If the tech industry has a signature fallacy for the 2020s aside from David Sacks, it belongs to Jensen Huang. The CEO of Nvidia has perfected a circular, self-consuming logic so brazen that it deserves a name: The Paradox of Huang’s Rope. It is the argument that China is too dangerous an AI adversary for the United States to regulate artificial intelligence at home or control export of his Nvidia chips abroad—while insisting in the very next breath that the U.S. must allow him to keep selling China the advanced Nvidia chips that make China’s advanced AI capabilities possible. The justification destroys its own premise, like handing an adversary the rope to hang you and then pointing to the length of that rope as evidence that you must keep selling more, perhaps to ensure a more “humane” hanging. I didn’t think it was possible to beat “sharing is caring” for utter fallacious bollocks.
The Paradox of Huang’s Rope works like this: First, hype China as an existential AI competitor. Second, declare that any regulatory guardrails—whether they concern training data, safety, export controls, or energy consumption—will cause America to “fall behind.” Third, invoke national security to insist that the U.S. government must not interfere with the breakneck deployment of AI systems across the economy. And finally, quietly lobby for carveouts that allow Nvidia to continue selling ever more powerful chips to the same Chinese entities supposedly creating the danger that justifies deregulation.
It is a master class in circularity: “China is dangerous because of AI → therefore we can’t regulate AI → therefore we must sell China more AI chips → therefore China is even more dangerous → therefore we must regulate even less and export even more to China.” At no point does the loop allow for the possibility that reducing the United States’ role as China’s primary AI hardware supplier might actually reduce the underlying threat. Instead, the logic insists that the only unacceptable risk is the prospect of Nvidia making slightly less money.
This is not hypothetical. While Washington debates export controls, Huang has publicly argued that restrictions on chip sales to China could “damage American technology leadership”—a claim that conflates Nvidia’s quarterly earnings with the national interest. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence assessments warn that China is building fully autonomous weapons systems, and European analysts caution that Western-supplied chips are appearing in PLA research laboratories. Yet the policy prescription from Nvidia’s corner remains the same: no constraints on the technology, no accountability for the supply chain, and no acknowledgment that the market incentives involved have nothing to do with keeping Americans safe. And anyone who criticizes the authoritarian state run by the Chinese Communist Party is a “China Hawk” which Huang says is a “badge of shame” and “unpatriotic” because protecting America from China by cutting off chip exports “destroys the American Dream.” Say what?
The Paradox of Huang’s Rope mirrors other Cold War–style fallacies, in which companies invoke a foreign threat to justify deregulation while quietly accelerating that threat through their own commercial activity. But in the AI context, the stakes are higher. AI is not just another consumer technology; its deployment shapes military posture, labor markets, information ecosystems, and national infrastructure. A strategic environment in which U.S. corporations both enable and monetize an adversary’s technological capabilities is one that demands more regulation, not less.
Naming the fallacy matters because it exposes the intellectual sleight of hand. Once the circularity is visible, the argument collapses. The United States does not strengthen its position by feeding the very capabilities it claims to fear. And it certainly does not safeguard national security by allowing one company’s commercial ambitions to dictate the boundaries of public policy. The Paradox of Huang’s Rope should not guide American AI strategy. It should serve as a warning of how quickly national priorities can be twisted into a justification for private profit.
“Operation Gatekeeper has exposed a sophisticated smuggling network that threatens our Nation’s security by funneling cutting-edge AI technology to those who would use it against American interests,” said Ganjei. “These chips are the building blocks of AI superiority and are integral to modern military applications. The country that controls these chips will control AI technology; the country that controls AI technology will control the future. The Southern District of Texas will aggressively prosecute anyone who attempts to compromise America’s technological edge.”
That divergence from the prosecutors is not industrial policy. That is incoherence. But mostly it’s just bad advice, likely coming from White House AI Czar David Sacks, Mr. Trump’s South African AI policy advisor who may have a hard time getting a security clearance in the first place..
