Tag: AI music

The Sync Apocalypse Case Against Suno

Democracy Made Them Do It

The new Poseidon Wave Media LLC lawsuit against Suno may become another important fair use case in generative AI music because it goes straight at the weak point Judge Vince Chhabria identified in Kadrey v. Meta regarding books: market substitution and market dilution under factor four that can trump the overused “transformative” analysis.

Poseidon-v-SunoDownload



In Kadrey, Judge Chhabria ruled for Meta on fair use, but he did not give AI companies a clean bill of health. Quite the opposite. He suggested that generative AI training may often fail fair use where plaintiffs build a real record showing that the model floods or dilutes the market for the plaintiffs’ works. Like what is happening in real life with synthetic music, and in particular with synthetic music produced using Suno.

Aside from being suspicious of a grown man voluntarily calling himself “Mikey”, there’s a lot to work with in the public statements of Suno CEO Mikey Shulman. In a widely panned venture capital podcast, “Mikey” argued that traditional music creation is too difficult and time-consuming for most people, claiming that “the majority of people don’t enjoy the majority of the time they spend making music.” He framed AI music generation as a way to democratize creativity by removing the need for years of practice or technical skill.

Yes, that’s right. He’s doing it for, like, democracy, you see. Just like Daniel Ek (who is currently occupying himself after Spotify with another autonomous weapon that again violates international treaties).

Shulman also acknowledged that using copyrighted works in AI training is effectively industry standard, stating that “every AI company does” copyright infringement when building generative AI systems. His comments triggered backlash from musicians, composers and industry observers who viewed the statements as dismissive of artistic labor and revealing about AI companies’ attitudes toward copyright and human creativity. We’ll come back to this bit.

When Did Noah Build the Ark? Before the flood….

But the flooding of markets using Suno is what makes Poseidon different than other cases I’ve seen so far, kind of like the eggshell skull case lawyers study on the first day of Torts. One could argue that Poseidon’s lawsuit against Suno resembles the classic “eggshell skull” rule because AI companies may be liable for the full downstream harm caused by training on copyrighted works even if they claim they did not anticipate the scale of damage. If Suno’s infringement helped create systems that flood markets and substitute for human creators, defendants take the creative marketplace “as they find it.” You could also find it reasonably foreseeable that if one AI lab’s executives knew that “everyone was doing it” the flip side is that “everyone” can cause a good deal of market harm to everyone else.

Plaintiff Poseidon Wave Media, the entity behind the instrumental duo The American Dollar, alleges that Suno copied and ingested 236 recordings and compositions covered by 164 copyright registrations. More importantly, Poseidon alleges that its licensing revenue has fallen by nearly 80% since Suno launched.

That is not a vibes-based fair use objection. That is a market-harm theory with a ledger attached. The plaintiffs still have to prove their case, but it sounds like a pretty good starting place.

The complaint targets the precise market most vulnerable to AI substitution: sync and production music. Cinematic instrumental catalogs are valuable because they supply mood, pacing, emotional texture, and audiovisual utility. Music supervisors are concerned that fully synthetic music undermines the basic trust and clearance infrastructure on which film, television and advertising music depends. They are often pitched an apparent “artist” that turned out to be AI-generated, raising immediate clearance and provenance concerns for music supervisors, their clients and E&O insurance carriers. AI-generated tracks are fundamentally incompatible with the human authorship and rights verification required for professional sync licensing. So in addition to the human cost, there’s a broader aspect to destroying the human market—synthetic music could flood the marketplace with unverifiable works, creating legal uncertainty and making it harder for supervisors to assess ownership, permissions and creative authenticity.

Generative AI does not have to spit out an identical American Dollar track to destroy the market for American Dollar licenses. It only has to produce infinite near-substitutes at lower cost, faster speed, and no meaningful bargaining friction. That is market dilution.

That is factor four. And that is happening at a devastating rate in our business.

The Sync Apocalypse Extends the Kadrey Theory

This is also why Poseidon extends the Kadrey analysis beyond books. In the book cases, market harm may appear more abstract. In sync music, the substitution pathway is far cleaner. The buyer has a practical production need. The AI output can satisfy that need if the music supervisor looks the other way, at least for a while, particularly for commercials, “source” music, other background uses. The original license disappears. Mikey wants you to believe that’s a good thing, because democracy.

Poseidon’s allegation that licensing income collapsed after Suno launched is therefore not just damages evidence. It may be the whole fair use fight.

