TikTok CEO and Investor Lobbying President Trump as January 19 Divestment Deadline Approaches

President Trump is a man who understands leverage. The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act aka the TikTok sell or shut down bill gives to the president the decision over allowing TikTok to continue to operate in America. As a practical matter, the TikTok Act gives whoever is in the office of the President of the United States the power to allow TikTok to sell shares in an initial public offering on the US exchanges. Given that TikTok is losing challenges to the TikTok Act as fast as the company files lawsuits, TikTok’s failures in the Congress and the courts gives President Trump tremendous leverage over the TikTok IPO.

It just so happened that TikTok’s CEO was in town yesterday, and, according to The Hill, TikTok’s “CEO Shou Zi Chew met with President-elect Trump in Florida on Monday, becoming the latest tech leader to hold talks with the incoming president ahead of Inauguration Day.” I wonder what they had to talk about?

As this drama plays out, guess who else happened to be at Mar-a-lago on Monday? Why it was Masayoshi Son, the CEO of SoftBank. Masa and President Trump announced that SoftBank will be investing $100 billion in the US and Trump was holding Masa to increase the investment to $200 billion on national television. That’s quite a pile of cash, and presumably Trump felt he had the leverage to display his negotiating in public. Now what ever gave him that idea?

SoftBank started its Vision Fund a few years ago which targeted $100 billion in various investments. So Masa’s investment in America is about the same scale as the Vision Fund. What did the Vision Fund invest in? Uber and WeWork which you’re probably familiar with as well as Arm Holdings (semiconductors) and South Korea’s largest online retailer Coupang.

And there was one other notable Vision Fund investment–ByteDance which owns TikTok. And make no mistake, Masa and SoftBank will do just fine in their TikTok exit if TikTok is allowed to continue to exist in the US.

Well worth Masa’s trip to Florida with his protege Mr. Chew.

Just sayin.

@SenAnaliseOrtiz: StubHub is Blatantly Allowing Illegal Speculative Ticketing Sales

https://twitter.com/SenAnaliseOrtiz/status/1864000231894822995

As we discussed on the Artist Rights Symposium ticketing panel, it’s blatant, it’s pervasive, and it’s not just Arizona… No way StubHub should be allowed access to the public IPO markets until they clean up their act. Of course, if they clean up their act, they will have to recast their earnings…

It’s the Stock, Stupid:  Will the Centrifugal Force of the Public Market Nix the TikTok Divestment?

It’s a damn good thing we never let another MTV build a business on our backs.

In case you were wondering, the founder of TikTok’s parent corporation Bytedance is now reportedly China’s richest man according to the Hurun Rich List at a net worth of US$49.3 billion.  Is that because of “profits”?  Ah, no.  It’s due to his share of the Bytedance stock valuation. This is why any royalty deal with Big Tech that is based solely on a percentage of revenue rather than a dollar rate based on total value is severely lacking.

Revenue is a factor in determining stock valuation, of course.  ByteDance’s first-half 2024 revenue increased to $73 billion, making Bytedance’s revenues almost as big as Facebook but potentially growing faster. (Meta/Facbook’s first half  revenue increased about 25% to $75.5 billion.)

But where does TikTok’s revenue come from? ByteDance’s international revenue reached $17 billion in the first half of 2024, largely driven by TikTok. Non-China revenues for ByteDance rose by nearly 60% during this period. ByteDance continues to leverage TikTok to expand into international e-commerce, sustaining its global popularity. So the company is throwing off a pile of cash–yet they are unable to come up with a functioning royalty system.

Then what would a Bytedance IPO price at?  We kind of have to guess because Bytedance is not publicly traded and doesn’t report its financials to the public (and even if they did, China-based companies got special beneficial treatment during the Obama Administration so PRC companies haven’t reported on the same basis as everyone else until recently).  Continuing the Meta/Facebook comparison, Meta has a market capitalization of $1.4 trillion give or take, while ByteDance’s valuation on the secondary market for private stocks is about $250 billion, according to a CapLight subscriber. 

That gap is not lost on our friends at Sequoia China and other influential investors in Bytedance such as Susquehanna,  SoftBank, and  General Atlantic.  And, of course, the Chinese Communist Party investing through its Cyberspace Administration of China owns “golden shares” in Bytedance that allows it to name directors to the board.  These cats did not put up cold hard cash for a distress asset sale of Bytedance’s principal operating unit aka TikTok.  

Assuming a constant growth rate, Bytedance is trading at a paltry 1.7x 2024 revenues compared to Meta which is trading at about 8.7x its revenues.  There are some difference, like operating profits:  Meta has a 38% operating margin compared to Bytedance at about 25%.  But we all know why Bytedance’s valuation is depressed—the TikTok divestment which seems to be on track to happen on or about January 19.

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act aka the TikTok Divestment Act, Bytedance must sell TikTok.  There’s a pretty good argument that the divestment is enforceable for a variety of reasons.  The law applies not only to TikTok, but also to any entity controlled by China, Iran, North Korea or Russia that distributes an application in the United States.  That’s a pretty significant barrier to IPO riches, or at least one major risk factor that could sour underwriters if not investors.  How to get around it?

As we saw with the Music Modernization Act that solved Spotify’s IPO issues due to the company’s massive copyright infringement business model, if you spread enough cash around Capitol Hill, it’s astonishing what can happen with the vast number of people on the take.  Whatever it costs, lobbyists and lawmakers are cheap dates compared to IPO riches.  Even so, it doesn’t look like the US government is quite ready to allow one of the biggest foreign agent data harvesting and user profiling operations in history to get its snout in the public markets trough.  At least not yet.

But an argument could be made that Bytedance is missing about $1 trillion in market cap.  Greed and resentment are a powerful combination.  To add insult to injury, even Triller managed to get to the public markets, so things could start to get weird while Mr. Tok watches his paper billions evaporate.

If You Don’t Vote…

WILLIE
If you don’t vote, you don’t matter…you don’t matter…you don’t matter. And then you’s just as ignorant as them in the city say you is while they stealing the food off your table and every last nickel out your pocket saying thank you please. ‘Cuz then you are just a bunch of ignorant hicks who got nothing because you deserve nothing.

All the King’s Men, Screenplay by Steven Zaillian, based on the novel by Robert Penn Warren (2006 version) with one of the best James Horner scores by that fellow Bruin.