On one hand, DOJ is rightly bringing cases over the illegal diversion of restricted AI chips—recognizing that these processors are strategic technologies with direct national-security implications. On the other hand, the White House is signaling that access to those same chips is negotiable, subject to licensing workarounds, regulatory carve-outs, or political discretion.
You cannot treat a technology as contraband in federal court and as a commercial export in the West Wing.
Pick one.
AI Chips Are Not Consumer Electronics
The United States does not sell China F-35 fighter jets. We do not sell Patriot missile systems. We do not sell advanced avionics platforms and then act surprised when they show up embedded in military infrastructure. High-end AI accelerators are in the same category.
NVIDIA’s most advanced chips are not merely commercial products. They are general-purpose intelligence infrastructure or what China calls military-civil fusion. They train surveillance systems, military logistics platforms, cyber-offensive tools, and models capable of operating autonomous weapons and battlefield decision-making pipelines with no human in the loop.
If DOJ treats the smuggling of these chips into China as a serious federal crime—and it should—there is no coherent justification for authorizing their sale through executive discretion. Except, of course, money, or in Mr. Sacks case, more money.
Fully Autonomous Weapons—and Selling the Rope
China does not need U.S. chips to build consumer AI. It wants them for military acceleration.Advanced NVIDIA AI chips are not just about chatbots or recommendation engines. They are the backbone of fully autonomous weapons systems—autonomous targeting, swarm coordination, battlefield logistics, and decision-support models that compress the kill chain beyond meaningful human control.
There is an old warning attributed to Vladimir Lenin—that capitalists would sell the rope by which they would later be hanged. Apocryphal or not, it captures this moment with uncomfortable precision.
If NVIDIA chips are powerful enough to underpin autonomous weapons systems for allied militaries, they are powerful enough to underpin autonomous weapons systems for adversaries like China. Trump’s own National Security Strategy statement clearly says previous U.S. elites made “mistaken” assumptions about China such as the famous one that letting China into the WTO would integrate Beijing into the famous rules-based international order. Trump tells us that instead China “got rich and powerful” and used this against us, and goes on to describe the CCP’s well known predatory subsidies, unfair trade, IP theft, industrial espionage, supply-chain leverage, and fentanyl precursor exports as threats the U.S. must “end.” By selling them the most advanced AI chips?
Western governments and investors simultaneously back domestic autonomous-weapons firms—such as Europe-based Helsing, supported by Spotify CEO Daniel Ek—explicitly building AI-enabled munitions for allied defense. That makes exporting equivalent enabling infrastructure to a strategic competitor indefensible.
The AI Moratorium Makes This Worse, Not Better
This contradiction unfolds alongside a proposed federal AI moratorium executive order originating with Mr. Sacks and Adam Thierer of Google’s R Street Institute that would preempt state-level AI protections. States are told AI is too consequential for local regulation, yet the federal government is prepared to license exports of AI’s core infrastructure abroad.
If AI is too dangerous for states to regulate, it is too dangerous to export. Preemption at home combined with permissiveness abroad is not leadership. It is capture.
This Is What Policy Capture Looks Like
The common thread is not national security. It is Silicon Valley access. David Sacks and others in the AI–VC orbit argue that AI regulation threatens U.S. competitiveness while remaining silent on where the chips go and how they are used.
When DOJ prosecutes smugglers while the White House authorizes exports, the public is entitled to ask whose interests are actually being served. Advisory roles that blur public power and private investment cannot coexist with credible national-security policymaking particularly when the advisor may not even be able to get a US national security clearance unless the President blesses it.
A Line Has to Be Drawn
If a technology is so sensitive that its unauthorized transfer justifies prosecution, its authorized transfer should be prohibited absent extraordinary national interest. AI accelerators meet that test.
Until the administration can articulate a coherent justification for exporting these capabilities to China, the answer should be no. Not licensed. Not delayed. Not cosmetically restricted.
And if that position conflicts with Silicon Valley advisers who view this as a growth opportunity, they should return to where they belong. The fact that the US is getting 25% of the deal (which i bet never finds its way into America’s general account), means nothing except confirming Lenin’s joke about selling the rope to hang ourselves, you know, kind of like TikTok.
David Sacks should go back to Silicon Valley.
