in advance of the upcoming “redesignation” proceeding at the Copyright Office. We all know the decision is cooked and scammed already as part of the Harry Fox Preservation Act (AKA Title I of the MMA), but it will be interesting to see if anyone actually cares and the investment policy is a perfect example. It will also be interesting to see which Copyright Office examiner goes to work for one of the DiMA companies after the redesignation as is their tradition.
It is commonplace for artists to conduct a royalty examination of their record company, sometimes called an “audit.” Until the Music Modernization Act, the statutory license did not permit songwriters to audit users of the statutory license. The Harry Fox Agency “standard” license for physical records had two principal features that differed from the straight statutory license: quarterly accounting and an audit right. When streaming became popular, the services both refused to comply with the statutory regulations and also refused to allow anyone to audit because the statutory regulations they failed to comply with did not permit an audit. I brought this absurdity to the attention of the Copyright Office in 2011.
After much hoopla, the lobbyists wrote an audit right for copyright owners into the Music Modernization Act. However, rather than permitting copyright owners to audit music users as is long standing common practice on the record side, the lobbyists decided to allow copyright owners to audit theMechanical Licensing Collective. This is consistent with the desire of services to distance themselves from those pesky songwriters by inserting the MLC in between the services and their ultimate vendors, the songwriters and copyright owners. The services can be audited by the MLC (whose salaries are paid by the services), but that hasn’t happened yet to my knowledge.
But the MLC has received what I believe is its first audit notice that was just published by the Copyright Office after receiving it on November 9. First up is Bridgeport Music, Inc. for the period January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2023. January 1, 2021 was the “license availability date” or the date that the MLC began accounting for royalties under the MMA’s blanket license.
Bridgeport’s audit is wise. There are no doubt millions if not billions of streams to be verified. The MLC’s systems are largely untested, compared to other music users such as record companies that have been audited hundreds, if not thousands of times depending on how long they are operating. Competent royalty examiners will look under the hood and find out whether it’s even possible to render reasonably accurate accounting statements given the MLC’s systems. Maybe it’s all fine, but maybe it’s not. The wisdom of Bridgeport’s two year audit window is that two years is long enough to have a chance at a recovery but it’s not so long that you are drowned in data and susceptible to taking shortcuts.
In other words, why wait around?
Auditing the Black Box
A big difference between the audit rules the lobbyists wrote into the MMA and other audits is that the MLC audit is based on payments, not statements. The relevant language in the statute makes this very clear:
A copyright owner entitled to receive payments of royalties for covered activities from the mechanical licensing collective may, individually or with other copyright owners, conduct an audit of the mechanical licensing collective to verify the accuracy of royalty payments by the mechanical licensing collective to such copyright owner…The qualified auditor shall determine the accuracy of royalty payments, including whether an underpayment or overpayment of royalties was made by the mechanical licensing collective to each auditing copyright owner.
Royalty payments would include a share of black box royalties distributed to copyright owners. It seems reasonable that on audit a copyright owner could verify how this share was arrived at and whatever calculations would be necessary to calculate those payments, or maybe the absence of such payments that should have been made. Determining what is not paid that should have been paid is an important part of any royalty verification examination.
Systems Transparency
Information too confidential to be detected cannot be corrected. It is important to remember that copyright owner audits of the MLC will be the first time an independent third party has had a look at the accounting systems and functional technology of The MLC. If those audits reveal functional defects in the MLC’s systems or technology that affects any output of The MLC, i.e., not just the royalties being audited, it seems to me that those defects should be disclosed to the public. Audit settlements should not be used as hush money payments to keep embarrassing revelations from being publicly disclosed.