Now with added retroactive acrobatics: @DamianCollins calls on UK Prime Minister to stop Google’s “Text and Data Mining” Circus

Damian Collins (former chair of the UK Parliament’s Digital Culture Media and Sport Select Committee) warns of Google’s latest AI shenanigans in a must-read opinion piece in the Daily Mail that highlights Google’s attempt to lobby its way into what is essentially a retroactive safe harbor to protect Google and its confederates in the AI land grab. While Mr. Collins writes about Google’s efforts to rewrite the laws of the UK to free ride in his home country which is egregious bullying, the episode he documents is instructive for all of us. If Google & Co. will do it to the Mother of Parliaments, it’s only a matter of time until Google & Co. do the same everywhere or know the reason why. Their goal is to hoover up all the world’s culture that the AI platforms have not scraped already and–crucially–to get away with it. And as Guy Forsyth says, “…nothing says freedom like getting away with it.”

The timeline of AI’s appropriation of all the world’s culture is a critical understanding to appreciate just how depraved Big Tech’s unbridled greed really is. The important thing to remember is that AI platforms like Google have been scraping the Internet to train their AI for some time now, possibly many years. This apparently includes social media platforms they control. My theory is that Google Books was an early effort at digitization for large language models to support products like corpus machine translation as a predecessor to Gemini (“your twin”) and other Google AI products. We should ask Ray Kurzweil.

There is starting to be increasing evidence that this is exactly what these people are up to.

The New York Times Uncovers the Crimes

According to an extensive long-form report in the New York Times by a team of very highly respected journalists, it turns out that Google has been planning this “Text and Data Mining” land grab for some time. At the very moment YouTube was issuing press releases about their Music AI Incubator and their “partners”–Google was stealing anything that was not nailed down that anyone had hosted on their massive platforms, including Google Docs, Google Maps, and…YouTube. The Times tells us:

Google transcribed YouTube videos to harvest text for its A.I. models, five people with knowledge of the company’s practices said. That potentially violated the copyrights to the videos, which belong to their creators….Google said that its A.I. models “are trained on some YouTube content,” which was allowed under agreements with YouTube creators, and that the company did not use data from office apps outside of an experimental program. 

I find it hard to believe that YouTube was both allowed to transcribe and scrape under all its content deals, or that they parsed through all videos to find the unprotected ones subject to their interpretation of the YouTube terms of use. So as we say in Texas, that sounds like bullshit for starters.

How does this relate to the Text and Data Mining exception that Mr. Collins warns of? Note that the NYT tells us “Google transcribed YouTube videos to harvest text.” That’s a clue.

As Mr. Collins tells us:

Google [recently] published a policy paper entitled: Unlocking The UK’s AI Potential.

What’s not to like?, you might ask. Artificial intelligence has the potential to revolutionise our economy and we don’t want to be left behind as the rest of the world embraces its benefits.

But buried in Google’s report is a call for a ‘text and data mining’ (TDM) exception to copyright.

This TDM exception would allow Google to scrape the entire history of human creativity from the internet without permission and without payment.

And, of course, Mr. Collins is exactly correct, that’s exactly what Google have in mind.

The Conspiracy of Dunces and the YouTube Fraud

In fairness, it wasn’t just Google ripping us off, but Google didn’t do anything to stop it as far as I can tell. One thing to remember is that YouTube was, and I think still is, not very crawlable by outsiders. It is almost certainly the case that Google would know who was crawling youtube.com, such as Bingbot, DuckDuckBot, Yandex Bot, or Yahoo Slurp if for no other reason that those spiders were not googlebot. With that understanding, the Times also tells us:

OpenAI researchers created a speech recognition tool called Whisper. It could transcribe the audio from YouTube videos, yielding new conversational text that would make an A.I. system smarter.

Some OpenAI employees discussed how such a move might go against YouTube’s rules, three people with knowledge of the conversations said. YouTube, which is owned by Google, prohibits use of its videos for applications that are “independent” of the video platform. [Whatever “independent” means.]

Ultimately, an OpenAI team transcribed more than one million hours of YouTube videos, the people said. The team included Greg Brockman, OpenAI’s president, who personally helped collect the videos, two of the people said. The texts were then fed into a system called GPT-4, which was widely considered one of the world’s most powerful A.I. models and was the basis of the latest version of the ChatGPT chatbot….

OpenAI eventually made Whisper, the speech recognition tool, to transcribe YouTube videos and podcasts, six people said. But YouTube prohibits people from not only using its videos for “independent” applications, but also accessing its videos by “any automated means (such as robots, botnets or scrapers).”

OpenAI employees knew they were wading into a legal gray area, the people said, but believed that training A.I. with the videos was fair use. 

And strangely enough, many of the AI platforms sued by creators raise “fair use” as a defense (if not all of the cases) which is strangely reminiscent of the kind of crap we have been hearing from these people since 1999.

Now why might Google have permitted OpenAI to crawl YouTube and transcribe videos (and who knows what else)? Probably because Google was doing the same thing. In fact, the Times tells us:

Some Google employees were aware that OpenAI had harvested YouTube videos for data, two people with knowledge of the companies said. But they didn’t stop OpenAI because Google had also used transcripts of YouTube videos to train its A.I. models, the people said. That practice may have violated the copyrights of YouTube creators. So if Google made a fuss about OpenAI, there might be a public outcry against its own methods, the people said.

So Google and its confederate OpenAI may well have conspired to commit massive copyright infringement against the owner of a valid copyright, did so willingly, and for purposes of commercial advantage and private financial gain. (Attempts to infringe are prohibited to the same extent as the completed act). The acts of these confederates vastly exceed the limits for criminal prosecution for both infringement and conspiracy.

But to Mr. Collins’ concern, the big AI platforms transcribed likely billions of hours of YouTube videos to manipulate text and data–you know, TDM.

The New Retroactive Safe Harbor: The Flying Googles Bring their TDM Circus Act to the Big Tent With Retroactive Acrobatics

But also realize the effect of the new TDM exception that Google and their Big Tech confederates are trying to slip past the UK government (and our own for that matter). A lot of the discussion about AI rulemaking acts as if new rules would be for future AI data scraping. Au contraire mes amis–on the contrary, the bad acts have already happened and they happened on an unimaginable scale.

So what Google is actually trying to do is get the UK to pass a retroactive safe harbor that would deprive citizens of valuable property rights–and also pass a prospective safe harbor so they can keep doing the bad acts with impunity.

Fortunately for UK citizens, the UK Parliament has not passed idiotic retroactive safe harbor legislation like the U.S. Congress has. I am, of course, thinking of the vaunted Music Modernization Act (MMA) that drooled its way to a retroactive safe harbor for copyright infringement, a shining example of the triumph of corruption that has yet to be properly challenged in the US on Constitutional grounds.