Suno will likely argue transformation: the model learns from recordings to generate new outputs. But Kadrey already shows why transformation is not enough if factor four turns decisively against the defendant and the plaintiff’s lawyers put on the right case. Judge Chhabria made it clear that this observation applied broadly to all fair use cases: “Generative AI has the potential to flood the market with endless amounts of images, songs, articles, books, and more.” Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 23-cv-03417-VC, slip op. at 1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2025).

That makes Poseidon dangerous for Suno. The complaint does not need to prove that every Suno output is a counterfeit. It needs to show that Suno used copyrighted works to build a machine that competes directly in the licensing market with those works it ripped off.

That is the sync apocalypse theory:

First, copy the catalog.
Then, train the machine.
Then, flood the licensing market with synthetic substitutes.
Then, tell the original musicians there is no market harm because the outputs are not exact copies. Because democracy demands it.

Factor four was built for this problem, even without the democracy part. And Poseidon may be the case that forces courts to say so. And as far as the democracy part goes, I think Mikey may have taken the wrong turn on his way to Collectivism class. In our legal tradition, there’s another idea that has far greater purchase:

“The right of property… [is] that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises… in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”
— Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book II, ch. 1. 

Could Suno’s Executives Be Added Personally?

One question hovering over the Poseidon complaint is whether Suno’s executives and investors could eventually be added as individual defendants. What did they know and when did they know it?

In copyright cases, corporate officers can face personal liability where they personally participated in the infringement, directed it, authorized it, or had the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct while receiving a financial benefit from it as we saw in a couple leading cases “All persons and corporations who participate in, exercise control over or benefit from an infringement are jointly and severally liable as copyright infringers.” Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); “One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright… is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005). See also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 1988 WL 128691, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1988) (“A corporate officer who directs, controls, ratifies, participates in, or is the moving force behind the infringing activity, is personally liable…”); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (operator liability tied to inducement and encouragement of infringement); and then my personal favorite, Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (evidence of executive knowledge and encouragement relevant to secondary liability).

If Suno’s leadership approved the acquisition, copying, ingestion, or retention of copyrighted sound recordings for model training, plaintiffs may argue that the executives were not passive corporate managers. They were decision-makers in the alleged infringement pipeline.

If discovery shows that senior executives knew copyrighted commercial recordings were being copied, discussed licensing risk, chose not to license, or treated infringement exposure as a cost of doing business, the case could begin to look more like direct participation or inducement than ordinary corporate oversight. For example, Complete Music Update quotes Mikey as like “…admitting to using copyright protected music in his company’s AI training data, something that he describes as ‘stock standard’ practice that ‘every AI company does.’” He evidently said this as part of an interview he gave to leading venture capital industry podcast The Twenty Minute VC. Now I’m not saying that statement alone is enough to close a case, but it certainly is one of those whatchamacalits, an admission against interest.


Shulman’s statement is significant because it is not merely a generalized industry observation. It is an admission by a senior corporate officer that his company Suno used copyrighted works in AI training and that the practice was understood internally at Suno as normal operating procedure. In civil discovery, that seems more than enough to justify targeted subpoenas designed to identify the scope, intent and commercial exploitation of the alleged infringement. And who else participated in the policy implementation.

Courts permit broad discovery where a plaintiff can show a reasonable basis to believe relevant evidence exists. Here, the CEO publicly acknowledged both (1) use of copyrighted music in training data and (2) awareness that such conduct implicated copyright law. The statement therefore supports discovery into knowledge, willfulness, inducement and commercial benefit under cases like Grokster, Fung, and Lime Group.

The quote particularly supports subpoenas for:

  • Training datasets and provenance records identifying sound recordings, compositions, stems, embeddings, fingerprints, metadata or source libraries used in model training;
  • Internal communications discussing ingestion of copyrighted music, licensing avoidance, fair use strategy, risk assessments or litigation exposure, including with members of the Suno board of directors;
  • Board materials and investor presentations discussing training practices, copyright risk, or competitive advantages derived from unlicensed datasets;
  • Engineering documents concerning scraping pipelines, dataset assembly, deduplication, filtering and retention of copyrighted material;
  • Financial records showing revenues, subscriptions, enterprise deals or valuations tied to models trained on copyrighted works;
  • Communications with third-party dataset providers, cloud vendors or contractors involved in obtaining or processing music files;
  • Prompt/output testing records showing whether models could reproduce recognizable musical expression, styles, voices or commercially substitutive outputs;
  • Policies regarding removal requests, provenance tracking, watermarking or rights management; and
  • Executive communications, including those involving Shulman personally, concerning decisions to proceed despite known copyright objections.

