If the tech industry has a signature fallacy for the 2020s aside from David Sacks, it belongs to Jensen Huang. The CEO of Nvidia has perfected a circular, self-consuming logic so brazen that it deserves a name: The Paradox of Huang’s Rope. It is the argument that China is too dangerous an AI adversary for the United States to regulate artificial intelligence—while insisting in the very next breath that the U.S. must keep selling China the chips that make China’s AI capabilities possible. The justification destroys its own premise, like handing an adversary the rope to hang you and then pointing to the length of that rope as evidence that you must keep selling more, perhaps to ensure a more “humane” hanging. I didn’t think it was possible to beat “sharing is caring” for utter bollocks.
The Paradox of Huang’s Rope works like this: First, hype China as an existential AI competitor. Second, declare that any regulatory guardrails—whether they concern training data, safety, export controls, or energy consumption—will cause America to “fall behind.” Third, invoke national security to insist that the U.S. government must not interfere with the breakneck deployment of AI systems across the economy. And finally, quietly lobby for carveouts that allow Nvidia to continue selling ever more powerful chips to the same Chinese entities supposedly creating the danger that justifies deregulation.
It is a masterpiece of circularity: “China is dangerous because of AI → therefore we can’t regulate AI → therefore we must sell China more AI chips → therefore China is even more dangerous → therefore we must regulate even less.” At no point does the loop allow for the possibility that reducing the United States’ role as China’s primary AI hardware supplier might actually reduce the underlying threat. Instead, the logic insists that the only unacceptable risk is the prospect of Nvidia making slightly less money.
This is not hypothetical. While Washington debates export controls, Huang has publicly argued that restrictions on chip sales to China could “damage American technology leadership”—a claim that conflates Nvidia’s quarterly earnings with the national interest. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence assessments warn that China is building fully autonomous weapons systems, and European analysts caution that Western-supplied chips are appearing in PLA research laboratories. Yet the policy prescription from Nvidia’s corner remains the same: no constraints on the technology, no accountability for the supply chain, and no acknowledgment that the market incentives involved have nothing to do with keeping Americans safe.
The Paradox of Huang’s Rope mirrors other Cold War–style fallacies, in which companies invoke a foreign threat to justify deregulation while quietly accelerating that threat through their own commercial activity. But in the AI context, the stakes are higher. AI is not just another consumer technology; its deployment shapes military posture, labor markets, information ecosystems, and national infrastructure. A strategic environment in which U.S. corporations both enable and monetize an adversary’s technological capabilities is one that demands more regulation, not less.
Naming the fallacy matters because it exposes the intellectual sleight of hand. Once the circularity is visible, the argument collapses. The United States does not strengthen its position by feeding the very capabilities it claims to fear. And it certainly does not safeguard national security by allowing one company’s commercial ambitions to dictate the boundaries of public policy. The Paradox of Huang’s Rope should not guide American AI strategy. It should serve as a warning of how quickly national priorities can be twisted into a justification for private profit.
Month: December 2025
You Can’t Prosecute Smuggling NVIDIA chips to CCP and Authorize Sales to CCP at the Same Time
The Trump administration is attempting an impossible contradiction: selling advanced NVIDIA AI chips to China while the Department of Justice prosecutes criminal cases for smuggling the exact same chips into China.
“Operation Gatekeeper has exposed a sophisticated smuggling network that threatens our Nation’s security by funneling cutting-edge AI technology to those who would use it against American interests,” said Ganjei. “These chips are the building blocks of AI superiority and are integral to modern military applications. The country that controls these chips will control AI technology; the country that controls AI technology will control the future. The Southern District of Texas will aggressively prosecute anyone who attempts to compromise America’s technological edge.”
That divergence from the prosecutors is not industrial policy. That is incoherence. But mostly it’s just bad advice, likely coming from White House AI Czar David Sacks, Mr. Trump’s South African AI policy advisor who may have a hard time getting a security clearance in the first place..
On one hand, DOJ is rightly bringing cases over the illegal diversion of restricted AI chips—recognizing that these processors are strategic technologies with direct national-security implications. On the other hand, the White House is signaling that access to those same chips is negotiable, subject to licensing workarounds, regulatory carve-outs, or political discretion.
You cannot treat a technology as contraband in federal court and as a commercial export in the West Wing.