There’s nothing like the MMA absurdity in the UK, at least not yet. However, that retroactive safe harbor was not lost on Google, who benefited directly from it. They loved it. They hung it over the mantle next to their other Big Game trophy, the DMCA. And now they’d like to do it again for the triptych of legislative taxidermy.

Because make no mistake–a retroactive safe harbor would be exactly the effect of Google’s TDM exception. Not to mention it would also be a form of retroactive eminent domain, or what the UK analogously might call the compulsory purchase of property under the Compulsory Purchase of Property Act. Well…”purchase” might be too strong a word, more like “transfer” because these people don’t intend to pay for a thing.

The effect of passing Google’s TDM exception would be to take property rights and other personal rights from UK citizens without anything like the level of process or compensation required under the Compulsory Purchase of Property–even when the government requires the sale of private property to another private entity (such as a railroad right of way or a utility easement).

The government is on very shaky ground with a TDM exception imposed by the government for the benefit of a private company, indeed foreign private companies who can well afford to pay for it. It would be missing government oversight on a case-by-base basis, no proper valuation, and for entirely commercial purposes with no public benefit. In the US, it would likely violate the Takings Clause of our Constitution, among other things.

It’s Not Just the Artists

Mr. Collins also makes a very important point that might get lost among the stars–it’s not just the stars that AI is ripping off–it is everyone. As the New York Times story points out (and it seems that there’s more whistleblowers on this point every day), the AI platforms are hoovering up EVERYTHING that is on the Internet, especially on their affiliated platforms. That includes baby videos, influencers, everything.

This is why it is cultural appropriation on a grand scale, indeed a scale of depravity that we haven’t seen since the Nurenberg Trials. A TDM exception would harm all Britons in one massive offshoring of British culture.

StubHub Class Action on Hold: Oppression is in the Eye of the Beholder

The current case of Kaiser v. StubHub (No. 1:2024cv00044 (JLR) SDNY 2024) highlights the importance of arbitration clauses in online agreements. This is particularly true in the Kaiser case when the plaintiff alleges serious and complex civil law violations that might even rise to the level of a criminal indictment or certainly a grand jury investigation. Those overarching public policy goals are cut off by the retroactive application of click-through arbitration provisions and the Federal Arbitration Act. If StubHub users like the plaintiff had any idea they were going to get ripped off, they would likely never have agreed to an arbitration clause that cut off their opportunity to be heard by a court. Meritorious plaintiffs are silenced by Silicon Valley’s web of loopholes. This is the essence of violating our Constitutional rights to due process.

In a nutshell, the facts in Kaiser are that Plaintiff Kaiser allegedly bought tickets through StubHub in the US to a major soccer game in the UK (Tottenham Hotspurs vs. Liverpool FC). The plaintiff alleged that he had received several assurances from StubHub that his tickets were authentic and in reliance made travel arrangements to the UK to attend the game. On arrival at Tottenham Hotspurs’ stadium on game day, he alleges that he was told by Hotspurs employees that his tickets were fake, that StubHub was not authorized to sell Hotspurs tickets and they knew it, and that the stadium routinely rejects numerous ticket holders from StubHub with fake tickets.

Despite the blanket class action waiver in StubHub’s terms of service (or “Global User Agreement“) requiring arbitration of all claims by a user, the Plaintiff timely filed a putative class action in NY state court alleging that StubHub engaged in the sale of invalid or bogus tickets. The current StubHub terms of service has a broad disclaimer that introduces the arbitration clause which will apply to the user before the user has any idea of a potential RICO claim:

FOR ALL USERS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES, PLEASE BE ADVISED: CLAUSE 22 OF THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE, WHICH WILL, WITH LIMITED EXCEPTIONS, REQUIRE YOU TO SUBMIT CLAIMS YOU HAVE AGAINST US TO BINDING AND FINAL ARBITRATION, UNLESS YOU OPT-OUT. UNLESS YOU OPT OUT: (1) YOU WILL ONLY BE PERMITTED TO PURSUE CLAIMS AGAINST US ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS, NOT AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION OR PROCEEDING, AND (2) YOU WILL ONLY BE PERMITTED TO SEEK RELIEF (INCLUDING MONETARY, INJUNCTIVE, AND DECLARATORY RELIEF) ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

What the clause does not say is “EVEN IF WE STEAL FROM YOU.”

According to the plaintiff, StubHub knowingly facilitated the sale of tickets that it had no authorization to sell. This fraudulent activity, Kaiser argues, has caused significant financial and emotional harm to consumers who purchased these tickets, only to find out they were invalid when attempting to use the tickets.

Although Plaintiff did not bifurcate his claims, Plaintiff’s claims can potentially be divided (or “bifurcated”) into two different categories: what might be called “contract claims” arising from StubHub’s potential breach of promises in violation of state contract laws and “statutory claims” sounding in state or federal consumer protection statutes and the federal civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). I would argue that the contract claims could be arbitrable and the statutory claims should not be decided by an arbitrator–otherwise public policy is decided by private arbitrators with no one in sight who had been elected dog catcher.

The contract claims are:

Breach of Contract: Kaiser alleges that StubHub has breached its contractual obligations to consumers. When consumers purchase tickets through StubHub, they enter into a click-through terms of service contract with the company, expecting to receive valid tickets in return for their payment. Kaiser argues that by selling invalid tickets, StubHub has failed to uphold its end of the contract, thereby breaching their agreement with consumers on a grand scale. The agreement StubHub allegedly breached includes the company’s terms of use which has an arbitration clause as do many if not substantially all online consumer agreements. That arbitration clause is broadly drafted to purport to require arbitration of all claims, even the civil RICO count.

Unjust Enrichment: The plaintiff claims that StubHub has been unjustly enriched through its fraudulent activities. By selling invalid tickets, StubHub has profited at the expense of consumers who paid for tickets they could not use. Kaiser argues that it is unjust for StubHub to retain these profits, given the fraudulent nature of the ticket sales.

Negligence: Kaiser contends that StubHub has been negligent in its duty to ensure the validity of the tickets sold on its platform. The plaintiff argues that StubHub has a responsibility to verify the legitimacy of the tickets it sells and to protect consumers from purchasing fraudulent tickets. By failing to do so, StubHub has acted negligently, causing harm to consumers.

The “statutory” claims are:

Consumer Protection Statutes: Kaiser asserts that StubHub has violated various consumer protection laws. The plaintiff argues that StubHub’s practices are deceptive and unfair, misleading consumers into believing they are purchasing legitimate tickets. This deception, Kaiser claims, is a clear violation of consumer rights and protection statutes designed to safeguard consumers from such fraudulent activities.

