Tag: Spotify

On the Internet, “Partners” Don’t Hear You Scream: Daniel Ek Makes a “Bundle” From the Value He Won’t Share

Here’s a quote for the ages:

MICHAEL BURRY

One of the hallmarks of mania is the rapid rise and complexity
of the rates of fraud. And did you know they’re going up?

The Big Short, screenplay by Charles Randolph and Adam McKay, based on the book by Michael Lewis

I have often said that if screwups were Easter eggs, Daniel Ek would be the Easter bunny, hop hop hopping from one to the next. I realize that is not consistent with his press agent’s pagan iconography, but it sure seems true to many.

The Bunny’s Bundle

This week was no different. Mr. Ek evidently has a “10b5-1 agreement” in place with Spotify, a common technique for insiders, especially founders, who hold at least 10% of the company’s shares to cash out and get the real money through selling their stock. The agreement establishes predetermined trading instructions for company stock (usually a sale and not a buy so not trading the shares) consistent with SEC rules under Section 10b5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 covering when the insider can sell. Why does this exist? The rule was established in 2000 to protect Silicon Valley insiders from insider trading lawsuits. Yep, you caught it–it’s yet another safe harbor for the special people.

As MusicBusinessWorldWide reported (thank you, Tim), Mr. Ek sold $118.8 million in shares of Spotify at roughly the same time that Spotify was planning to change the way the company paid songwriters on streaming mechanicals by claiming that its recent audiobook offering made it a “bundle” for purposes of the statutory mechanical rate. That would be the same rate that was heavily negotiated in 2021-22 at great expense to all concerned, not to mention torturing the Copyright Royalty Judges. The rates are in effect for five years, but the next negotiation for new rates is coming soon (called Phonorecords V or PR V for short). We’ll get to the royalty bundle but let’s talk about the cash bundle first.

As Tim notes in MBW, Mr. Ek has had a few recent sales under his 10b5-1 agreement: “Across these four transactions (today’s included), Ek has cashed out approximately $340.5 million in Spotify shares since last summer.” Rough justice, but I would place a small wager that Ek has cashed out in personal wealth all or close to all of the money that Spotify has paid to songwriters (through their publishers) for the same period. In this sense, he is no different that the usual disproportionately compensated CEOs at say Google or Raytheon.

Don’t get me wrong, I don’t begrudge Mr. Ek the opportunity to be a billionaire. I don’t at all. But I do begrudge him the opportunity to do it when the government is his “partner” as it is with statutory mechanical royalties, he benefits from various other safe harbors, has had his lobbyists rewrite Section 115 to avoid litigation in a potentially unconstitutional reach back safe harbor, and he hired the lawyer at the Copyright Office who largely wrote the rules that he’s currently bending. Yes, I do begrudge him that stuff.

And here’s the other thing. When Daniel Ek pulls down $340.5 million as a routine matter, I really don’t want to hear any poor mouthing about how Spotify cannot make a profit because of the royalty payments it makes to artists and songwriters. (Or these days, doesn’t make to some artists.) This is, again, why revenue share calculations are just the wrong way to look at the value conferred by featured and nonfeatured artists and songwriters on the Spotify juggernaut. That’s also the point we made in some detail in the paper I co-wrote with Professor Claudio Feijoo for WIPO that came up in Spain, Hungary, France, Uruguay and other countries.

The Malthusian Algebra Strikes Again

It’s not solely Mr. Ek who is the problem child here, it’s partly the fault of industry negotiators who bought into the idea that what was important was getting a share of revenue based on a model that was almost guaranteed to cause royalties to decline over time. This would be getting a share of revenue from someone who purposely suppressed (and effectively subsidized) their subscription pricing for years and years and years. (See Robert Spencer’s Get Big Fast.). If I were a betting man, I would bet that the reason they subsidized the subscription price was to boost the share price by telling a growth story to Wall Street bankers (looking at you, Goldman Sachs) and retail traders because the subsidized subscription price increased subscribers.

Just a guess.

Now about this bundled subscription issue. One of the fundamental points that I think gets missed in the statutory mechanical licensing scheme is the scheme itself. The fact that songwriters have a compulsory license forced on them for one of their primary sources of income is a HUGE concession that songwriters have been asked to agree to since 1909. That’s right–for over 100 years. A decision that seemed reasonable 100 years ago really doesn’t seem reasonable at all today in a networked world. So start there as opposed to streaming platforms are doing us a favor by paying us at all, Daniel Ek saved the music business, and all the other iconography.