Unsurprisingly, The MLC lobbied to have broadly confidential treatment of all audits. Realize that there may well be confidential financial information disclosed as part of any audit that both copyright owners and The MLC will want to keep secret. There is no reason to keep secrets about The MLC’s systems. To take an extreme example, if on audit the auditors discovered that The MLC’s systems added 2 plus 2 and got 5, that is a fact that others have a legitimate interest in having disclosed to include the Copyright Office itself that is about to launch a 5 year review of The MLC for redesignation. Indeed, auditors may discover systemic flaws that could arguably require The MLC to recalculate many if not all statements or at least explain why they should not. (Note that a royalty auditor is required to deliver a copy of the auditor’s final report to The MLC for review even before giving it to their client. This puts The MLC on notice of any systemic flaws in The MLC’s systems found by the auditor and gives it the opportunity to correct any factual errors.)
I think that systemic flaws found by an auditor should be disclosed publicly after taking care to redact any confidential financial information. This will allow both the Copyright Office and MLC members to fix any discovered flaws.
The “Qualified Auditor” Typo
It is important to realize that there is no good reason why a C.P.A. must conduct the audit; this is another drafting glitch in the MMA that requires both The MLC’s audited financial statements and royalty compliance examinations be conducted by a C.P.A, defined as a “Qualified Auditor” (17 USC § 115(e)(25)). It’s easy to understand why audited financials prepared according to GAAP should be opined by a C.P.A. but it is ludicrous that a C.P.A. should be required to conduct a royalty exam for royalties that have nothing to do with GAAP and never have.
As Warner Music Group’s Ron Wilcox testified to the CRJs, “Because royalty audits require extensive technical and industry-specific expertise, in WMG’s experience a CPA certification is not generally a requirement for conducting such audits. To my knowledge, some of the. most experienced and knowledgeable royalty auditors in the music industry are not CPAs.”
The “Qualified Auditor” defined term should be limited to the MLC’s financials and removed from the audit clauses.
@VVBrown Articulates the Need for a Complete Reset of Streaming
Finally, I asked singer-songwriter VV Brown about the impact of streaming:
"It's impacted my income massively, we aren't making the money we should, I don't see my music as a way for me to survive – put food on the table. We have to change this; we need a complete reset." (5/5) pic.twitter.com/dbXC59p2IE
Harsh? Not really, at least not from a share price point of view. Spotify’s all time highest share price was during the COVID pandemic.
Spotify CEO Daniel Ek and the press tells us that Spotify is cutting 1,500 jobs which works out to about 17% of Spotify employees. Which works out to a pre-layoff workforce of 8,823. So let’s start there—that workforce number seems very high and is completely out of line with some recent data from Statista which is usually reliable.
If Statista is correct, Spotify employed 5,584 as of last year. Yet somehow Spotify’s 2023 workforce grew to 9200 according to the Guardian, fully 2/3 over that 2022 level without a commensurate and offsetting growth in revenue. That’s a governance question in and of itself.
Why the layoffs? The Guardian reports that Spotify CEO Daniel Ek is concerned about costs. He says “Despite our efforts to reduce costs this past year, our cost structure for where we need to be is too big.” Maybe I missed it, but the only time I can recall Daniel Ek being vocally concerned about Spotify’s operating costs was when it came to paying royalties. Then it was full-blown poor mouthing while signing leases for very expensive office space in 4 World Trade Center as well as other pricy real estate, executive compensation and podcasters like Harry & Meghan.
Over the last two years, we’ve put significant emphasis on building Spotify into a truly great and sustainable business – one designed to achieve our goal of being the world’s leading audio company and one that will consistently drive profitability and growth into the future. While we’ve made worthy strides, as I’ve shared many times, we still have work to do. Economic growth has slowed dramatically and capital has become more expensive. Spotify is not an exception to these realities.
Which “economic growth” is that?
But, he is definitely right about capital costs.