The statement also strengthens arguments for discovery into willful infringement. Saying that infringement is “stock standard” and that “every AI company does” it can be framed not as innocence, but as evidence of conscious normalization of unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs could argue this reflects industry-wide deliberate disregard for licensing obligations rather than accidental or technically unavoidable copying.

Finally, the quote helps establish proportionality. Suno itself has publicly placed copyright infringement at the center of its business model and competitive narrative. Once the CEO publicly admits the conduct, defendants have a much harder time arguing that subpoenas directed at training records, executive knowledge or dataset provenance are speculative fishing expeditions.

Naming executives can sharpen the willfulness theory. It can support discovery into board materials, investor pitches, licensing discussions, data-acquisition plans, and internal risk assessments.

These claims also may open the door to the boardroom. If discovery shows that Suno’s training strategy, licensing posture, or infringement-risk tolerance was discussed at the board level, plaintiffs may seek board materials, investor communications, voting agreements, consent rights, and other governance documents. Yes, the entire odious apparatus.

That may be exceptionally relevant and productive especially if major investors had approval rights, information rights, veto rights, or board seats tied to key business decisions. In that scenario, the inquiry may not stop with management. It could reach the investors who helped authorize, finance, or control the strategy that made the alleged infringement commercially valuable.

Public reporting identifies Menlo, Lightspeed, Matrix, Founder Collective, Nat Friedman, Daniel Gross, NVentures/Nvidia, and Hallwood Media as Suno investors. I have not found a public source confirming which, if any, hold board seats or board-observer rights. Given the size and lead-investor status of Menlo and Lightspeed, board or observer rights would be plausible and even typical, but that should be confirmed through charter documents, investor rights agreements, board minutes, cap table materials, or other discovery.

Notably, many of these same issues are already surfacing in the book publisher plus Scott Turow litigation against Meta and Mark Zuckerberg, including the allegations raised in the Elsevier-related AI copyright cases and the broader author lawsuits against Meta.

Plaintiffs in those matters have increasingly focused not only on the existence of infringing training datasets, but on executive-level awareness, internal discussions concerning licensing risk, data acquisition strategy, and decisions to proceed despite known copyright concerns.

The same dynamics may emerge in the Suno litigation if discovery reveals board-level discussions, investor oversight, or strategic decisions concerning whether copyrighted music catalogs would be licensed, copied without permission, or treated as a litigation risk worth taking.

The Potential Shareholder Suit

Developing a detailed factual record against Mikey Shulman (or Mark Zuckerberg) could significantly increase the risk of a future shareholder derivative suit because it potentially transforms the case from “the company made aggressive legal bets” into “management knowingly exposed the company to massive liability while failing to fulfill fiduciary duties.”

A derivative case would likely center on fiduciary duty theories under Delaware law — particularly the duties of loyalty, oversight (Caremark), disclosure, and good faith.

The pathway looks something like this:

  1. Public admissions establish scienter groundwork

    Shulman’s statements that using copyrighted works was “stock standard” and that “every AI company does” infringement could be framed as evidence that senior management understood the conduct implicated copyright law from the outset. Plaintiffs in a derivative action would argue this was not inadvertent infringement or a technical edge case, but a conscious business strategy. Of course, it would also be interesting to see if we could find out exactly what made Mikey say such things? Any meetings he’d like to discuss? All like very democratic, I’m like so sure.
  2. Discovery in copyright litigation creates the evidentiary record

    The underlying copyright cases are what really matter. If discovery uncovers:
    • internal discussions acknowledging piracy risks,

    • deliberate avoidance of licensing,executive-level approval of infringing datasets,warnings from counsel or employees,or

    • efforts to conceal provenance,

    then plaintiffs’ firms would likely use that material to argue the board failed to exercise oversight or knowingly permitted unlawful conduct.
  3. Massive enterprise risk can trigger Caremark-style claims

    Delaware courts increasingly recognize that boards must monitor “mission critical” legal risks. For Suno, copyright compliance is not peripheral — it is existential. The entire company depends on ingesting copyrighted music. If plaintiffs could show there were inadequate controls over training data provenance, licensing, or infringement risk, they could argue the board ignored core compliance obligations.
  4. Investor disclosures become vulnerable