This is not venture capital. This is our national security and he’s selling it like rope.
If you’re a TikTok user who has ever worried, even a tiny bit, that the People’s Republic of China might have an interest in your behavior, preferences, movements, or social graph, take heart. A newly released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory from intelligence agencies in the United States, Canada, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and a long list of allied intelligence agencies proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that the PRC is far too busy compromising the world’s telecommunications infrastructure to care about your TikTok “For You Page.”
Nothing to see here. Scroll on.
For those who like their reassurance with a side of evidence, the advisory—titled “Countering Chinese State Actors’ Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System”—is one of the clearest, broadest warnings ever issued about a Chinese state-sponsored intrusion campaign. And, because the agencies involved designated it as not sensitive and may be shared publicly without restriction (TLP:CLEAR), you can read it yourself.
The World’s Telecom Backbones: Now Featuring Uninvited Guests
The intel agency advisory describes a “Typhoon class” global espionage ecosystem run through persistent compromises of backbone routers, provider-edge and customer-edge routers, ISP and telecom infrastructure, transportation networks, lodging and hospitality systems, government and military-adjacent networks.
This is not hypothetical. The advisory includes extremely detailed penetration chains: attackers exploit widely known “Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures” (CVEs) in routers, firewalls, VPNs, and management interfaces, then establish persistence through configuration modifications, traffic mirroring, injected services, and encrypted tunnels. This lets them monitor, redirect, copy, or exfiltrate traffic across entire service regions.
Put plainly: if your internet service provider has a heartbeat and publicly routable equipment, the attackers have probably knocked on the door. And for a depressingly large number of large-scale network operators, they got in.
This is classical intelligence tradecraft. The PRC’s immediate goal isn’t ransomware. It’s not crypto mining. It’s not vandalism. It’s good old-fashioned espionage: long-term access, silent monitoring, and selective exploitation.
What They’re Collecting: Clues About Intent
The advisory makes the overall aim explicit: to give PRC intelligence the ability to identify and track targets’ communications and movements worldwide.
That includes metadata on calls, enterprise-internal communications, hotel and travel itineraries, traffic patterns for government and defense systems, persistent vantage points on global networks.
This is signals intelligence (SIGINT), not smash-and-grab.
And importantly: this kind of operation requires enormous intelligence-analytic processing, not a general-purpose “LLM training dataset.” These are targeted, high-value accesses, not indiscriminate web scrapes. The attackers are going after specific information—strategic, diplomatic, military, infrastructure, and political—not broad consumer content.
So no, this advisory is not about “AI training.” It is about access, exfiltration, and situational awareness across vital global communications arteries.
Does This Tell Us Anything About TikTok?
Officially, no. The advisory never mentions TikTok, ByteDance, or consumer social media apps. It is focused squarely on infrastructure.
But from a strategic-intent standpoint, it absolutely matters. Because when you combine:
1. Global telecom-layer access 2. Persistent long-term SIGINT footholds 3. The PRC’s demonstrated appetite for foreign behavioral data 4. The existence of the richest behavioral dataset on Earth—TikTok’s U.S. user base
—you get a coherent picture of the intelligence ecosystem the Chinese Communist Party is building on…I guess you’d have to say “the world”.
If a nation-state is willing to invest years compromising backbone routers, it is not a stretch to imagine what they could do with a mobile app installed on the phones of oh say 170 million Americans to pick a random number that conveniently collects social graphs, location traces, contact patterns, engagement preferences, political and commercial interests that are visible in the PRC.
But again, don’t worry. The advisory suggests only that Chinese state actors have global access to the infrastructure over which your TikTok traffic travels—not that they would dare take an interest in the app itself. And besides, the TikTok executives swore under oath to the U.S. Congress that it didn’t happen that way so it must be true.
After all, why would a government running a worldwide intrusion program want access to the largest behavioral-data sensor array outside the NSA?
If you still believe the PRC is nowhere near TikTok’s data, then this advisory will reassure you: it’s just a gentle reminder that Chinese state actors are burrowed into global telecom backbones, hotel networks, transportation systems, and military-adjacent infrastructure—pure souls simply striving to make sure your “For You” page loads quickly.