Still, Spotify’s job cuts are not necessarily that surprising considering the macro economy, most specifically rents and interest rates. As recently as 2018, Spotify was the second largest tenant at 4 WTC. Considering the sheer size of Spotify’s New York office space, it’s not surprising that Spotify is now sublettingfive floors of 4 WTC earlier this year. That’s right, the company had a spare five floors. Can that excess just be more people working at home given Mr. Ek’s decision to expand Spotify’s workforce? But why does Spotify need to be a major tenant in World Trade Center in the first place? Renting the big New York office space is the corporate equivalent of playing house. That’s an expensive game of pretend.
Remember that Spotify is one of the many companies that rose to dominance during the era of easy money in response to the financial crisis that was the hallmark of quantitative easing and the Federal Reserve’s Zero Interest Rate Policy beginning around 2008. Spotify’s bankers were able to fuel Daniel Ek’s desire to IPO and cash out in the public markets by enabling Spotify to run at a loss because money was cheap and the stock market had a higher tolerance for risky investments. When you get a negative interest rate for saving money, Spotify stock doesn’t seem like a totally insane investment by comparison. This may have contributed to two stock buy-back programs of $1 billion each, Spotify’s deal with Barcelona FC and other notorious excesses.
As a great man said, don’t confuse leverage for genius. It was only a matter of time until the harsh new world of quantitative tightening and sharply higher inflation came back to bite. For many years, Spotify told Wall Street a growth story which deflected attention away from the company’s loss making operations. A growth story pumps up the stock price until the chickens start coming home to roost. (Growth is also the reason to put off exercising pricing power over subscriptions.) Investors bought into the growth story in the absence of alternatives, not just for Spotify but for the market in general (compare Russell Growth and Value indexes from 2008-2023). Cutting costs and seeking profit is an example of what public company CEOs might do in anticipation of a rotational shift from growth to value investing that could hit their shares.
Never forget that due to Daniel Ek’s super-voting stock (itself an ESG fail), he is in control of Spotify. So there’s nowhere to hide when the iconography turns to blame. It’s not that easy or cheap to fire him, but if the board really wanted to give him the heave, they could do it.
I expect that Ek’s newly found parsimony will be even more front and center in renegotiations of Spotify’s royalty deals since he’s always blamed the labels for why Spotify can’t turn a profit. Not that WTC lease, surely. This would be a lot more tolerable from someone you thought was actually making an effort to cut all costs not just your revenue. Maybe that will happen, but even if Spotify became a lean mean machine, it will take years to recover from the 1999 levels of stupid that preceded it.
Hellooo Apple. One big thinker in music business issues calls it “Spotify drunk” which describes the tendency of record company marketers to focus entirely on Spotify and essentially ignore Apple Music as a distribution partner. If you’re in that group drinking the Spotify Kool Aid, you may want to give Apple another look. One thing that is almost certain is that that Apple will still be around in five years.
Just sayin.
Mechanicals on Physical and Downloads Get COLA Increase; Nothing for Streaming
Recall that the “Phonorecords IV” minimum mechanical royalties paid by record companies on physical and downloads increased from 9.1¢ to 12¢ with an annual cost of living adjustment each year of the PR IV rate period. The first increase was calculated by the Copyright Royalty Judges and was announced this week. That increase was from 12¢ to 12.40¢ and is automatic effective January 1, 2024.
Note that there is no COLA increase for streaming for reasons I personally do not understand. There really is no justification for not applying a COLA to a government mandated rate that blocks renegotiation to cover inflation expectations. After all, it works for Edmund Phelps.
The Federal Trade Commission on Copyright and AI
The FTC’s comment in the Copyright Office AI inquiry shows an interesting insight to the Commission’s thinking on some of the same copyright issues that bother us about AI, especially AI training. Despite Elon Musk’s refreshing candor of the obvious truth about AI training on copyrights, the usual suspects in the Copyleft (Pam Samuelson, Sy Damle, etc.) seem to have a hard time acknowledging the unfair competition aspects of AI and AI training (at p. 5):
Conduct that may violate the copyright laws––such as training an AI tool on protected expression without the creator’s consent or selling output generated from such an AI tool, including by mimicking the creator’s writing style, vocal or instrumental performance, or likeness—may also constitute an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive practice, especially when the copyright violation deceives consumers, exploits a creator’s reputation or diminishes the value of her existing or future works, reveals private information, or otherwise causes substantial injury to consumers. In addition, conduct that may be consistent with the copyright laws nevertheless may violate Section 5.
