Tag: intellectual property

The Constitutional Shadow of the White House AI Framework: Law Without Law

One of the most important things about the White House AI framework released last week is what it is not.

It is not an executive order.

That may sound like a technical distinction, but it is doing an enormous amount of work here. Because by avoiding the form of an executive order, the framework avoids something even more important: Judicial review.

An executive order that attempted to declare AI training on copyrighted works lawful—or to constrain Congress from acting—would immediately invite challenge in the very judicial branch the framework also seeks to influence. Oh, that would be fun.

It would raise Administrative Procedure Act questions. It would trigger separation-of-powers scrutiny. It would likely be litigated within days.

This framework does none of that and is not susceptible to judicial challenge.

Instead, it achieves much of the same practical effect—shaping legal outcomes, constraining policy space, and signaling preferred doctrine—without creating a justiciable action. It is, in effect, law without law, and outcomes by positioning. Silicon Valley’s favorite.

Takings by Policy, Not Statute

Start with the most obvious constitutional issue: the Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which states that “private property [cannot] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

Copyright is a form of property. That is not controversial. It is a statutory property right grounded in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause, and it carries exclusive rights that have long been understood as economically valuable.

Now consider what the White House framework does.

It declares that AI training—mass, indiscriminate ingestion of copyrighted works—as lawful. It does so without requiring compensation. And it does so in a context where the resulting systems can substitute for, or diminish the market for, the original works.

If that official policy position of the Executive Branch were enacted into law, it would raise a straightforward question:

Has the government authorized the use of private property for public and commercial purposes without compensation? Or more directly, has the Executive Branch just announced that will not prosecute that indiscriminate ingestion for any reason? Can we expect to see amicus briefs from the Solicitor General opposing copyright owners pursuing their rights in court?

That is sounding a lot like a taking.

But because the framework is not law, it avoids the moment where that question must be answered. It does not extinguish rights formally. It renders them economically hollow in practice, while leaving the formal structure intact.

That is the key move: functional elimination without formal abolition.

Ex Post Facto in Everything but Name

The framework also raises a second, less discussed issue: the logic of ex post facto lawmaking.

The Ex Post Facto Clause technically applies to criminal law. But the underlying principle is broader: the government should not change the legal consequences of past conduct to benefit favored actors or disadvantage others. Of course, copyright owners raising this argument will have the Spotify retroactive safe harbor in Title I of the Music Modernization Act thrown in their face as rank hypocrisy, which they would richly deserve, although as any 10 year old can tell you, two wrongs don’t make a right, at least in theory.

Here, the timeline matters.

  • Massive datasets have already been scraped.
  • Models have already been trained.
  • The conduct that enabled this may, in many instances, have been legally questionable—and in cases of willful infringement, potentially criminal under federal copyright law. Or if you listen to me, the largest case of criminal copyright infringement in history.

Now comes the policy years after the fact in the face of over 150 AI lawsuits all based on copyright infringement to one degree or another:

Training is lawful.

That looks less like interpretation and more like retroactive validation.

Even if framed as civil doctrine, the effect is similar to retroactive decriminalization of conduct tied to vested rights. It sends a clear message: conduct that may have been unlawful when undertaken will be treated as lawful because it is now economically indispensable to the broligarchs.

That is not how the rule of law is supposed to work.

Separation of Powers by Suggestion

The framework’s treatment of Congress is equally striking. It does not say Congress lacks authority to legislate. The President cannot say that. Well…he can, but there’s no foundation for the statement. The Constitution is clear: Congress defines copyright.

Instead, the framework says Congress should not act in ways that would affect judicial resolution of the training question.

That is an unusual formulation. Congress legislates in areas under litigation all the time. Indeed, it is often expected to clarify statutory ambiguity.

What the framework is doing is more subtle: It is attempting to shape the legislative field without formally constraining it.

And it pairs that with an implicit second message:

  • Legislation that restricts training or mandates licensing is inconsistent with executive policy.
  • Such legislation is therefore unlikely to be signed by the President. So why bring it?

That is a veto signal—delivered without the political cost of an actual veto.

Judicial Signaling Without Command

The same dynamic applies to the courts.

The framework claims to “defer” to the judiciary. But it simultaneously declares a preferred outcome: training is lawful.

That is not deference. That is signaling.

Judges are, of course, independent. But they do not operate in a vacuum. They are aware of executive priorities, legislative inaction, and market realities. When all three align around a single policy direction, it creates an interpretive gravitational force that is difficult to ignore.

And the signal travels further.

To lawyers.
To regulators.
To anyone whose career may intersect with executive appointment.

It normalizes what counts as a “reasonable” position within the current policy environment.