Civil Racketeering: The plaintiff claims that StubHub’s actions constitute a violation of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Kaiser argues that StubHub has been operating as a criminal enterprise by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. This includes the fraudulent sale of tickets and the misrepresentation of the legitimacy of these tickets to consumers. By framing StubHub’s actions within the context of rackeetering, Kaiser apparently seeks to highlight the systemic and ongoing nature of the alleged fraud by StubHub.

Injunctive Relief: In addition to seeking monetary damages, Kaiser requested injunctive relief to prevent StubHub from continuing its alleged fraudulent practices. The plaintiff argues that without court intervention, StubHub will likely continue to engage in the sale of invalid tickets, causing further harm to consumers. Kaiser contended that an injunction is necessary to protect consumers and ensure that StubHub ceases its fraudulent activities.

StubHub’s Response

StubHub’s response was to seek to remove the case to federal court, which was successful, and to assert that its clickthrough arbitration agreement in the terms of use for the StubHub site was the proper forum, not a court. StubHub argued that the arbitration clause was agreed upon by the plaintiff when using StubHub’s allegedly fraudulent services. They contended that this clause was valid and enforceable, citing to the Federal Arbitration Act which favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements, asserting that the court should compel arbitration as per the agreement. Crucially, the Federal Arbitration Act was signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge in 1925–slightly pre-Internet. More about this later.

The plaintiff Kaiser argued that application of the arbitration clause was unconscionable, meaning it was unfairly one-sided and should not be enforced. Kaiser claimed that there was no mutual agreement to arbitrate due to the manner in which the terms were presented.

Judge Rochon’s Order

The case on removal was heard before U.S. District Judge Jennifer L. Rochon in the Southern District of New York. Judge Rochon’s order in the case granted StubHub’s motion to compel arbitration but stayed the case pending the completion of arbitration proceedings. Judge Rochon’s resolution did not address the merits and turned on the enforceability of the arbitration clause under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court considered several factors:

Existence of an Agreement: The court found that there was a valid agreement between the parties, as the plaintiff had accepted StubHub’s terms of service, which included the arbitration clause.

Scope of the Arbitration Clause: The court determined that the arbitration clause covered the plaintiff’s claims, as it broadly encompassed any disputes arising out of or relating to the terms of service or the plaintiff’s use of StubHub’s services including Plaintiff’s statutory RICO claims.

Unconscionability: The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. Judge Rochon noted that the clause was not overly one-sided or oppressive and that the plaintiff had the opportunity to review the terms before agreeing to them and also had the ability to opt out of the arbitration clause, but did not. The Court discussed the Plaintiff’s failure to take advantage of the “opt out” clause in some detail, which I’ll speak to later in this post.

The court also addressed other motions filed by the parties:

StubHub’s Motion to Dismiss: StubHub’s motion to dismiss the complaint was denied without prejudice as moot, given that the case was being referred to arbitration. As I read it, this allowed the Court to retain jurisdiction of the case should the parties wish to pursue any post-arbitration litigation.

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend: The plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend the complaint was denied. The court found that the proposed amendments would not change the outcome of the motion to compel arbitration.

Judge Rochon’s order emphasizes the enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer agreements, provided they meet the legal requirements under the FAA. The decision underscores the importance of carefully reviewing and understanding the terms of service when using online platforms like StubHub as click through agreements are notorious traps for the unwary.

Chicken and Egg: StubHub’s Arbitration Opt Out

The “opt-out” clause in StubHub’s arbitration agreement plays a crucial role in determining the enforceability of the arbitration provision and the forum for resolving the case. Note that the opt out requires mailing a specific form. That’s right–mailing the form, as in snail mail. You know, because the Internet. The current version of the opt-out states:

Opt-Out Procedure

You can choose to reject this Agreement to Arbitrate (‘opt out’) by mailing us a written opt-out notice (‘Opt-Out Notice’). The Opt-Out Notice must be postmarked no later than 30 days after the date you accept the User Agreement for the first time. You may also opt out no later than 30 days upon receipt of notice that the arbitration provision is being updated or changed. You must mail the Opt-Out Notice to StubHub, Inc., Attn: Litigation Department, Re: Opt-Out Notice, 1209 Orange Street, Corporation Trust Center, Wilmington, DE 19801.

For your convenience, we are providing an Opt-Out Notice form you must complete and mail to opt out of the Agreement to Arbitrate. You must complete the Opt-Out Notice form by providing the information called for in the form, including your name, address (including street number and address, city, state, and zip code), phone number and the email address(es) used to log in to the account(s) to which the opt-out applies. You must sign the Opt-Out Notice for it to be effective. This procedure is the only way you can opt out of the Agreement to Arbitrate. If you opt out of the Agreement to Arbitrate, all other parts of the User Agreement will continue to apply. Opting out of this Agreement to Arbitrate has no effect on any previous, other, or future arbitration agreements that you may have with us.

My bet is that public policy importance of Kaiser is in the RICO claim; all the other claims seem to be an effort to satisfy the “RICO predicates,” although that’s just my view. Given that StubHub is trying to get an IPO on file, the last thing that they want is a public trial on racketeering.

Opt out clauses in arbitration agreements provides users with the option to decline the arbitration agreement within a specified period, allowing them to retain their right to pursue legal action in court. Typically, an opt out requires users to take specific actions within a certain timeframe to opt out. If users do not opt out within the given period, they are deemed to have accepted the arbitration agreement and are bound by its terms. This is what happened in Kaiser.

Of course, there is a timing issue with any opt-out clause. Before the consumer has reason to suspect that they are dealing with a racketeer, they must click through the terms of service including the arbitration clause and very likely do not understand that they are giving up valuable rights to protect themselves. More importantly, they are unlikely to understand that that the later-identified racketeer is using lawfare to protect their potentially actionable, if not criminal, operation.

If you are thinking that it does not seem fair for a private arbitrator to be making decisions about whether a defendant has violated public policy in consumer protection statutes or RICO cases that were never envisioned by legislators to be getting resolved in arbitration, you are not alone.

However unfair the result, it seems unlikely that the judge will overturn herself. What does seem likely is that a state attorney general or even a U.S. Attorney could open a RICO investigation into StubHub. A criminal investigation is unlikely to be subject to arbitration, although I feel confident that StubHub will try. You know, because the Internet.