We’ve seen unfair competition claims pleaded in the AI cases–maybe we should be thinking about trying to engage the FTC in prosecutions.
The UK Government “Took the Bait”: Eric Schmidt Says the Quiet Part Out Loudon Biden AI Executive Order and Global Governance
There are a lot of moves being made in the US, UK and Europe right now that will affect copyright policy for at least a generation. Google’s past chair Eric Schmidt has been working behind the scenes for the last two years at least to establish US artificial intelligence policy. Those efforts produced the “Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence“, the longest executive order in history. That EO was signed into effect by President Biden on October 30, so it’s done. (It is very unlikely that that EO was drafted entirely at Executive Branch agencies.)
You may ask, how exactly did this sweeping Executive Order come to pass? Who was behind it, because someone always is. As you will see in his own words, Eric Schmidt, Google and unnamed senior engineers from the existing AI platforms are quickly making the rule and essentially drafted the Executive Order that President Biden signed into law on October 30. And which was presented as what Mr. Schmidt calls “bait” to the UK government–which convened a global AI safety conference convened by His Excellency Rishi Sunak (the UK’s tech bro Prime Minister) that just happened to start on November 1, the day after President Biden signed the EO, at Bletchley Park in the UK (see Alan Turing). (See “Excited schoolboy Sunak gushes as mentor Musk warns of humanoid robot catastrophe.”)
Remember, an executive order is an administrative directive from the President of the United States that addresses the operations of the federal government, particularly the vast Executive Branch. In that sense, Executive Orders are anti-majoritarian and are as close to at least a royal decree or Executive Branch legislation as we get in the United States (see Separation of Powers, Federalist 47 and Montesquieu). Executive orders are not legislation; they require no approval from Congress, and Congress cannot simply overturn them.
So you can see if the special interests wanted to slide something by the people that was difficult to undo or difficult to pass in the People’s House…and based on Eric Schmidt’s recent interview with Mike Allen at the Axios AI+ (available here), this appears to be exactly what happened with the sweeping and vastly concerning AI Executive Order. I strongly recommend that you watch Mike Allen’s “interview” with Mr. Schmidt which fortunately is the first conversation in the rather long video of the entire event. I put “interview” in scare quotes because whatever it is, it isn’t the kind of interview that prompts probing questions that might put Mr. Schmidt on the spot. That’s understandable because Axios is selling a conference and you simply won’t get senior corporate executives to attend if you put them on the spot. Not a criticism, but understand that you have to find value for your time. Mr. Schmidt’s ego provides plenty of value; it just doesn’t come from the journalists.
Crucially, Congress is not involved in issuing an executive order. Congress may refuse to fund the subject of the EO which could make it difficult to give it effect as a practical matter but Congress cannot overturn an EO. Only a sitting U.S. President may overturn an existing executive order. In Mr. Schmidt’s interview at AI+, he tells us how all this regulatory activity happened:
The tech peoplealong with myself have been meeting for about a year. The narrative goes something like this: We are moving well past regulatory or government understanding of what is possible, we accept that. [Remember the antecedent of “we” means Schmidt and “the tech people,” or more broadly the special interests, not you, me or the American people.].
Strangely…this is the first time that the senior leaders who are engineers have basically said that they want regulation, but we want it in the following ways…which as you know never works in Washington [unless you can write an Executive Order and get the President to sign it because you are the biggest corporation in commercial history].