Prosecutorial Silence as Policy

There is also a more immediate, practical consequence.

While the framework does not have the force of law, it functions as an indirect directive to the Department of Justice. By declaring training lawful as a matter of policy, it signals that federal enforcement resources should not be used to pursue cases premised on the opposite view.

In effect, it tells prosecutors:

Do not spend time considering criminal enforcement for large-scale copyright violations tied to AI training. Do not spend time considering antitrust enforcement against the broligarchs. In fact, don’t spend any time prosecuting anyone regarding AI.

That matters because, for example, willful copyright infringement at scale can, in certain circumstances, give rise to criminal liability. I mean if that doesn’t, what does? Yet under this framework, even the possibility of such enforcement is quietly set aside.

This is not formal immunity. But in practice, it can look very similar.

Why “Not an Executive Order” Matters

If this were an executive order, all of these issues would be front and center:

  • Is this a taking?
  • Does it exceed executive authority?
  • Does it interfere with Congress?
  • Does it interfere with the Judiciary?

Because it is not and EO, these important issues remain in the background—present but untested.

That is the genius, and the danger, of the approach.

It allows the executive branch to:

  • Shape doctrine
  • Influence courts
  • Constrain Congress
  • Guide enforcement priorities
  • Normalize contested conduct

—all without triggering the mechanisms designed to check it.

The Constitutional Shadow

The AI framework does not violate the Constitution in any formal sense.

It does something more complicated.

It operates in the constitutional shadow—where policy can reshape rights, incentives, and expectations without ever crossing the line that would allow a court to say no.

But shadows matter.

Because by the time the law catches up—if it ever does—the world the Constitution was meant to govern and protect may already have changed.

The Devil’s Greatest Trick: Ro Khanna’s “Creator Bill of Rights” Is a Political Shield, Not a Charter for Creative Labor

La plus belle des ruses du Diable est de vous persuader qu’il n’existe pas! (“The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist.”)

Charles Baudelaire, Le Joueur généreux

Ro Khanna’s so‑called “Creator Bill of Rights” is being sold as a long‑overdue charter for fairness in the digital economy—you know, like for gig workers. In reality, it functions as a political shield for Silicon Valley platforms: a non‑binding, influencer‑centric framework built on a false revenue‑share premise that bypasses child labor, unionized creative labor, professional creators, non‑featured artists, and the central ownership and consent crises posed by generative AI. 

creator-bill-of-rights-resolution-draft-2.0-clean-55Download

Mr. Khanna’s resolution treats transparency as leverage, consent as vibes, and platform monetization as deus ex machina-style natural law of the singularity—while carefully avoiding enforceable rights, labor classification, copyright primacy, artist consent for AI training, work‑for‑hire abuse, and real remedies against AI labs for artists. What flows from his assumptions is not a “bill of rights” for creators, but a narrative framework designed to pacify the influencer economy and legitimize platform power at the exact moment that judges are determining that creative labor is being illegally scraped, displaced, and erased by AI leviathans including some publicly traded companies with trillion-dollar market caps.

The First Omission: Child Labor in the Creator Economy

Rep. Khanna’s newly unveiled “Creator Bill of Rights” has been greeted with the kind of headlines Silicon Valley loves: Congress finally standing up for creators, fairness, and transparency in the digital economy. But the very first thing it doesn’t do should set off alarm bells. The resolution never meaningfully addresses child labor in the creator economy, a sector now infamous for platform-driven exploitation of minors through user generated content, influencer branding, algorithmic visibility contests, and monetized childhood.  (Wikipedia is Exhibit A, Facebook Exhibit B, YouTube Exhibit C and Instagram Exhibit D.)

There is no serious discussion of child worker protections and all that comes with it, often under state laws: working-hour limits, trust accounts, consent frameworks, or the psychological and economic coercion baked into platform monetization systems. For a document that styles itself as a “bill of rights,” that omission alone is disqualifying. But perhaps understandable given AI Viceroy David Sacks’ obsession with blocking enforcement of state laws that “impede” AI.

And it’s not an isolated miss. Once you read Khanna’s framework closely, a pattern emerges. This isn’t a bill of rights for creators. It’s a political shield for platforms that is built on a false economic premise, framed around influencers, silent on professional creative labor, evasive on AI ownership and training consent, and carefully structured to avoid enforceable obligations.