Since the situs of the fraud was also arguably in the UK at Hotspurs World, and assuming that Hotspurs did not authorize StubHub to sell the fake tickets, it is possible that StubHub’s UK operations could also be investigated under the UK’s Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA). POCA is similar, but not identical, to RICO. POCA has some very interesting provisions such as the National Crime Agency’s ability to serve an “Unexplained Wealth Order” on someone who seems to have gotten rich all of a sudden. I’m not a UK lawyer, but it’s worth considering if a “UWO” just might apply to StubHub’s entire senior management team, who knows. The UK have this great organization called the “Serious Fraud Office” which sounds like it came from Harry Potter, but is very real, I assure you.

Now What?

It appears that the Kaiser lawsuit is going to need to go through the formalities of arbitration under the American Arbitration Association (AAA) before it can land back in Judge Rochon’s court. It is unlikely that we will hear much publicly about the proceeding. For example, the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules do include provisions for confidentiality, but they do not mandate it for all aspects of the arbitration proceedings. Specifically, Rule R-45 requires the arbitrator to keep all matters relating to the arbitration or an award confidential. However, the rules do not impose a blanket requirement for the parties themselves to maintain confidentiality throughout the entire process unless they otherwise agree, which hopefully they will not.

Note that this all applies to the statutory RICO claim as well as the contract claims. The Gambino Family must be envious.

However, state and federal law enforcement agencies are not bound by Internet company arbitration clauses, at least not yet–the line between Google, Amazon, Facebook and the federal government continues to blur. For example,  New York has its own version of the federal RICO Act called the Enterprise Corruption statute. This law is designed to combat organized crime by targeting the diversified illegal activities that such groups engage in. The statute makes it a Class B felony to participate in an enterprise through a pattern of criminal activity. This would likely require the District Attorney for New York County or the New York State Organized Crime Task Force to open an investigation of StubHub. It is worth noting that 33 states have these “Little RICO” acts, such as the Texas Organized Crime Statute.

Congress may also act to limit the applicability of arbitration clauses generally to exclude civil RICO claims and class action waivers, or at least allow consumer fraud claims to be heard outside of arbitration by state and federal courts. This could be a fix for the obvious due process issues present in Judge Rochon’s ruling that illustrate how a trial judge’s hands are tied absent Congressional action. It seems that this issue is so blatant in the Kaiser case that it’s at least worth a Congressional investigation and also a disclosure as a risk factor in any StubHub IPO prospectus.

Stay tuned, cats and kitties, the plot sickens.

Open the Pod Bay Doors, HAL: Why Eric Schmidt is Insane in his own words

In the GAI, no one can hear you scream. Let’s remember that this man has already stolen world culture–twice. It will be a dark kind of fun watching Schmidt get the World Economic Forum, Lawrence Lessig and Greta Thunberg to do a 180 on climate change. Don’t laugh–if anyone can do it, he can. You watch, the Berkman Center and EFF will lead the charge.

After Universal, TikTok Throws Its Toys Out of the Pram In Concerted Refusal to Deal with Merlin

Here’s some news, and make sure you’re sitting down: Still stinging from its encounter with Universal, TikTok wants its counterparties weak, divided and broke. So naturally TikTok is going after Merlin in TikTok’s latest concerted refusal to deal.

Let’s remember the basic premise behind Merlin, the licensing body that independent labels can opt into at their election. Independent labels as a group have a combined market share that is on par with a major label. I recall hearing this from Alison Wenham back when the Association of Independent Music was founded back in 1999. Joining together, independent labels could be strong, united and claiming their fair share right along side the major labels. (Unclear why this seems to be lost on the publishers.)

So after Mr. Tok got a spanking from Universal, TikTok are definitely not going to put up with resistance from independent labels, assuming TikTok are even in business by the time the dust settles. As Kristin Robinson reports in Billboard:

A TikTok spokesperson says that “TikTok would like to offer all of the world’s music to our users. We are committed to working with the independent sector as well as the major labels and publishers. We know that our community of over a billion music fans value the diversity and richness that independent music brings to our platform. We are committed to entering into direct deals with Merlin members in order to keep their music on TikTok.”

Founded in 2008, Merlin represents 15% of the global recorded music market, and it uses that collective market power to negotiate with digital partners on behalf of its members on a similar footing as the bigger major labels. 

So there you have it: TikTok doesn’t want any lip from independents that might put them on the same footing as the majors anymore than the MIC Coalition wants lip from GMR. The one thing that TikTok cannot say is that it’s more efficient for the company to negotiate separately with independents. This isn’t about efficiency–it’s about stopping a near Universal-level exodus from happening again. And not just stopping it this time, it’s about stopping it forever. 

In other words, crushing the resistance. That option wasn’t available to Mr. Tok when negotiating with Universal but it’s available now.

Of course you know that TikTok intends to hose the independents because the first thing they did before even discussing a potential deal is require the labels sign a nondisclosure agreement (which no doubt is nonnegotiable). Because nothing says transparency like secrecy. And what’s really great is that it’s no problem because nobody in the music business ever talks about their deals.

As Ms. Robinson reports:

Billboard obtained an email TikTok sent out to some Merlin members, stating that the short-form video app “decided not to renew [its] license agreements with Merlin” and that TikTok “may be able to do direct deals” with the labels, provided that they agree to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). “The purpose of the NDA is to enable us to discuss direct licensing agreements with you.” The deadline to sign and return the NDA is Oct. 4. A TikTok spokesperson says, however, that any Merlin label that wishes to stay on TikTok after Oct. 31 can review and sign the TikTok and CapCut agreements anytime before Oct. 25.

Merlin told its members that it is doing “all [it] can to re-engage with TikTok… we have already made it clear to them that we are ready to hold an actual negotiation and address any concerns they may have.”

Actually, the purpose of the NDA is to keep the independent labels quiet under threat of lawsuit from Mr. Tok and his backers like Neil Shen and Sequoia China. TikTok’s feigned support for independent music is about as convincing as an ivory poacher joining PETA.

Careful What You Wish For: Consent Decrees, Compulsory Licenses and the Right to Say No

[This post first appeared on Artist Rights Institute’s Artist Rights Watch blog]

I remember you, you’re the one who made my dreams come true…
Written by Johnny Mercer

Careful What You Wish For

Remember the sales pitch for how wonderful the Music Modernization Act was going to be? An even broader compulsory mechanical license for songwriters combined with yet another safe harbor for music users (with new and improved retroactivity) was going to solve all our problems. A solution for unlicensed songs, black box, unpaid royalties, a stop for “inefficient” litigation. The new musical works database would succeed where all other efforts had failed, not to worry and now back to sleep. Good thing it didn’t make the already complex music licensing regime even more convoluted.