There is a complete agreement that there are systems and scenarios that are dangerous. [Agreement by or with whom? No one asks.]. And in all of the big [AI platforms with which] you are familiar like GPT…all of them have groups that look at the guard rails [presumably internal groups of managers] and they put constraints on [their AI platform in their silo]. They say “thou shalt not talk about death, thou shall not talk about killing”. [Anthropic, which received a $300 million investment from Google] actually trained the model with its own constitution [see “Claude’s Constitution“] which they did not just write themselves, they hired a bunch of people [actually Claude’s Constitution was crowd sourced] to design a “constitution” for an AI, so it’s an interesting idea.
The problem is none of us believe this is strong enough….Our opinion at the moment is that the best path is to build some IPCC-like environment globally that allows accurate information of what is going on to the policy makers. [This is a step toward global governance for AI (and probably the Internet) through the United Nations. IPCC is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.]
So far we are on a win, the taste of winning is there. If you look at the UK event which I was part of, the UK government took the bait, took the ideas, decided to lead, they’re very good at this, and they came out with very sensible guidelines. Because the US and UK have worked really well together—there’s a group within the National Security Council here that is particularly good at this, and they got it right, and that produced this EO which is I think is the longest EO in history, that says all aspects of our government are to be organized around this.
While Mr. Schmidt may say, aw shucks dictating the rules to the government never works in Washington, but of course that’s simply not true if you’re Google. In which case it’s always true and that’s how Mr. Schmidt got his EO and will now export it to other countries.
It’s not Just Google: Microsoft Is Getting into the Act on AI and Copyright
Google and New Mountain Capital Buy BMI: Now what?
Careful observers of the BMI sale were not led astray by BMI’s Thanksgiving week press release that was dutifully written up as news by most of the usual suspects except for the fabulous Music Business Worldwide and…ahem…us. You may think we’re making too much out of the Google investment through it’s CapitalG side fund, but judging by how much BMI tried to hide the investment, I’d say that Google’s post-sale involvement probably varies inversely to the buried lede. Not to mention the culture clash over ageism so common at Google–if you’re a BMI employee who is over 30 and didn’t go to Carnegie Mellon, good luck.
After Uruguay was the first Latin American country to pass streaming remuneration laws to protect artists, Spotify threw its toys out of the pram and threatened to go home. Can we get that in writing? A Spotify exit would probably be the best thing that ever happened to increase local competition in a Spanish language country. Also, this legislation has been characterized as “equitable remuneration” which it really isn’t. It’s its own thing, see the paper I wrote for WIPO with economist Claudio Feijoo. Complete Music Update’s Chris Cook suggested that a likely result of Spotify paying the royalty would be that they would simply do a cram down with the labels on the next round of license negotiations. If that’s not prohibited in the statute, it should be, and it’s really not “paying twice for the same music” anyway. The streaming remuneration is compensation for the streamers use of and profit from the artists’ brand (both featured and nonfeatured), e.g., as stated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and many other human rights documents:
The Covenant recognizes everyone’s right — as a human right–to the protection and the benefits from the protection of the moral and material interests derived from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author. This human right itself derives from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons.
BMI recently sold to New Mountain Capital and Google’s CapitalG side fund. If you review CapitalG’s website, you’ll see that the fund announces that providing Google employees to advise portfolio companies are a big part of its management style. That’s fine when the cultures of Google and the investment are compatible. But a quick review of CapitalG’s portfolio companies should tell you that the culture of BMI just ain’t quite the same as Airbnb, Fanduel or Lyft. Let’s start with the obvious one–age.
According to Business Insider, the average age of Google employees is 30. I don’t have any specific data about the average age of BMI employees, but I’d be willing to place a fairly sizable bet that it’s over 30. So when CapitalG sends a consulting team of Googlers over to BMI to help them do their jobs better, or do their jobs the Google way, the Googlers (or more likely YouTubers) will probably have to get past the initial reaction of why do you have a job?