The Foundational Error: Treating Revenue Share as Natural Law that Justifies A Stream Share Threshold

The foundational error appears right at the center of the resolution: its uncritical embrace of the Internet’s coin of the realm: revenue-sharing. Khanna calls for “clear, transparent, and predictable revenue-sharing terms” between platforms and creators. That phrase sounds benign, even progressive. But it quietly locks in the single worst idea anyone ever had for royalty economics: big-pool platform revenue share.  An idea that is being rejected by pretty much everyone except Spotify with its stream share threshold. In case Mr. Khanna didn’t get the memo, artist-centric is the new new thing.

Revenue sharing treats creators as participants in a platform monetization program, not as rights-holders.  You know, “partners.”  Artists don’t get a share of Spotify stock, they get a “revenue share” because they’re “partnering” with Spotify.   If that’s how Spotify treats “partners”….

Under that revenue share model, the platform defines what counts as revenue, what gets excluded, how it’s allocated, which metrics matter, and how the rules change. The platform controls all the data. The platform controls the terms. And the platform retains unilateral power to rewrite the deal. Hey “partner,” that’s not compensation grounded in intellectual property or labor rights. It’s a dodge grounded in platform policy.

We already know how this story ends. Big-pool revenue share regimes hide cross-subsidies, reward algorithm gaming over quality, privilege viral noise over durable cultural work, and collapse bargaining power into opaque market share payments of microscopic proportion. Revenue share deals destroy price signals, hollow out licensing markets, and make creative income volatile and non-forecastable. This is exceptionally awful for songwriters and nobody can tell a songwriter today what that burger on Tuesday will actually bring.

A advertising revenue-share model penalizes artists because they receive only a tiny fraction of the ads served against their own music, while platforms like Google capture roughly half of the total advertising revenue generated across the entire network. Naturally they love it.

Rev shares of advertising revenue are the core economic pathology behind what happened to music, journalism, and digital publishing over the last fifteen years.  As we have seen from Spotify’s stream share threshold, a platform can unilaterally decide to cut off payments at any time for any absurd reason and get away with it.  And Khanna’s resolution doesn’t challenge that logic. It blesses it.

He doesn’t say creators are entitled to enforceable royalties tied to uses of their work at rates set by the artist. He doesn’t say there should be statutory floors, audit rights, underpayment penalties, nondiscrimination rules, or retaliation protections. He doesn’t say platforms should be prohibited from unilaterally redefining the pie. He says let’s make the revenue share more “transparent” and “predictable.” That’s not a power shift. That’s UX optimization for exploitation.

This Is an Influencer Bill, Not a Creator Bill

The second fatal flaw is sociological. Khanna’s resolution is written for the creator economy, not the creative economy.

The “creator” in Khanna’s bill is a YouTuber, a TikToker, a Twitch streamer, a podcast personality, a Substack writer, a platform-native entertainer (but no child labor protection). Those are real jobs, and the people doing them face real precarity. But they are not the same thing as professional creative labor. They are usually not professional musicians, songwriters, composers, journalists, photographers, documentary filmmakers, authors, screenwriters, actors, directors, designers, engineers, visual artists, or session musicians. They are not non-featured performers. They are not investigative reporters. They are not the people whose works are being scraped at industrial scale to train generative AI systems.

Those professional creators are workers who produce durable cultural goods governed by copyright, contract, and licensing markets. They rely on statutory royalties, collective bargaining, residuals, reuse frameworks, audit rights, and enforceable ownership rules. They face synthetic displacement and market destruction from AI systems trained on their work without consent. Khanna’s resolution barely touches any of that. It governs platform participation. It does not govern creative labor.  It’s not that influencers shouldn’t be able to rely on legal protections; it’s that if you’re going to have a bill of rights for creators it should include all creators and very often the needs are different.  Starting with collective bargaining and unions.

The Total Bypass of Unionized Labor

Nowhere is this shortcoming more glaring than in the complete bypass of unionized labor. The framework lives in a parallel universe where SAG-AFTRA, WGA, DGA, IATSE, AFM, Equity, newsroom unions, residuals, new-use provisions, grievance procedures, pension and health funds, minimum rates, credit rules, and collective bargaining simply do not exist. That entire legal architecture is invisible.  And Khanna’s approach could easily roll back the gains on AI protections that unions have made through collective bargaining.

Which means the resolution is not attempting to interface with how creative work actually functions in film, television, music, journalism, or publishing. It is not creative labor policy. It is platform fairness rhetoric.

Invisible Labor: Non-Featured Artists and the People the Platform Model Erases

The same erasure applies to non-featured artists and invisible creative labor. Session musicians, backup singers, supporting actors, dancers, crew, editors, photographers on assignment, sound engineers, cinematographers — these people don’t live inside platform revenue-share dashboards. They are paid through wage scales, reuse payments, residuals, statutory royalty regimes, and collective agreements.

None of that exists in Khanna’s world. His “creator” is an account, not a worker.