After all, why would a government running a worldwide network-intrusion program have any interest in the richest behavioral dataset on Earth?
Xi Jinping’s new article in Qiushi (the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s flagship theoretical public policy journal) repackages a familiar message: China will promote the “healthy and high-quality development” of the private economy, but under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This is expressed in China’s statutory law as the “Private Economy Promotion Law.” And of course we have to always remember that under the PRC “constitution,” statutes are primarily designed to safeguard the authority and interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather than to protect the rights and privileges of individuals—because individuals don’t really have any protections against the CCP.
For U.S. policymakers weighing what to do about TikTok, this is not reassuring rhetoric in my view. It is instead a reminder that, in China, private platforms ultimately operate within a legal-and-political framework that gives state-security organs binding powers over companies, the Chinese people, and their data.
In another show of support for China’s private sector, Beijing has released the details of a speech from President Xi Jinping which included vows the country would guarantee a level playing field for private firms, safeguard entrepreneurs’ lawful rights and interests, and step up efforts to solve their long-standing challenges, including overdue payments.
The full address, delivered in February to a group of China’s leading entrepreneurs, had not been made available to the public before Friday, when Qiushi – the ruling Communist Party’s theoretical journal – posted a transcript on its website.
“The policies and measures to promote the development of the private economy must be implemented in a solid and thorough manner,” Xi said in February. “Whatever the party Central Committee has decided must be resolutely carried out – without ambiguity, delay, or compromise
I will try to explain why the emphasis of Xi’s policy speech matters, and why the divest-or-ban logic for TikTok under US law (and it is a law) remains intact regardless of what may seem like “friendly” language about private enterprise. It’s also worth remembering that whatever the result of the TikTok divestment may be, it’s just another stop along the way in the Sino-American struggle—or something more kinetic. As Clausewitz wrote in his other famous quotation, the outcomes produced by war are never final. (See Book I Chapter 1 aka the good stuff.) Even the most decisive battlefield victory may have no lasting political achievement. As we have seen time and again, the termination of one conflict often produces the necessary conditions for future conflict.
What Xi’s piece actually signals
Xi’s article combines pro-private-sector language (property-rights protection, market access, financing support) with an explicit call for Party leadership and ideological guidance in the private economy. In other words, the promise is growth within control, and not just any control but the control of the Party. There is no carve‑out from national-security statutes, no “TikTok exemption,” and no suggestion that private firms can decline cooperation when state-security laws apply consistent with China’s “unrestricted warfare” doctrine.
Recall that the CCP has designated the TikTok algorithm as a strategic national asset, and “national” in this context and the context of Xi’s article means the Chinese Communist Party of which Xi is President-for-Life. This brother is not playing.
The laws that define the TikTok Divestment risk (not the press releases)
The core concern about TikTok is jurisdiction, or the CCP’s extra-territorial jurisdiction, a concept we don’t fully comprehend. Xi’s Qiushi article promises support for private firms under Party leadership. That means that the National Intelligence Law, Cybersecurity Law, Counter‑Espionage Law, and China’s data‑export regime remain in force and are controlling authority over companies like TikTok. For U.S. reviewers like CIFIUS, that means ByteDance‑controlled TikTok is, by design, subject to compelled, confidential cooperation with state‑security organs.
As long as the TikTok platform and algorithm is ultimately controlled by a company subject to the CCP’s security laws, U.S. reviewers correctly assume those laws can reach the service, even if operations are partly localized abroad. MTP readers will recall the four pillars of China’s statutory security regime that matter most in this context, being:
National Intelligence Law (2017). Requires all organizations and citizens to support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work, and to keep that cooperation secret. Corporate policies and NDAs do not trump statutory duties, especially in the PRC.
Cybersecurity Law (2017). Obligates “network operators” to provide technical support and assistance to public‑security and state‑security organs, and sets the baseline for security reviews and Multi‑Level Protection (MLPS) obligations.