While age is a significant issue in Silicon Valley hiring practices, salary is, too. In a stock-option environment (which probably does not exist at BMI except for the very senior management perhaps), salaries are often not as high as music industry. So the Google consultant who is dictating the new rules may well make significantly less than the BMI person they are managing. All the while wondering why AI can’t do the job and do it “better.”
Not to be cynical, but that ageist culture clash is so predictable and incurably actuarial that I would expect to see many, many early retirement offers on the table. Googlers don’t understand the concept of writer relations, they think we make too much money, have too many assistants and aren’t properly motivated.
You don’t have to look very hard for empirical evidence on Silicon Valley’s culture:
“Mark Zuckerberg said that “young people are just smarter.” In recent years, older employees have faced layoffs, or not been hired by tech companies in the first place. Older startup founders have been refused venture capital funding because they’re “not 25 years old having just left Facebook as a product manager.”
If I’m correct about that culture clash, this could be a great opportunity to take early retirement or for highly skilled employees to start something new before Google does the same thing to The MLC.
Fraudsters are using AI-enabled voice cloning to defraud & extort Americans.
Today @FTC launched a voice cloning challenge to spur ideas for how to prevent and detect voice cloning misuse. Submissions accepted from Jan. 2-12, with $25k for the winner. https://t.co/nJYmPmDMLS
Congress is considering whether to renew The MLC, Inc.‘s designation as the mechanical licensing collective. If that sentence seems contradictory, remember those are two different things: the mechanical licensing collective is the statutory body that administers the compulsory license under Section 115. The MLC, Inc. is the private company that was “designated” by Congress through its Copyright Office to do the work of the mechanical licensing collective. This is like the form of a body that performs a function (the mechanical licensing collective) and having to animate that form with actual humans (The MLC, Inc.), kind of like Plato’s allegory of the cave, shadows on the wall being what they are.
Congress reviews the work product of The MLC, Inc. every five years (17 USC §115(d)(3)(B)(ii)) to decide if The MLC, Inc. should be allowed to continue another five years. In its recent guidance to The MLC, Inc. about artificial intelligence, the Copyright Office correctly took pains to make that distinction in a footnote (footnote 2 to be precise. Remember–always read the footnotes, it’s often where the action is.). This is why it is important that we be clear that The MLC, Inc. does not “own” the data it collects (and that HFA as its vendor doesn’t own it either, a point I raised to Spotify’s lobbyist several years ago). Although it may be a blessing if Congress fired The MLC, Inc. and the new collective had to start from scratch.
But Congress likely would only re-up The MLC, Inc. if it had already decided to extend the statutory license and all its cumbersome and byzantine procedures, proceedings and prohibitions on the freedom of songwriters to collectively bargain. Not to mention an extraordinarily huge thumbs down on the scales in favor of the music user and against the interest of the songwriters. The compulsory license is so labyrinthine and Kafka-esque it is actually an insult to Byzantium, but that’s another story.
Rather than just deciding about who is going to get the job of administering the revenues for every songwriter in the world, maybe there should be a vote. Particularly because songwriters cannot be members of the mechanical licensing collective as currently operated. Congress did not ask songwriters what they thought when the whole mechanical licensing scheme was established, so how about now?
Before the Congress decides to continue The MLC, Inc. many believe strongly that the body should reconsider the compulsory license itself. It is the compulsory license that is the real issue that plagues songwriters and blocks a free market. The compulsory license really has passed its sell by date and it’s pretty easy to understand why its gone so sour. Eliminating the Section 115 license will have many implications and we should tread carefully, but purposefully.
Party Like it’s 1909
First of all, consider the actual history of the compulsory license. It’s over 100 years old, and it was established at a time, believe it or not, when the goal of Congress was to even the playing field between, music users and copyright owners. They were worried about music users being hard done by because of the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters and copyright owners. As the late Register Marybeth Peters told Congress, when Congress created the exclusive right to control reproduction and distribution in 1909, “…due to concerns about potential monopolistic behavior [by the copyright owners], Congress also created a compulsory license to allow anyone to make and distribute a mechanical reproduction of a nondramatic musical work without the consent of the copyright owner provided that the person adhered to the provisions of the license, most notably paying a statutorily established royalty to the copyright owner.”
