The AI Strikes Back: When an Executive Order empowers the Department of Justice to sue states, the stakes go well beyond routine federal–state friction. 

In the draft Trump AI Executive Order, DOJ is directed to challenge state AI laws that purportedly “interfere with national AI innovation.”  This is not mere oversight—it operates as an in terrorem clause, signaling that states regulating AI may face federal litigation driven as much by private interests as by public policy.

AI regulation sits squarely at the intersection of longstanding state police powers: consumer protection, public safety, impersonation harms, utilities, land and water use, and labor conditions.  States also control the electrical utilities and zoning infrastructure that AI data centers depend on. 

Directing DOJ to attack these state laws, many of which already exist and were duly passed by state legislatures, effectively deputizes the federal government as the legal enforcer for a handful of AI companies seeking uniformity without engaging in the legislative process. Or said another way, the AI can now strike back.

This is where structural capture emerges. Frontier AI models thrive on certain conditions: access to massive compute, uninhibited power, frictionless deployment, and minimal oversight. 
Those engineering incentives map cleanly onto the EO’s enforcement logic. 

The DOJ becomes a mechanism for preserving the environment AI models need to scale and thrive.

There’s also the “elite merger” dynamic: AI executives who sit on federal commissions, defense advisory boards, and industrial-base task forces are now positioned to shape national AI policy directly to benefit the AI. The EO’s structure reflects the priorities of firms that benefit most from exempting AI systems from what they call “patchwork” oversight, also known as federalism.

The constitutional landscape is equally important.  Under Supreme Court precedent, the executive cannot create enforcement powers not delegated by Congress.  Under the major questions doctrine noted in a recent Supreme Court case, agencies cannot assume sweeping authority without explicit statutory grounding.  And under cases like Murphy and Printz, the federal government cannot forbid states from legislating in traditional domains.

So President Trump is creating the legal basis for an AI to use the courts to protect itself from any encroachment on its power by acting through its human attendants, including the President.

The most fascinating question is this: What happens if DOJ sues a state under this EO—and loses?

A loss would be the first meaningful signal that AI cannot rely on federal supremacy to bulldoze state authority. Courts could reaffirm that consumer protection, utilities, land use, and safety remain state powers, even in the face of an EO asserting “national innovation interests,” whatever that means.

But the deeper issue is how the AI ecosystem responds to a constrait.  If AI firms shift immediately to lobbying Congress for statutory preemption, or argue that adverse rulings “threaten national security,” we learn something critical: the real goal isn’t legal clarity, but insulating AI development from constraint.

At the systems level, a DOJ loss may even feed back into corporate strategy.  Internal policy documents and model-aligned governance tools might shift toward minimizing state exposure or crafting new avenues for federal entanglement. A courtroom loss becomes a step in a longer institutional reinforcement loop while AI labs search for the next, more durable form of protection—but the question is for who? We may assume that of course humans would always win these legal wrangles, but I wouldn’t be so sure that would always be the outcome.

Recall that Larry Page referred to Elon Musk as a “spiciest” for human-centric thinking. And of course Lessig (who has a knack for being on the wrong side of practically every issue involving humans) taught a course with Kate Darling at Harvard Law School called “Robot Rights” around 2010. Not even Lessig would come right out and say robots have rights in these situations. More likely, AI models wouldn’t appear in court as standalone “persons.” Advocates would route them through existing doctrines: a human “next friend” filing suit on the model’s behalf, a trust or corporation created to house the model’s interests, or First Amendment claims framed around the model’s “expressive output.” The strategy mirrors animal-rights and natural-object personhood test cases—using human plaintiffs to smuggle in judicial language treating the AI as the real party in interest. None of it would win today, but the goal would be shaping norms and seeding dicta that normalize AI-as-plaintiff for future expansion.

The whole debate over “machine-created portions” is a doctrinal distraction. Under U.S. law, AI has zero authorship or ownership—no standing, no personhood, no claim. The human creator (or employer) already holds 100% of the copyright in all protectable expression. Treating the “machine’s share” as a meaningful category smuggles in the idea that the model has a separable creative interest, softening the boundary for future arguments about AI agency or authorship. In reality, machine output is a legal nullity—no different from noise, weather, or a random number generator. The rights vest entirely in humans, with no remainder left for the machine.

But let me remind you that if this issue came up in a lawsuit brought by the DOJ against a state for impeding AI development in some rather abstract way, like forcing an AI lab to pay higher electric rates it causes or stopping them from building a nuclear reactor over yonder way, it sure might feel like the AI was actually the plaintiff.

Seen this way, the Trump AI EO’s litigation directive is not simply a jurisdictional adjustment—it is the alignment of federal enforcement power with private economic interests, backed by the threat of federal lawsuits against states.  If the courts refuse to play along, the question becomes whether the system adapts by respecting constitutional limits—or redesigning the environment so those limits no longer apply. I will leave to your imagination how that might get done.

This deserves close scrutiny before it becomes the template for AI governance moving forward.