AI Without Consent Is Not Accountability

The AI plank in the resolution follows the same pattern of rhetorical ambition and structural emptiness. Khanna gestures at transparency, consent, and accountability for AI and synthetic media. But he never defines what consent actually means.

Consent for training? For style mimicry? For voice cloning? For archival scraping of journalism and music catalogs? For derivative outputs? For model fine-tuning? For prompt exploitation? For replacement economics?

The bill carefully avoids the training issue. Which is the whole issue.

A real AI consent regime would force Congress to confront copyright primacy, opt-in licensing, derivative works, NIL rights, data theft, model ownership, and platform liability. Khanna’s framework gestures at harms while preserving the industrial ingestion model intact.

The Ownership Trap: Work-for-Hire and AI Outputs

This omission is especially telling. Nowhere does Khanna say platforms may not claim authorship or ownership of AI outputs by default. Nowhere does he say AI-assisted works are not works made for hire. Nowhere does he say users retain rights in their contributions and edits. Nowhere does he say WFH boilerplate cannot be used to convert prompts into platform-owned assets.

That silence is catastrophic.

Right now, platforms are already asserting ownership contractually, claiming assignments of outputs, claiming compilation rights, claiming derivative rights, controlling downstream licensing, locking creators out of monetization, and building synthetic catalogs they own. Even though U.S. law says purely AI-generated content isn’t copyrightable absent human authorship, platforms can still weaponize terms of service, automated enforcement, and contractual asymmetry to create “synthetic  ownership” or “practical control.” Khanna’s resolution says nothing about any of it.

Portable Benefits as a Substitute for Labor Rights

Then there’s the portable-benefits mirage. Portable benefits sound progressive. They are also the classic substitute for confronting misclassification. So first of all, Khanna starts our saying that “gig workers” in the creative economy don’t get health care—aside from the union health plans, I guess. But then he starts with the portable benefits mirage. So which is it? Surely he doesn’t mean nothing from nothing leaves nothing?

If you don’t want to deal with whether creators are actually employees, whether platforms owe payroll taxes, whether wage-and-hour law applies, whether unemployment insurance applies, whether workers’ comp applies, whether collective bargaining rights attach, or…wait for it…stock options apply…you propose portable benefits without dealing with the reality that there are no benefits. You preserve contractor status. You socialize costs and privatize upside. You deflect labor-law reform and health insurance reform for that matter. You look compassionate. And you change nothing structurally.

Khanna’s framework sits squarely in that tradition of nothing from nothing leaves nothing.

A Non-Binding Resolution for a Reason

The final tell is procedural. Khanna didn’t introduce a bill. He introduced a non-binding resolution.

No enforceable rights. No regulatory mandates. No private causes of action. No remedies. No penalties. No agency duties. No legal obligations.

This isn’t legislation. It’s political signaling.

What This Really Is: A Political Shield

Put all of this together and the picture becomes clear. Khanna’s “Creator Bill of Rights” is built on a false revenue-share premise. It is framed around influencers. It bypasses professional creators. It bypasses unions. It bypasses non-featured artists. It bypasses child labor. It bypasses training consent. It bypasses copyright primacy. It bypasses WFH abuse. It bypasses platform ownership grabs. It bypasses misclassification. It bypasses enforceability. I give you…Uber.

It doesn’t fail because it’s hostile to creators, rather because it is indifferent to creators. It fails because it redefines “creator” downward until every hard political and legal question disappears.

And in doing so, it functions as a political shield for the very platforms headquartered in Khanna’s district.

When the Penny Drops

Ro Khanna’s “Creator Bill of Rights” isn’t a rights charter.

It’s a narrative framework designed to stabilize the influencer economy, legitimize platform compensation models, preserve contractor status, soften AI backlash, avoid copyright primacy, avoid labor-law reform, avoid ownership reform, and avoid real accountability.

It treats transparency as leverage. It treats consent as vibes. It treats revenue share as natural law. It treats AI as branding. It treats creative labor as content. It treats platforms as inevitable.

And it leaves out the people who are actually being scraped, displaced, devalued, erased, and replaced: musicians, journalists, photographers, actors, directors, songwriters, composers, engineers, non-featured performers, visual artists, and professional creators.

If Congress actually wants a bill of rights for creators, it won’t start with influencer UX and non-binding resolutions. It will start with enforceable intellectual-property rights, training consent, opt-in regimes, audit rights, statutory floors, collective bargaining, exclusion of AI outputs from work-for-hire, limits on platform ownership claims, labor classification clarity, and real remedies.

Until then, this isn’t a bill of rights.

It’s a press release with footnotes.