There is, of course, a very simple way to clean up at least some complexities in the music licensing system. Digital services don’t use a track if they don’t clear the publishing. Radio stations certainly can block tracks when they blacklist a particular song. That would, of course, require not just accepting responsibility for licensing but also for doing an effective job of licensing so the platform did not get sued. The whole point of the civil law system is to encourage honest behavior and to empower individuals to unleash hell. Don’t mistake “holding up” a license for standing up and fighting back. Those noisy smallfolk may get in the way but that doesn’t mean they’re wrong.

Who Made Them Special?

It doesn’t seem like it’s working out quite as advertised. We were told before the MMA that you just can’t ask the digital services to actually confirm they have the rights to sell their products. Why do we ask it of other commercial actors in complex rights situations but not digital services? We ask grocers, car dealers, doctors, bankers or even lawyers to know who they are dealing with and make sure they are doing so lawfully. As Justice Thomas wrote in a recent Supreme Court case, [i]n the platforms’ world, they are fully responsible for their websites when it results in constitutional protections, but the moment that responsibility could lead to liability, they can disclaim any obligations and enjoy greater protections from suit than nearly any other industry.”

If a car dealer sold a hot Ford or Ferrari, could the dealer tell the prosecutors that compliance was just too hard? If a pharmacy sold counterfeit insulin could they ask for a safe harbor? If a vaccine manufacturer ….no wait.

But no, we were told that digital services were special and that we needed to give them an even broader compulsory license and an even broader safe harbor than Section 230, DMCA and the natural safe harbor from being the richest companies in commercial history. (And there’s a connection between safe harbors and them being rich while we get a royalty that starts 3 or 5 decimal places to the right.).

After the Spotify bundling debacle, all of a sudden a broader and deeper compulsory license doesn’t look so hot. Plus it now appears that Spotify is to be singled out in the coming Phonorecords V proceeding which will be starting in a matter of months. That may not be a dog whistle to the lawyers, but it sure sounds like the meter going down. This may be a test of the antitrust exemption for what sure seems to me to be a concerted refusal to deal, but then I’m just a country lawyer and I’m not as smart as the city fellers. (All the more reason for songwriters and labels to make another separate peace on physical like Phonorecords IV and do it quickly.)

Abandoning The Right to Say No

In other words, it looks like it’s going to be making something extremely complicated with side issues galore when it really comes down to a simple issue: The right to say no. Unfortunately, the compulsory license and the ASCAP and BMI antitrust consent decrees exist for a single reason which is to take away that right to say no. But that was what they wanted and now they’ve got it.

How does the other side perceive their cherished ability to hide behind the government’s boot on our throats? A “friend of the court” brief in the current appeal of the BMI v. NACPA rate court case under the BMI antitrust consent decree gives us some insight. These briefs (also called “amicus briefs”) are sometimes filed in court cases, especially appellate cases, by entities who are not parties to the litigation but who may be affected by the outcome and who are trying to influence the court’s decision. The briefs are often filed by trade associations, giving the members of those associations plausible deniability as to their own intentions.

The “friends” or “amici” often want to point out to the members of the court potential unintended consequences or broader effects of a pending judicial decision resolving the particular controversy. It is common for groups of amici to band together, thus giving the court the benefit of the thinking of companies with (or representing) an interest in how the court rules. These briefs also give some insight into what the other side is thinking.

The joint amicus brief that caught my eye in the BMI v. NACPA BMI rate court case was a brief filed by a number of amici including the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Digital Media Association (DiMA). That alliance caught my eye. Three guesses why.

The Satanic Cult known as the MIC Coalition

The core logical flaw of the argument by these amici is that they omit the solution of saying no. They want the court to believe that using music is all too complicated. For example:

The [BMI rate court’s] decision here is wrong. It set a rate for BMI using as “benchmarks” rates obtained by two very different performing rights organizations, SESAC and GMR, in very different economic circumstances than pertain to the marketplace governing BMI and ASCAP licensing. 

What’s the principal difference between rates paid to BMI (and ASCAP) and rates paid to SESAC and GMR? The biggest difference identified by the trade association “friends” representing companies that together have market capitalizations in the $3 trillion range is that songwriters represented by SESAC and GMR are free to negotiate. And we can’t have that, now, can we? Here’s the explanation from the “friends”:

BMI and ASCAP, which together control over 90% of all public performance rights in musical works…are subject to consent decrees intended to protect entities like amici from the anticompetitive abuses that come with the aggregation of vast numbers of copyrights in the hands of a single licensing entity….As amici have experienced firsthand [oh, my, first hand? Poor babies!], SESAC and GMR are not subject to the same constraints on anticompetitive conduct as BMI and ASCAP, and amici enjoy none of the consent decrees’ protections when they negotiate—as they must—with SESAC and GMR.

Although SESAC and GMR have smaller repertories than BMI and ASCAP do (partially because they are invitation-only organizations, unlike BMI and ASCAP), each nonetheless controls the rights to multiple thousands of musical compositions, including works of writers as iconic as those who populate the ranks of BMI and ASCAP (such as Adele and Bob Dylan who are licensed by SESAC, and Bruce Springsteen and John Lennon who are licensed by GMR).  

Friends Don’t Let Friends Change One-Way Streets

So what the friends argue is that the BMI rate court should not have taken into account the rates negotiated by SESAC and GMR at arms length when setting the consent decree rate for BMI. In other words, when setting what is effectively a government-mandated rate, the BMI rate court should not have considered a willing buyer/willing seller negotiated rate because that was mixing apples and rotten apples. Which those poor babies know “first hand”–they, too, have been bullied by those “iconic” writers who fancy themselves worth more to music users than the other 90%. Oh, the arrogance!

And here is the fallacious conclusion of the false choice:

Industry reality thus makes it a necessity for amici to obtain blanket licenses from SESAC and GMR as well as BMI and ASCAP. This is particularly the case because music rights are often fragmented, with multiple PROs controlling interests in a single song. Adding to the problem, composition ownership information is opaque and inaccurate. Amici thus face, on the one hand, the threat of crippling copyright infringement liability if they do not obtain SESAC and GMR licenses and, on the other, supra-competitive prices that SESAC and GMR invariably charge when they do. As a result, they find themselves wedged between a rock and a hard place. 

This is the essence of the false choice that keeps coming up in these relationships. The underlying fallacy is that in order to use the music, the richest companies in commercial history must negotiate with SESAC and GMR (especially GMR if you ask me) and those pesky, albeit iconic, songwriters who allow these PROs to represent them. SESAC and GMR are not compelled by the government to bend the knee. If songwriters are allowed to keep going down that road outside the government’s boot, God knows where that might end up. They might get it in their heads that they’re actually worth something. We can’t have that, now can we?