Well, that ship has sailed, don’t you think?
This is kind of incredible when you think about it today because the biggest users of the compulsory license are those who torture the bejesus out of songwriters by conducting lawfare at the Copyright Royalty Board–the richest corporations in commercial history that dominate practically every moment of American life. In fact, the statutory license was hardly used at all before these fictional persons arrived on the scene and have been on a decades-long crusade to hack the Copyright Act through lawfare ever since. This is particularly true since about 2007 when Big Tech discovered Section 115. (And they’re about to do it again with AI–first they send the missionaries.)
If the purpose of the statutory scheme was to create a win-win situation that floats all boats, you would have expected to see songwriters profiting like never before, right? If the compulsory was so great, what we really needed was for everyone to use Section 115, right? Actually, the opposite has happened, even with decades of price fixing at 2¢ by the federal government. When hardly anyone used the compulsory license, songwriters prospered. When its use became widespread, songwriters suffered, and suffered badly.
Songwriters have been relegated to the bottom of the pile in compensation, a sure sign of no leverage because whatever leverage songwriters may have is taken–there’s that word again–by the compulsory license. I don’t think Google, a revanchist Microsoft, Apple, Amazon or Spotify need any protection from the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters. Google, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Spotify are only worried about “monopolistic behavior” when one of them does it to one of the others. The Five Families would tell you its nothing personal, it’s just business.
Yet these corporate neo-colonialists would have you believe that the first thing that happens when the writing room door closes is that songwriters collude against them. (Sounding very much like the Radio Music Licensing Committee–so similar it makes you wonder, speaking of collusion.)
The Five Year Plan
Merck Mercuriadis makes the good point that there is no time like the present to evolve: “In the United States, we have a position of stability for the next five years – at the highest rates paid to songwriters to date – in the evolution of the streaming economy. We are now working towards improving the songwriters’ share of the streaming revenue ‘pie’ yet further and, eventually, getting to a free market.” The clock is ticking on the next five years, a reference to the rate period set by the Copyright Royalty Board in the Phonorecords IV proceeding. (And that five years is a different clock than the five years clock on the MLC which is itself an example of the unnecessary confusion in the compulsory license.)
What would happen if the compulsory license vanished? Very likely the industry would continue its easily documented history of voluntary catalog licenses. The evidence is readily apparent for how the industry and music users handled services that did not qualify for a compulsory license like YouTube or TikTok. However stupid the deals were doesn’t change the fact that they happened in the absence of a compulsory license. That Invisible Hand thing, dunno could be good. Seems to work out fine for other people.
Let’s also understand that there is a cottage industry complete with very nice offices, pensions and rich salaries that has grown up around the compulsory license (or consent decrees for that matter). A cottage industry where collecting the songwriters’ money results in dozens of jobs paying more in a year than probably 95% of songwriters will make, maybe ever. (The Trichordist published an excerpt from a recent MLC tax return showing the highest compensated MLC employees.) Generations of lawyers and lobbyists have put generations of children through college and law school from legal fees charged in the pursuit of something that has never existed in the contemporary music business–a willing buyer and a willing seller. Those people will not want to abandon the very government policy that puts food on their tables, but both sides are very, very good at manufacturing excuses why the compulsory license really must be continued to further humanity.