Pick one.
AI Chips Are Not Consumer Electronics
The United States does not sell China F-35 fighter jets. We do not sell Patriot missile systems. We do not sell advanced avionics platforms and then act surprised when they show up embedded in military infrastructure. High-end AI accelerators are in the same category.
NVIDIA’s most advanced chips are not merely commercial products. They are general-purpose intelligence infrastructure or what China calls military-civil fusion. They train surveillance systems, military logistics platforms, cyber-offensive tools, and models capable of operating autonomous weapons and battlefield decision-making pipelines with no human in the loop.
If DOJ treats the smuggling of these chips into China as a serious federal crime—and it should—there is no coherent justification for authorizing their sale through executive discretion. Except, of course, money, or in Mr. Sacks case, more money.
Fully Autonomous Weapons—and Selling the Rope
China does not need U.S. chips to build consumer AI. It wants them for military acceleration.Advanced NVIDIA AI chips are not just about chatbots or recommendation engines. They are the backbone of fully autonomous weapons systems—autonomous targeting, swarm coordination, battlefield logistics, and decision-support models that compress the kill chain beyond meaningful human control.
There is an old warning attributed to Vladimir Lenin—that capitalists would sell the rope by which they would later be hanged. Apocryphal or not, it captures this moment with uncomfortable precision.
If NVIDIA chips are powerful enough to underpin autonomous weapons systems for allied militaries, they are powerful enough to underpin autonomous weapons systems for adversaries like China. Trump’s own National Security Strategy statement clearly says previous U.S. elites made “mistaken” assumptions about China such as the famous one that letting China into the WTO would integrate Beijing into the famous rules-based international order. Trump tells us that instead China “got rich and powerful” and used this against us, and goes on to describe the CCP’s well known predatory subsidies, unfair trade, IP theft, industrial espionage, supply-chain leverage, and fentanyl precursor exports as threats the U.S. must “end.” By selling them the most advanced AI chips?
Western governments and investors simultaneously back domestic autonomous-weapons firms—such as Europe-based Helsing, supported by Spotify CEO Daniel Ek—explicitly building AI-enabled munitions for allied defense. That makes exporting equivalent enabling infrastructure to a strategic competitor indefensible.
The AI Moratorium Makes This Worse, Not Better
This contradiction unfolds alongside a proposed federal AI moratorium executive order originating with Mr. Sacks and Adam Thierer of Google’s R Street Institute that would preempt state-level AI protections.
States are told AI is too consequential for local regulation, yet the federal government is prepared to license exports of AI’s core infrastructure abroad.
If AI is too dangerous for states to regulate, it is too dangerous to export. Preemption at home combined with permissiveness abroad is not leadership. It is capture.
This Is What Policy Capture Looks Like
The common thread is not national security. It is Silicon Valley access. David Sacks and others in the AI–VC orbit argue that AI regulation threatens U.S. competitiveness while remaining silent on where the chips go and how they are used.
When DOJ prosecutes smugglers while the White House authorizes exports, the public is entitled to ask whose interests are actually being served. Advisory roles that blur public power and private investment cannot coexist with credible national-security policymaking particularly when the advisor may not even be able to get a US national security clearance unless the President blesses it.
A Line Has to Be Drawn
If a technology is so sensitive that its unauthorized transfer justifies prosecution, its authorized transfer should be prohibited absent extraordinary national interest. AI accelerators meet that test.
Until the administration can articulate a coherent justification for exporting these capabilities to China, the answer should be no. Not licensed. Not delayed. Not cosmetically restricted.
And if that position conflicts with Silicon Valley advisers who view this as a growth opportunity, they should return to where they belong. The fact that the US is getting 25% of the deal (which i bet never finds its way into America’s general account), means nothing except confirming Lenin’s joke about selling the rope to hang ourselves, you know, kind of like TikTok.
David Sacks should go back to Silicon Valley.
This is not venture capital. This is our national security and he’s selling it like rope.
Back to Commandeering Again: David Sacks, the AI Moratorium, and the Executive Order Courts Will Hate
Why Silicon Valley’s in-network defenses can’t paper over federalism limits.