And worse yet, if the government’s rate courts start using these freely negotiated terms to set compulsory rates, the one way street might change direction. And we can’t have that, either. But isn’t the essence of a compulsory license that the government is supposed to approximate what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the licensed rights? So aren’t the SESAC and GMR rates for the same use exactly the kind of benchmark the government should use when setting rates for everyone else?

Saying the Quiet Part Out Loud

This drives them wild, of course. They actually say the quiet part out loud:

[T]he impact of [SESAC and GMR’s] supra-competitive [free market] licensing practices on licensees has been cabined before the decision below, in large part because (a) the actual prices, while inflated, are not so high as to be ruinous to licensees given the comparatively smaller repertories involved; and (b) no rate court until now had relied on SESAC or GMR rates in setting rates for the much larger BMI and ASCAP repertories. In relying on SESAC and GMR’s rates, the district court turned a long-standing consent decree designed to protect music users on its head. The BMI consent decree was designed to stop BMI, a music-rights aggregator with monopoly power, from abusing that power. But [BMI Rate Court] Judge Stanton’s decision effectively endorsed those abuses by setting a rate that BMI could never get in a competitive marketplace, even though that is the governing standard for BMI (and ASCAP) rate-setting cases. 

And there’s the false choice again. If you can’t afford Le Bernadin, no one is forcing you to dine there. All these music users can just say no. They don’t want to. What they want is to get the music on the cheap. And, frankly, take a lazy approach to licensing. Yet the amici acknowledge that the court is bound to use a rate from a competitive marketplace as the “governing standard” in setting consent decree rates.

Here’s the rub. Until SESAC and especially GMR came along there effectively had never been a competitive performance royalty rate so the “governing standard” was essentially iterative and therefore meaningless. All these companies represented by amici got the government discount in rate court because of their lobbying power. As Senator John Kennedy told Mark Zuckerberg, tech companies are like countries and they get whatever they want in Washington–the primary reason artists have never been paid for broadcast radio performances of their recordings. And a recession is when Google lays off 25 Members of Congress.

While these music users are supposed to negotiate before going to rate court, those negotiations are just inconveniences so they could get to rate court and start running up legal fees. And shocker–when they have to negotiate with GMR and cannot go to rate court, they end up paying more. Just FYI, there’s also gambling in Rick’s American Bar.

The False Choices

So false choice number 1: The users don’t have to use music they can’t afford. False choice number 2: When songwriters cannot step away from the table and refuse to license, it’s the government that imposes a lower rate particularly when staying in rate court costs a fortune.

The government doesn’t protect the user from anticompetitive behavior, it protects the user from a competitive marketplace. That insulated rate is brought about through lobbying the executive branch and ultimately the Department of Justice. My bet is that this is the only reason–the only reason–that the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees are the longest running consent decrees in US history and probably world history.

Remember when the DOJ was reviewing all antitrust consent decrees in 2018 and terminated over 1000? But not for those dangerous anti-competitive songwriters. Yes, sir, as soon as that writer room door closes they get right down to colluding because that is the essence of songwriting.

For some reason–I wonder why–the DOJ decided that songwriters needed to be right up there with Otis Elevator and Microsoft and continued the bloodsucking consent decree cottage industry that has sent generations of children through prep school, college and law school. So here we are again arguing over the false choices. Hopefully, we may be entering a new era of enlightened thinking where publishers are willing to stand up and be counted to get the government’s boot off their throats.

 

Fired for Cause:  @RepFitzgerald Asks for Conditional Redesignation of the MLC

U.S. Representative Scott Fitzgerald joined in the MLC review currently underway and sent a letter to Register of Copyrights Shira Perlmutter on August 29 regarding operational and performance issues relating to the MLC.  The letter was in the context of the five year review for “redesignation” of The MLC, Inc. as the mechanical licensing collective.  (That may be confusing because of the choice of “The MLC” as the name of the operational entity that the government permits to run the mechanical licensing collective.  The main difference is that The MLC, Inc. is an entity that is “designated” or appointed to operationalize the statutory body.  The MLC, Inc. can be replaced.  The mechanical licensing collective (lower case) is the statutory body created by Title I of the Music Modernization Act) and it lasts as long as the MMA is not repealed or modified. Unlikely, but we live in hope.)

I would say that songwriters probably don’t have anything more important to do today in their business beyond reading and understanding Rep. Fitzgerald’s excellent letter.

Rep. Fitzgerald’s letter is important because he proposes that the MLC, Inc. be given a conditional redesignation, not an outright redesignation.  In a nutshell, that is because Rep. Fitzgerald raises many…let’s just say “issues”…that he would like to see fixed before committing to another five years for The MLC, Inc.  As a member of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Rep. Fitzgerald’s point of view on this subject must be given added gravitas.

In case you’re not following along at home, the Copyright Office is currently conducting an operational and performance review of The MLC, Inc. to determine if it is deserving of being given another five years to operate the mechanical licensing collective.  (See Periodic Review of the Mechanical Licensing Collective and the Digital Licensee Coordinator (Docket 2024-1), available at https://www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/mma-designations/2024/.)

The redesignation process may not be quickly resolved.  It is important to realize that the Copyright Office is not obligated to redesignate The MLC, Inc. by any particular deadline or at all.  It is easy to understand that any redesignation might be contingent on The MLC, Inc. fixing certain…issues…because the redesignation rulemaking is itself an operational and performance review.  It is also easy to understand that the Copyright Office might need to bring in some technical and operational assistance in order to diligence its statutory review obligations.  This could take a while.

Let’s consider the broad strokes of Rep. Fitzgerald’s letter.

Budget Transparency

Rep. Fitzgerald is concerned with a lack of candor and transparency in The MLC, Inc.’s annual report among other things. If you’ve read the MLC’s annual reports, you may agree with me that the reports are long on cheerleading and short on financial facts.  It’s like The MLC, Inc. thought they were answering the question “How can you tolerate your own awesomeness?”   That question is not on the list.  Rep. Fitzgerald says “Unfortunately, the current annual report lacks key data necessary to examine the MLC’s ability to execute these authorities and functions.”  He then goes on to make recommendations for greater transparency in future annual reports.

I agree with Rep. Fitzgerald that these are all important points.  I disagree with him slightly about the timing of this disclosure.  These important disclosures need not be prospective–they could be both prospective and retroactive. I see no reason at all why The MLC, Inc. cannot be required to revise all of its four annual reports filed to date (https://www.themlc.com/governance) in line with this expanded criteria.  I am just guessing, but the kind of detail that Rep. Fitzgerald is focused on are really just data that any business would accumulate or require in the normal course of prudently operating its business.  That suggests to me that there is no additional work required in bringing The MLC, Inc. into compliance; it’s just a matter of disclosure.