Counter‑Espionage Law (2023 amendment). Broadens the scope of what counts as “espionage” to include data, documents, and materials related to national security or the “national interest,” increasing the zone where requests can be justified.
Data regime (Data Security Law (DSL), Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL), and the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) regulatory measures). Controls cross‑border transfers through security assessments or standard contracts and allows denials on national‑security grounds. Practically, many datasets can’t leave China without approval—and keys/cryptography used onshore must follow onshore rules.
None of the above is changed by the Private Economy Promotion Law or by Xi’s supportive tone toward entrepreneurs. The laws remain superior in any conflict such as the TikTok divest-or-ban law.
It is these laws that are at the bottom of U.S. concerns about TikTok’s data scraping–it is, after all, spyware with a soundtrack. There’s a strong case to be made that U.S. artists, songwriters, creators and fans are all dupes of TikTok as a data collection tool in a country that requires its companies to hand over to the Ministry of State Security all it needs to support the intelligence mission (MSS is like the FBI and CIA in one agency with a heavy ration of FSB).
Zhang Yiming, founder of ByteDance and former public face of TikTok, stepped down as CEO in 2021 but remains Chairman and key shareholder. He controls more than half of the company’s voting rights and retains about a 21% stake. That also makes him China’s richest man. Though low-profile publicly, he is actively guiding ByteDance’s AI strategy and long-term direction. Mr. Zhang does not discuss this part. It should come as no surprise–according to his Wikipedia page, Mr. Zhang understands what happens when you don’t toe the Party line:
ByteDance’s AI strategy is built on aggressive large-scale data scraping including from TikTok. Its proprietary crawler, ByteSpider, dominates global web-scraping traffic, collecting vast amounts of content at speeds far beyond rivals like OpenAI. This raw data fuels TikTok’s recommendation engine and broader generative AI development, giving ByteDance rapid adaptability and massive training inputs. Unlike OpenAI, which emphasizes curated datasets, ByteDance prioritizes scale, velocity, and real-time responsiveness, integrating insights from TikTok user behavior and the wider internet. This approach positions ByteDance as a formidable AI competitor, leveraging its enormous data advantage to strengthen consumer products, expand generative AI capabilities, and consolidate global influence.
I would find it very, very hard to believe that Mr. Zhang is not a member of the Chinese Communist Party, but in any event he understands very clearly what his role is under the National Intelligence Law and related statutes. Do you think that standing up to the MSS to protect the data privacy of American teenagers is consistent with “Xi Jinping Thought”?
Why this makes TikTok’s case harder, not easier
For Washington, the TikTok problem is not market access or entrepreneurship. It’s the data governance chain. Xi’s article underscores that private firms are expected to align with the Party Center’s decisions and to embed Party structures. Combine that political expectation with the statutory duties described above, and you get a simple inference: if China’s security services want something—from data access to algorithmic levers—ByteDance and its affiliates are obliged to give it to them or at least help, and are often barred from disclosing that help.
That’s why divestiture has become the U.S. default: the only durable mitigation against TikTok is to place ownership and effective control outside PRC legal reach, with clean technical and organizational separation (code, data, keys, staffing, and change control). Anything short of that leaves the fundamental risk untouched.
Where the U.S. law and process fit
Congress’s divest‑or‑ban statute requires TikTok to be controlled by an entity not subject to PRC direction, on terms approved by U.S. authorities. Beijing’s export‑control rules on recommendation algorithms make a full transfer difficult if not impossible; that’s why proposals have floated a U.S. “fork” with separate code, ops, and data. But Xi’s article doesn’t move the ball: it simply reinforces that CCP jurisdiction over private platforms is a feature, not a bug, of the system.
Practical implications (policy and product)
For policymakers: Treat Xi’s article as confirmation that political control and security statutes are baked in. Negotiated “promises” won’t outweigh legal duties to assist intelligence work. Any compliance plan that assumes voluntary transparency or a “hands‑off” approach is fragile by design.
For platforms: If you operate in China, assume compelled and confidential cooperation is possible and in this case almost a certainty if it hasn’t already happened. Architect China operations as least‑privilege, least‑data environments; segregate code and keys; plan for outbound data barrrers as a normal business condition.