    Once litigation and discovery mature, shareholders may ask whether fundraising materials accurately described legal risks. If management portrayed datasets as compliant, transformative, or low-risk while internally acknowledging likely infringement, that creates exposure around disclosure duties and securities-related claims.
  5. Personal enrichment allegations amplify pressure

    Derivative plaintiffs often focus on:
    • executive compensation,liquidity events,fundraising rounds,valuation increases,and insider sales.
    The theory becomes: executives increased enterprise value through unlawful conduct while externalizing legal risk onto the corporation and shareholders.
  6. Insurance and indemnification issues emerge

    Findings of willful misconduct or bad faith can create disputes over D&O insurance coverage and indemnification rights. That dramatically increases settlement pressure and board conflict concerns.

The important strategic point is that copyright plaintiffs do not need to bring the derivative suit themselves. They only need to build the factual record. Once discovery produces emails, board materials, or executive communications suggesting knowing infringement or oversight failures, shareholder firms may step in independently.

That is why executive statements like, you know, matter so much. Public comments can later be connected to internal documents to argue that management knew exactly what it was doing, understood the legal exposure, and proceeded anyway because rapid AI scaling and market capture were prioritized over licensing compliance.

And who wants to bet that the board was leading the charge?

Less Than Zero: The Significance of the Per Stream Rate and Why It Matters

Spotify’s insistence that it’s “misleading” to compare services based on a derived per-stream rate reveals exactly how out of touch the company has become with the very artists whose labor fuels its stock price. Artists experience streaming one play at a time, not as an abstract revenue pool or a complex pro-rata formula. Each stream represents a listener’s decision, a moment of engagement, and a microtransaction of trust. Dismissing the per-stream metric as irrelevant is a rhetorical dodge that shields Spotify from accountability for its own value proposition. (The same applies to all streamers, but Spotify is the only one that denies the reality of the per-stream rate.)

Spotify further claims that users don’t pay per stream but for access as if that negates the artist’s per stream rate payments. It is fallacious to claim that because Spotify users pay a subscription fee for “access,” there is no connection between that payment and any one artist they stream. This argument treats music like a public utility rather than a marketplace of individual works. In reality, users subscribe because of the artists and songs they want to hear; the value of “access” is wholly derived from those choices and the fans that artists drive to the platform. Each stream represents a conscious act of consumption and engagement that justifies compensation.

Economically, the subscription fee is not paid into a vacuum — it forms a revenue pool that Spotify divides among rights holders according to streams. Thus, the distribution of user payments is directly tied to which artists are streamed, even if the payment mechanism is indirect. To say otherwise erases the causal relationship between fan behavior and artist earnings.

The “access” framing serves only to obscure accountability. It allows Spotify to argue that artists are incidental to its product when, in truth, they are the product. Without individual songs, there is nothing to access. The subscription model may bundle listening into a single fee, but it does not sever the fundamental link between listener choice and the artist’s right to be paid fairly for that choice.

Less Than Zero Effect: AI, Infinite Supply and Erasing Artist

In fact, this “access” argument may undermine Spotify’s point entirely. If subscribers pay for access, not individual plays, then there’s an even greater obligation to ensure that subscription revenue is distributed fairly across the artists who generate the listening engagement that keeps fans paying each month. The opacity of this system—where listeners have no idea how their money is allocated—protects Spotify, not artists. If fans understood how little of their monthly fee reached the musicians they actually listen to, they might demand a user-centric payout model or direct licensing alternatives. Or they might be more inclined to use a site like Bandcamp. And Spotify really doesn’t want that.

And to anticipate Spotify’s typical deflection—that low payments are the label’s fault—that’s not correct either. Spotify sets the revenue pool, defines the accounting model, and negotiates the rates. Labels may divide the scraps, but it’s Spotify that decides how small the pie is in the first place either through its distribution deals or exercising pricing power.

Three Proofs of Intention

Daniel Ek, the Spotify CEO and arms dealer, made a Dickensian statement that tells you everything you need to know about how Spotify perceives their role as the Streaming Scrooge—“Today, with the cost of creating content being close to zero, people can share an incredible amount of content”.

That statement perfectly illustrates how detached he has become from the lived reality of the people who actually make the music that powers his platform’s market capitalization (which allows him to invest in autonomous weapons). First, music is not generic “content.” It is art, labor, and identity. Reducing it to “content” flattens the creative act into background noise for an algorithmic feed. That’s not rhetoric; it’s a statement of his values. Of course in his defense, “near zero cost” to a billionaire like Ek is not the same as “near zero cost” to any artist. This disharmonious statement shows that Daniel Ek mistakes the harmony of the people for the noise of the marketplace—arming algorithms instead of artists.