There is nothing proprietary about that disclosure and there is no reason to keep secrets about how you handle other people’s money.  It is important to recognize that The MLC, Inc. only handles other people’s money.  It has no revenue because all of the money under its management comes from either royalties that belong to copyright owners or operating capital paid by the services that use the blanket license.  It should not be overlooked that the services rely on the MLC and it has a duty to everyone to properly handle the funds. The MLC, Inc. also operates at the pleasure of the government, so it should not be heard to be too precious about information flow, particularly information related to its own operational performance. Those duties flow in many directions.

Board Neutrality

The board composition of the mechanical licensing collective (and therefore The MLC, Inc.) is set by Congress in Title I.  It should come as no surprise to anyone that the major publishers and their lobbyists who created Title I wrote themselves a winning hand directly into the statute itself.  (And FYI, there is gambling at Rick’s American Café, too.)  As Rep. Fitzgerald says:  

Of the 14 voting members, ten are comprised of music publishers and four are songwriters. Publishers were given a majority of seats in order to assist with the collective’s primary task of matching and distributing royalties. However, the MMA did not provide this allocation in order to convert the MLC into an extension of the music publishers.

I would argue with him about that, too, because I believe that’s exactly what the MMA was intended to do by those who drafted it who also dictated who controlled the pen.  This is a rotten system and it was obviously on its way to putrefaction before the ink was dry.

For context, Section 8 of the Clayton Act, one of our principal antitrust laws, prohibits interlocking boards on competitor corporations.  I’m not saying that The MLC, Inc. has a Section 8 problem–yet–but rather that interlocking boards is a disfavored arrangement by way of understanding Rep. Fitzgerald’s issue with The MLC, Inc.’s form of governance:

Per the MMA, the MLC is required to maintain an independent board of directors. However, what we’ve seen since establishing the collective is anything but independent. For example, in both 2023 and 2024, all ten publishers represented by the voting members on the MLC Board of Directors were also members of the NMPA’s board.  This not only raises questions about the MLC’s ability to act as a “fair” administrator of the blanket license but, more importantly, raises concerns that the MLC is using its expenditures to advance arguments indistinguishable from those of the music publishers-including, at times, arguments contrary to the positions of songwriters and the digital streamers.

Said another way, Rep. Fitzgerald is concerned that The MLC, Inc. is acting very much like HFA did when it was owned by the NMPA.  That would be HFA, the principal vendor of The MLC, Inc. (and that dividing line is blurry, too).

It is important to realize that the gravamen of Rep. Fitzgerald’s complaint (as I understand it) is not solely with the statute, it is with the decisions about how to interpret the statute taken by The MLC, Inc. and not so far countermanded by the Copyright Office in its oversight role.  That’s the best news I’ve had all day.  This conflict and competition issue is easily solved by voluntary action which could be taken immediately (with or without changing the board composition).  In fact, given the sensitivity that large or dominant corporations have about such things, I’m kind of surprised that they walked right into that one.  The devil may be in the details, but God is in the little things.

Investment Policy

Rep. Fitzgerald is also concerned about The MLC, Inc.’s “investment policy.”  Readers will recall that I have been questioning both the provenance and wisdom of The MLC, Inc. unilaterally deciding that it can invest the hundreds of millions in the black box in the open market.  I personally cannot find any authority for such a momentous action in the statute or any regulation.  Rep. Fitzgerald also raises questions about the “investment policy”:

Further, questions remain regarding the MLC’s investment policy by which it may invest royalty and assessment funds. The MLC’s Investment Policy Statement provides little insight into how those funds are invested, their market risk, the revenue generated from those investments, and the percentage of revenue (minus fees) transferred to the copyright owner upon distribution of royalties. I would urge the Copyright Office to require more transparency into these investments as a condition of redesignation.

It should be obvious that The MLC, Inc.’s “investment policy” has taken on a renewed seriousness and can no longer be dodged.

Black Box

It should go without saying that fair distribution of unmatched funds starts with paying the right people.  Not “connect to collect” or “play your part” or any other sloganeering.  Tracking them down. Like orphan works, The MLC, Inc. needs to take active measures to find the people to whom they owe money, not wait for the people who don’t know they are owed to find out that they haven’t been paid.  

Although there are some reasonable boundaries on a cost/benefit analysis of just how much to spend on tracking down people owed small sums, it is important to realize that the extraordinary benefits conferred on digital services by the Music Modernization Act, safe harbors and all, justifies higher expectations of those same services in finding the people they owe money.  The MLC, Inc. is uniquely different than its counterparts in other countries for this reason.

I tried to raise the need for increased vigilance at the MLC during a Copyright Office roundtable on the MMA. I was startled that the then-head of DiMA (since moved on) had the brass to condescend to me as if he had ever paid a royalty or rendered a royalty statement.  I was pointing out that the MLC was different than any other collecting society in the world because the licensees pay the operating costs and received significant legal benefits in return. Those legal benefits took away songwriters’ fundamental rights to protect their interests through enforcing justifiable infringement actions which is not true in other countries.

In countries where the operating cost of their collecting society is deducted from royalties, it is far more appropriate for that society to consider a more restrictive cost/benefit analysis when expending resources to track down the songwriters they owe. This is particularly true when no black box writer is granting nonmonetary consideration like a safe harbor whether they know it or not.

I got an earful from this person about how the services weren’t an open checkbook to track down people they owed money to (try that argument when failing to comply with Know Your Customer laws).  Grocers know more about ham sandwiches than digital services know about copyright owners. The general tone was that I should be grateful to Big Daddy and be more careful how I spend my lunch money. And yes I do resent this paternalistic response which I’m sorry to say was not challenged by the Copyright Office lawyer presiding who shortly thereafter went to work for Spotify.  Nobody ever asked for an open check.  I just asked that they make a greater effort than the effort that got Spotify sued a number of times resulting in over $50 million in settlements, a generous accommodation in my view. If anyone should be grateful, it is the services who should be grateful, not the songwriters.

And yet here we are again in the same place.  Except this time the services have a safe harbor against the entire world which I believe has value greater than the operating costs of the MLC.  I’d be perfectly happy to go back to the way it was before the services got everything they wanted and then some in Title I of the MMA, but I bet I won’t get any takers on that idea.

Instead, I have to congratulate Rep. Fitzgerald for truly excellent work product in his letter and for framing the issue exactly as it should be posed.  Failing to fix these major problems should result in no redesignation—fired for cause.