For users and advertisers: The risk discussion is about governance and jurisdiction, not whether a particular management team “would never do that.” They would. Corporate intent can’t override state legal authority particularly when the Party’s Ministry of State Security is doing the asking.
Now What?
Xi’s article does not soften TikTok’s regulatory problem in the United States. If anything, it sharpens it by reiterating that the private economy advances underthe Party’s direction, never apart from it. When you combine Mr. Zhang’s role with Bytedance in China’s AI national champions, it’s pretty obvious whose side TikTok is on.
Wherever the divest-or-ban legislation ends up, it will inevitably set the stage for the next conflict. If I had to bet today, my bet is that Xi has no intention of making a deal with the US that involves giving up the TikTok algorithm in violation of the Party’s export-control rules and access to US user data for AI training.
It finally happened–Congress passed the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act that prohibits the distribution, maintenance, or provision of internet hosting services for applications that are directly or indirectly operated by foreign adversaries. This legislation would include applications owned by ByteDance, Ltd. (the company that owns TikTok) or social media companies controlled by foreign adversaries that pose a significant threat to national security.
According to a Reuters exclusive, the response from Bytedance is that they would rather shut down TikTok than sell it–if the sale included the TikTok algorithm:
“The algorithms TikTok relies on for its operations are deemed core to ByteDance’s overall operations, which would make a sale of the app with algorithms highly unlikely, said the sources close to the parent….
TikTok shares the same core algorithms with ByteDance domestic apps like short video platform Douyin, three of the sources said. Its algorithms are considered better than ByteDance rivals such as Tencent and Xiaohongshu, said one of them.
It would be impossible to divest TikTok with its algorithms as their intellectual property licence is registered under ByteDance in China and thus difficult to disentangle from the parent company, said the sources.”
Well then. Of course, one of the primary national security arguments supporting any First Amendment defense on a challenge by TikTok to the content neutral, time, place and manner regulation will involve both the data privacy and foreign actor mass media manipulation evidentiary hearings. I don’t know how you make that defense without access to the algorithm. So why so secretive?
One could therefore plausibly argue that refusing to put the algorithm on the table is as good as admitting that TikTok is manipulating US users through algorithmic emotional targeting and scraping their users private data to do so. That would directly undermine their First Amendment attack on the US government and be a big step toward proving the government’s case.
And, of course, that secret algorithm uses music as the honeypot to attract users from the very young to the not so young. Remember, if this issue ever comes up in a court as a defense for the government, it will likely be because TikTok brought the underlying lawsuit that gave rise to the defense, and then refused to comply with a subpoena for the key piece of evidence. We call that “bootstrapping” in the trade.
In the interest of full disclosure, I’ve been supporting a version of the foreign adversary divestment legislation since 2020 and did so publicly that year when I moderated a great panel at the Music Biz conference on this very subject. If that panel or this topic made you uncomfortable, it may be because you felt such a strong…let’s say attraction…to TikTok as either a marketer or user that you couldn’t imagine living without it. Or maybe you bought into the “exposure” benefits of TikTok. Or maybe you’d had no reason to think about the larger implications. More about that another time.
After the legislation passed–despite a US lobbying campaign against it worthy of The Internet Association…ahem–people are asking, now what? So let’s think about that.
The Universal Connection
TikTok’s future cannot be well understood without taking into account the withdrawal of Universal’s recordings and songs from the platform for commercial reasons. That withdrawal now looks even more prescient given the foreign adversary divestiture legislation. Is it materially different to make a deal with a company that is just another piggy Big Tech company that doesn’t value music and considers it a loss leader to get to the really big bundle of cash like Spotify stock, or to do a deal with that piggy company who has also been declared a tool of a strategic foreign adversary of the United States by none other than the President of the United States?
I think it rather is. So the two events are in some ways quite connected.
First of all, in the short run I would expect TikTok to immediately expand their direct licensing campaign which evidently has already snared Taylor Swift and do it quickly before anyone noticed that what was just a crappy licensing deal the day before President Biden signed the legislation into law, now is a crappy licensing deal from a declared foreign adversary of the United States. How that twist will affect the brand of Miss Americana remains to be seen.