Second, the notion that the cost of creating recordings is “close to zero” is absurd. Real artists pay for instruments, studios, producers, engineers, session musicians, mixing, mastering, artwork, promotion, and often the cost of simply surviving long enough to make the next record or write the next song. Even the so-called “bedroom producer” incurs real expenses—gear, software, electricity, distribution, and years of unpaid labor learning the craft. None of that is zero. As I said in the UK Parliament’s Inquiry into the Economics of Streaming, when the day comes that a soloist aspires to having their music included on a Spotify “sleep” playlist, there’s something really wrong here.

Ek’s comment reveals the Silicon Valley mindset that art is a frictionless input for data platforms, not an enterprise of human skill, sacrifice, and emotion. When the CEO of the world’s dominant streaming company trivializes the cost of creation, he’s not describing an economy—he’s erasing one.

While Spotify tries to distract from the “per-stream rate,” it conveniently ignores the reality that whatever it pays “the music industry” or “rights holders” for all the artists signed to one label still must be broken down into actual payments to the individual artists and songwriters who created the work. Labels divide their share among recording artists; publishers do the same for composers and lyricists. If Spotify refuses to engage on per-stream value, what it’s really saying is that it doesn’t want to address the people behind the music—the very creators whose livelihoods depend on those streams. In pretending the per-stream question doesn’t matter, Spotify admits the artist doesn’t matter either.

Less Than Zero or Zeroing Out: Where Do We Go from Here?

The collapse of artist revenue and the rise of AI aren’t coincidences; they’re two gears in the same machine. Streaming’s economics rewards infinite supply at near-zero unit cost which is really the nugget of truth in Daniel Ek’s statements. This is evidenced by Spotify’s dalliances with Epidemic Sound and the like. But—human-created music is finite and costly; AI music is effectively infinite and cheap. For a platform whose margins improve as payout obligations shrink, the logical endgame is obvious: keep the streams, remove the artists.

  • Two-sided market math. Platforms sell audience attention to advertisers and access to subscribers. Their largest variable cost is royalties. Every substitution of human tracks with synthetic “sound-alikes,” noise, functional audio, or AI mashup reduces royalty liability while keeping listening hours—and revenue—intact. You count the AI streams just long enough to reduce the royalty pool, then you remove them from the system, only to be replace by more AI tracks. Spotify’s security is just good enough to miss the AI tracks for at least one royalty accounting period.
  • Perpetual content glut as cover. Executives say creation costs are “near zero,” justifying lower per-stream value. That narrative licenses a race to the bottom, then invites AI to flood the catalog so the floor can fall further.
  • Training to replace, not to pay. Models ingest human catalogs to learn style and voice, then output “good enough” music that competes with the very works that trained them—without the messy line item called “artist compensation.”
  • Playlist gatekeeping. When discovery is centralized in editorial and algorithmic playlists, platforms can steer demand toward low-or-no-royalty inventory (functional audio, public-domain, in-house/commissioned AI), starving human repertoire while claiming neutrality.
  • Investor alignment. The story that scales is not “fair pay”; it’s “gross margin expansion.” AI is the lever that turns culture into a fixed cost and artists into externalities.

Where does that leave us? Both streaming and AI “work” best for Big Tech, financially, when the artist is cheap enough to ignore or easy enough to replace. AI doesn’t disrupt that model; it completes it. It also gives cover through a tortured misreading through the “national security” lens so natural for a Lord of War investor like Mr. Ek who will no doubt give fellow Swede and one of the great Lords of War, Alfred Nobel, a run for his money. (Perhaps Mr. Ek will reimagine the Peace Prize.) If we don’t hard-wire licensing, provenance, and payout floors, the platform’s optimal future is music without musicians.

Plato conceived justice as each part performing its proper function in harmony with the whole—a balance of reason, spirit, and appetite within the individual and of classes within the city. Applied to AI synthetic works like those generated by Sora 2, injustice arises when this order collapses: when technology imitates creation without acknowledging the creators whose intellect and labor made it possible. Such systems allow the “appetitive” side—profit and scale—to dominate reason and virtue. In Plato’s terms, an AI trained on human art yet denying its debt to artists enacts the very disorder that defines injustice.