The even sadder reality is that as much as we would like to simply terminate the compulsory license, there is a certain legitimacy to being clear-eyed about a transition. (An example is the proposals for transitioning from PRO consent decrees–ASCAP’s consent decree has been around a long time, too.) There would likely need to be a certain grandfathering in of services that were pre or post the elimination of the compulsory, but that’s easily done, albeit not without a last hurrah of legal fees and lobbyist invoices. Register Pallante noted in the well-received 2015 Copyright Office study (Copyright and the Music Marketplace at 5) “The Office thus believes that, rather than eliminating section 115 altogether, section 115 should instead become the basis of a more flexible collective licensing system that will presumptively cover all mechanical uses except to the extent individual music publishers choose to opt out.” An opt out is another acceptable stop along the way to liberation, or even perhaps a destination itself. David Lowery had a very well thought-out idea along these lines in the pre-MLC era that should be revisited.
X Day
However, while there is a certain attractiveness to having a plan that the dreaded “stakeholders” and their legions of lobbyists and lawyers agree with, it is crucially important for Congress to fix a date certain by which the compulsory license will expire. Rain or shine, plan or no plan, it goes away on the X Day, say five years from now as Merck suggests. So wakey, wakey.
That transparency drives a wedge into the process because otherwise millions will be spent in fees for profiting from moral hazard and surely the praetorians protecting the cottage industry wouldn’t want that. If you doubt that asking for a plan before establishing X Day would fail as a plan, just look at the Copyright Royalty Board and in particular the Phonorecords III remand. Years and years, multiple court rulings, and the rates still are not in effect. Perseveration is not perseverance, it’s compulsive repetition when you know the same unacceptable result will occur.
But don’t let people tell you that the sky will fall if Congress liberates songwriters from the government mandate. The sky will not fall and songwriters will have a generational opportunity to organize a collective bargaining unit with the right to say no to a deal.
The closest that Congress has come to a meaningful “vote” in the songwriting world is inviting public comments through interventions, rule makings, roundtables and the like–information gathering that is not controlled by the lobbyists. Indeed, it was this very process at the Copyright Royalty Board that resulted in many articulate comments by songwriters and publishers themselves that were clearly quite at odds with what the CRB was being fed by the lobbyists and lawyers. So much so that the Copyright Royalty Judges rejected not only the “Subpart B” settlement reached by the insiders but the very premise of that settlement. Imagine what might happen if the issue of the compulsory license itself was placed upon the table?
Now that songwriters have had a taste of how The MLC, Inc. has been handling their money, maybe this would be a good time to ask them what they think about how things are going. And whether they want to be liberated from the entire sinking ship that is designed to help Big Tech. And you can start by asking how they feel about the $500 million in black box money that is still sitting in the bank account of The MLC, Inc. and has not been paid–with an infuriating lack of transparency. Yet is being “invested” by The MLC, Inc. with less transparency than many banks with smaller net assets.
This “investment” is another result of the compulsory license which has no transparency requirements for such “investments” of other peoples’ money, perhaps “invested” in the very Big Tech companies that fund the The MLC, Inc. That wasn’t a question that was on the minds of Congress in 1909 but it should be today.
Attention Must Be Paid
Let’s face facts. The compulsory license has coexisted in the decimation of songwriting as a profession. That destruction has increased at an increasing rate roughly coincident with the time the Big Tech discovered Section 115 and sent their legions of lawyers to the Copyright Royalty Board to grind down publishers, and very successfully. That success is in large part due to the very mismatch that the compulsory license was designed to prevent back in 1909 except stood on its head waiting for loophole seekers to notice the potential arbitrage opportunity.
The Phonorecords III and IV proceedings at the Copyright Royalty Board tell Congress all they need to know about how the game is played today and how it has changed since 1909, or the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act for that matter. The compulsory license is no longer fit for purpose and songwriters should have a say in whether it is to be continued or abandoned.
We see the Writers Guild striking and SAG-AFTRA taking a strike authorization vote. When was the last time any songwriters voted on their compensation? Maybe never? Voting, hmm. There’s a concept. Now where have I heard that before?
New body to look at musician remuneration – example of how cross party Select Committee working @CommonsCMS and effective campaigning @WeAreTheMU @MrTomGray can achieve progress – the industry must engage positively https://t.co/zDERe5ehoB
Music Tech Solutions 