One solution I would expect to get floated in coming days is the need for TikTok executives to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. According to the Congressional Research Service:
In 1938, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (22 U.S.C. §§611-621; FARA) was enacted to require individuals doing political or advocacy work on behalf of foreign entities in the United States to register with the Department of Justice and to disclose their relationship, activities, receipts, and disbursements in support of their activities. The FARA does not prohibit any specific activities; rather it seeks to require registration and disclosure of them….In 1966, FARA was amended to shift the focus from political propagandists to agents representing the economic interests of foreign principals. These amendments were partially the result of an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into foreign sugar interests and other lobbying activities. The 1966 amendments changed several definitions in the law, prohibited contingent fee contracts, broadened exemptions to ensure legitimate commercial activities were not burdened, strengthened provisions for the disclosure and labeling of propaganda, and required the Department of Justice to issue regulations on the act (28 C.F.R. §5.1 et seq.).
FARA enforcement languished for a bit over the years. However, FARA enforcement against those who fail to register as a foreign agent has had a resurgence in popularity at the Department of Justice. I think it can fairly be said that requiring TikTok executives to register would be consistent with DOJ’s actions and is worth a discussion. The policy underlying FARA is for the public to be aware of who is whom–disclosure not imprisonment, or at least disclosure first.
Enter the Miasma of Angst
There is something of a miasma of angst around passing the foreign adversary divestment legislation as applied to TikTok which is partly due to an extraordinary amount of commercial activity between the US and China which may tend to mask the underlying kinetic tensions between our countries. It’s quite difficult for Americans to grasp this kinetic part due to the Great Firewall of China, the language and cultural barrier, and China’s own propaganda which is way, way more effective and long lasting than anything the Nazis dreamed up. TikTok is, after all, a danger close propaganda missile battery.
The legislation seems to assume that China is an “adversary” and not a “belligerent”. Is that actually true?
There are other rather inescapable events that suggests that the U.S. is already in a war with China, at least as far as the Chinese government are concerned. It helps to understand that when people say the Chinese Communist Party or “the CCP”, they mean the Chinese government and vice versa, a government ruled by Chairman for Life Xi Jinping. The Chinese constitution is, for example, the Constitution of the CCP.
Always remember that Usama Bin Laden declared war on the US but nobody took him seriously. Nuff said.
Why is that relevant to TikTok? Well, here’s another declaration of war on the US that nobody noticed. On May 14, 2019, the CCP government declared a “people’s war” against the United States as reported in the Pravda of China, the Global Times operated by Xinhua News Agency (the cabinet-level “news” agency run by the CCP):
“The most important thing is that in the China-US trade war, the US side fights for greed and arrogance … and morale will break at any point…The Chinese side is fighting back to protect its legitimate interests. The trade war in the US is the creation of one person and one administration, but it affects that country’s entire population…In China, the entire country and all its people are being threatened. For us, this is a real ‘people’s war.'”
What is the “people’s war”? It is an old Maoist phrase (remembering that Xi Jinping’s father fought with Mao during China’s Communist Revolution). It has a very specific meaning in the history of the Chinese Communist Party according to Wikipedia:
People’s war, also called protracted people’s war, is a Maoist military strategy. First developed by the Chinese communist revolutionary leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the basic concept behind people’s war is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the countryside (stretching their supply lines) where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare.
So in the dimension of “unrestricted warfare,” what end state would the CCP like to see? Bearing in mind that they will avoid a shooting war in favor of the various other dimensions of civil-military fusion and following Sun Tzu’s admonishment o subdue the enemy without fighting. One way would be to impose economic damage on the United States.
The Unrestricted Warfare Dimension
What is this “unrestricted warfare”? That is a much bigger topic and I cannot emphasize enough the importance for every American and really everyone to understand it. Literally “Unrestricted Warfare” is one of the most important books on military strategy and geopolitics that nobody has read.