The old line attributed to music lawyer Allen Grubman is, “No conflict, no interest.” Conflicts are part of the music business. But the AI moratorium that David Sacks is pushing onto President Trump (the idea that Washington should freeze or preempt state AI protections in the absence of federal AI policy) takes that logic to a different altitude. It asks the public to accept not just conflicts of interest, but centralized control of AI governance built around the financial interests of a small advisory circle, including Mr. Sacks himself.
When the New York Times published its reporting on Sacks’s hundreds of AI investments and his role in shaping federal AI and chip policy, the reaction from Silicon Valley was immediate and predictable. What’s most notable is who didn’t show up. No broad political coalition. No bipartisan defense. Just a tight cluster of VC and AI-industry figures from he AI crypto–tech nexus, praising their friend Mr. Sacks and attacking the story.
And the pattern was unmistakable: a series of non-denial denials from people who it is fair to say are massively conflicted themselves.
No one said the Times lied.
No one refuted the documented conflicts.
Instead, Sacks’ tech bros defenders attacked tone and implied bias, and suggested the article merely arranged “negative truths” in an unflattering narrative (although the Times did not even bring up Mr. Sacks’ moratorium scheme).
And you know who has yet to defend Mr. Sacks? Donald J. Trump. Which tells you all you need to know.
The Rumored AI Executive Order and Federal Lawsuits Against States
Behind the spectacle sits the most consequential part of the story: a rumored executive order that would direct the U.S. Department of Justice to sue states whose laws “interfere with AI development.” Reuters reports that “U.S. President Donald Trump is considering an executive order that would seek to preempt state laws on artificial intelligence through lawsuits and by withholding federal funding, according to a draft of the order seen by Reuters….”
That is not standard economic policy. That is not innovation strategy. That is commandeering — the same old unconstitutional move in shiny AI packaging that we’ve discussed many times starting with the One Big Beautiful Bill Act catastrophe.
The Supreme Court has been clear on this such as in Printz v. United States (521 U.S. 898 (1997) at 925): “[O]pinions of ours have made clear that the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement,by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”
Crucially, the Printz Court teaches us what I think is the key fact. Federal policy for all the United States is to be made by the legislative process in regular order subject to a vote of the people’s representatives, or by executive branch agencies that are led by Senate-confirmed officers of the United States appointed by the President and subject to public scrutiny under the Administrative Procedures Act. Period.
The federal government then implements its own policies directly. It cannot order states to implement federal policy, including in the negative by prohibiting states from exercising their Constitutional powers in the absence of federal policy. The Supreme Court crystalized this issue in a recent Congressional commandeering case of Murphy v. NCAA (138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)) where the court held “[t]he distinction between compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a State from enacting new laws is an empty one. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.” Read together, Printz and Murphy extend this core principle of federalism to executive orders.
The “presumption against preemption” is a canon of statutory interpretation that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held to be a foundational principle of American federalism. It also has the benefit of common sense. The canon reflects the deep Constitutional understanding that, unless Congress clearly says otherwise—which implies Congress has spoken—states retain their traditional police powers over matters such as the health, safety, land use, consumer protection, labor, and property rights of their citizens. Courts begin with the assumption that federal law does not displace state law, especially in areas the states have regulated for generations, all of which are implicated in the AI “moratorium”.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this principle. When Congress legislates in fields historically occupied by the states, courts require a clear and manifest purpose to preempt state authority. Ambiguous statutory language is interpreted against preemption. This is not a policy preference—it is a rule of interpretation rooted in constitutional structure and respect for state sovereignty that goes back to the Founders.
The presumption is strongest where federal action would displace general state laws rather than conflict with a specific federal command. Consumer protection statutes, zoning and land-use controls, tort law, data privacy, and child-safety laws fall squarely within this protected zone. Federal silence is not enough; nor is agency guidance or executive preference.
In practice, the presumption against preemption forces Congress to own the consequences of preemption. If lawmakers intend to strip states of enforcement authority, they must do so plainly and take political responsibility for that choice. This doctrine serves as a crucial brake on back-door federalization, preventing hidden preemption in technical provisions and preserving the ability of states to respond to emerging harms when federal action lags or stalls. Like in A.I.
Applied to an A.I. moratorium, the presumption against preemption cuts sharply against federal action. A moratorium that blocks states from legislating even where Congress has chosen not to act flips federalism on its head—turning federal inaction into total regulatory paralysis, precisely what the presumption against preemption forbids.
As the Congressional Research Service primer on preemption concludes:
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land” notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. This language is the foundation for the doctrine of federal preemption, according to which federal law supersedes conflicting state laws. The Supreme Court has identified two general ways in which federal law can preempt state law. First, federal law can expressly preempt state law when a federal statute or regulation contains explicit preemptive language. Second, federal law can impliedly preempt state law when Congress’s preemptive intent is implicit in the relevant federal law’s structure and purpose.
In both express and implied preemption cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that Congress’s purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” of its statutory analysis. In analyzing congressional purpose, the Court has at times applied a canon of statutory construction known as the “presumption against preemption,” which instructs that federal law should not be read as superseding states’ historic police powers “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
If there is no federal statute, no one has any idea what that purpose is, certainly no justiciabile idea. Therefore, my bet is that the Court would hold that the Executive Branch cannot unilaterally create preemption, and neither can the DOJ sue states simply because the White House dislikes their AI, privacy, or biometric laws, much less their zoning laws applied to data centers.
Why David Sacks’s Involvement Raises the Political Temperature
As Scott Fitzgerald famously wrote, the very rich are different. But here’s what’s not different—David Sacks has something he’s not used to having. A boss. And that boss has polls. And those polls are not great at the moment. It’s pretty simple, really. When you work for a politician, your job is to make sure his polls go up, not down.
David Sacks is making his boss look bad. Presidents do not relish waking up to front-page stories that suggest their “A.I. czar” holds hundreds of investments directly affected by federal A.I. strategy, that major policy proposals track industry wish lists more closely than public safeguards, or that rumored executive orders could ignite fifty-state constitutional litigation led by your supporters like Mike Davis and egged on by people like Steve Bannon.
Those stories don’t just land on the advisor; they land on the President’s desk, framed as questions of his judgment, control, and competence. And in politics, loyalty has a shelf life. The moment an advisor stops being an asset and starts becoming a daily distraction much less liability, the calculus changes fast. What matters then is not mansions, brilliance, ideology, or past service, but whether keeping that adviser costs more than cutting them loose. I give you Elon Musk.
AI Policy Cannot Be Built on Preemption-by-Advisor
At bottom, this is a bet. The question isn’t whether David Sacks is smart, well-connected, or persuasive inside the room. The real question is whether Donald Trump wants to stake his presidency on David Sacks being right—right about constitutional preemption, right about executive authority, right about federal power to block the states, and right about how courts will react.
Because if Sacks is wrong, the fallout doesn’t land on him. It lands on the President. A collapsed A.I. moratorium, fifty-state litigation, injunctions halting executive action, and judges citing basic federalism principles would all be framed as defeats for Trump, not for an advisor operating at arm’s length.
Betting the presidency on an untested legal theory pushed by a politically exposed “no conflict no interest” tech investor isn’t bold leadership. It’s unnecessary risk. When Trump’s second term is over in a few years, Trump will be in the history books for all time. No one will remember who David Sacks was.
2026 Mechanical Rate 13.1¢
The Copyright Royalty Judges have announced that the new COLA-adjusted minimum statutory rate for 2026 is 13.1¢ for physical and downloads, up from 12.7¢, effective 1/1/26. This is the last year of the Phonorecords IV rate period, so that’s an increase from the 9.1¢ frozen mechanical rate that had been in effect for 15 years.
The adjusted rate stands in stark contrast to the streaming mechanical which not only has been frozen for the entire 5 year rate period, but has actually declined substantially due to Spotify’s bundling silliness. That smooth move has set up what will no doubt be a donnybrook in Phonorecords V, i.e., the next rate proceeding which is due to start any minute now (actually more like January, which is close enough).
It must be said that the reason there’s a rate increase for physical/downloads is due to the efforts of independents who filed two rounds of comments in Phonorecords IV and also the willingness of the labels to be flexible and reasonable. I suspect that has a lot to do with the fact that at the end of the day, we are all in the same business and it’s to everyone’s advantage that songwriters thrive. Obviously, the same cannot be said of the streaming platforms like Spotify that are busy seeding AI tracks with both hands. I really don’t know what business those people think they are in, but it’s not the music business.
Music Tech Solutions 