We think the book was published in Mandarin In 1999; it could have been earlier. It was written by two colonels in the Peoples’ Liberation Army of the Peoples Republic of China and entitled Unrestricted Warfare. The title is variously translated as Unrestricted Warfare: Two Air Force Senior Colonels on Scenarios for War and the Operational Art in an Era of Globalization, or the more bellicose Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America.
Why is this important? You must understand that when the colonels say “to destroy America” they actually mean that very thing. China’s military and civil goal is to replace the United States as the global hegemon under the “mandate of Heaven.” (See 2050 China: Understanding Xi Jinping Thought.)
No kidding.
The thesis of the book is that it is a mistake for a contemporary great power to think of war solely in military terms; war includes an economic, cyber, space, information war (especially social media like TikTok), and other dimensions–including kinetic–depending on the national interest at the time. I think of Unrestricted Warfare as an origin story for China’s civil and military fusion policy, later expressed in various statutes of the Chinese Communist Party that were on full display in the TikTok hearings before Congress.
Although the book was translated and certain of the cognoscenti read it in Mandarin (see Josh Rogan, Michal Pillsbury and Gen. Rob Spaulding), it was largely unnoticed until recently. Except in China–the CCP rewarded the authors handsomely: Colonel Qiao Liang retired as a major general in the PLA and Colonel Wang Xiangsui is a professor at Beihang University in Beijing following his retirement as a senior Colonel in the PLA (OF-5).
The point of both Bin Ladin’s 1998 fatwa and Unrestricted Warfare, and the 2019 people’s war declaration, is both that each of them declared war on America, and that no one paid attention. We know where that got us with bin Ladin, there are movies about it.
To War or Not?
So the first question is what is the argument that we are not at war currently with China under their definition? Particularly given that they declared war on us with just enough plausible deniability to make you feel bad about shutting down TikTok–see what I did there? (I think the CCP declared war started much, much longer ago, but let’s stick with their people’s war declaration as a recent tangible event to keep it manageable and ignore, oh, say island building, expanding to the largest navy in the world, and the rest of it. (Read The Hundred-Year Marathon and see what you think. It may be worth reviewing the history on the Anglo-German Naval Agreement indirectly referenced in a Noël Coward song.)
Don’t Let’s Be Beastly to the Germans by Noël Coward is reflective on “excessive humanitarians”
It is also worth remembering that should open hostilities with China actually break out, i.e., in the colonels’ words should the current level of unrestricted warfare go kinetic, CCP-owned companies operating in the US will fall under an entirely more intense level of scrutiny. This is permitted by international laws of armed conflict and doesn’t even require additional US national laws although there surely will be many.
In the first instance, is the ostensibly private company actually private? What if good old chummy Mr. Tok turned out to be a colonel in the People’s Liberation Army and just didn’t get around to telling anyone? (I don’t think anyone in Congressional hearings ever asked him.)
And what if TikTok complied with the CCP laws that apply to Bytedance for sure and may apply to TikTok that require there to be a CCP cadre in each company? (See Article 19 of China’s “Company Law.”) If a private company’s staff members are also members of the armed forces of a state or have combat functions for an organized armed group belonging to a party in the conflict, they are notconsidered civilians. Further, if a private company is directly involved in military operations (e.g., cyber attacks or psy ops), it may lose its civilian status and become a legitimate military target under the Geneva Conventions. (Further reading, an excellent article from West Point on topic. I don’t think anyone ever asked Mr. Chew if he was a serving member of the PLA.)
So if China invades Taiwan and the US comes in on the side of Taiwan, but TikTok assists in even psychological warfare ops to support that war effort for China against Taiwan (and possibly the US), then what happens? What if it turns out that senior Tiks are reservists or active duty in the Peoples Liberation Army that they just kind of didn’t mention before? Good old Uncle Chew? This kind of thing can also get you sanctioned if you try hard enough. Remember this came up with Elon Musk when Starlink allegedly thwarted an attack by Ukraine (which he denied for other reasons).
So about those licenses….Do artists really want to be used as a honeypot? Especially if TikTok keeps its algorithm, ostensibly shuts down in the US, but parks outside the US and still assaults US users?
Music Tech Solutions 