Has anyone seen them in the same room at the same time?

The problem that I have with the Spotify move to bundled subscriptions is that it can happen in the middle of a rate period and at least on the surface has the look of a colorable argument to reduce royalty payments. I think if you asked songwriters what they thought the rule was, to the extent they had focused on it at all after being bombarded with self-congratulatory hoorah, they probably thought that the deal wasn’t change rates without renegotiating or at least coming back and asking.

And they wouldn’t be wrong about that, because it is reasonable to ask that any changes get run by your, you know, “partner.” Maybe that’s where it all goes wrong. Because let me suggest and suggest strongly that it is a big mistake to think of these people as your “partner” if by “partner” you mean someone who treats you ethically and politely, reasonably and in good faith like a true fiduciary.

They are not your partner. Stop using that word.

A Compulsory License is a Rent Seeker’s Presidential Suite

But let’s also point out that what is happening with the bundle pricing is a prime example of the brittleness of the compulsory licensing system which is itself like a motel in the desolate and frozen Cyber Pass with a light blinking “Vacancy: Rent Seekers Wanted” surrounded by the bones of empires lost. Unlike the physical mechanical rate which is a fixed penny rate per transaction, the streaming mechanical is a cross between a Rube Goldberg machine and a self-licking ice cream cone.

The Spotify debacle is just the kind of IED that was bound to explode eventually when you have this level of complexity camouflaging traps for the unwary written into law. And the “written into law” part is what makes the compulsory license process so insidious. When the roadside bomb goes off, it doesn’t just hit the uparmored people before the Copyright Royalty Board–it creams everyone.

Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan tried to make this point to the Copyright Royalty Judges in Phonorecords IV. They were not confused by the royalty calculations–they understood them all too well. They were worried about fraud hiding in the calculations the same way Michael Burry was worried about fraud in The Big Short. Except there’s no default swaps for songwriters.

Here’s how the Judges responded, you decide if it’s condescending or if the songwriters were prescient knowing what we know now:

While some songwriters or copyright owners may be confused by the royalties or statements of account, the price discriminatory structure and the associated levels of rates in settlement do not appear gratuitous, but rather designed, after negotiations, to establish a structure that may expand the revenues and royalties to the benefit of copyright owners and music services alike, while also protecting copyright owners from potential revenue diminution. This approach and the resulting rate setting formula is not unreasonable. Indeed, when the market itself is complex, it is unsurprising that the regulatory provisions would resemble the complex terms in a commercial agreement negotiated in such a setting.

PR IV Final Rule at 80452 https://app.crb.gov/document/download/27410

It must be said that there never has been a “commercial agreement negotiated in such a setting” that wasn’t constrained by the compulsory license so I’m not sure what that reference even means. But if what the Judges mean is that the compulsory license approximates what would happen in a free market where the songwriters ran free and good men didn’t die like dogs, the compulsory license is nothing like a free market deal. If they are going to allow services to change their business model in midstream but essentially keep their music offering the same while offloading the cost of their audiobook royalties onto songwriters (and probably labels, too, although maybe not) through a discount in the statutory rate, then there should be some downside protection or another bite at the apple.

Unfortunately, there are neither, which almost guarantees another acrimonious, scorched earth lawyer fest in PR V coming soon to a charnel house near you.

Eject, Eject!

This is really disappointing because it was so avoidable if for no other reason. It’s a great time for someone…ahem…to step forward and head off the foreseeable collision on the billable time highway. I actually think the Judges know that the rate calculation is a farce but are dealing with people who have made too much money negotiating it to ever give it up willingly. If they are looking for a way off the theme park ride run by the evil clown, grab my hand on the next pass and I’ll try to pull you out of the centrifugal force. It won’t be easy.

This inevitable dust up means other work will suffer at the CRB. It must be said in fairness that the Judges seem to find it hard enough to get to the work they’ve committed to according to a recent SoundExchange filing in a different case (SDARS III remand from 2020) brought to my attention by Mr. George Johnson.

That’s not uncharitable–I’m merely noting that when dozens of lawyers in Phonorecords proceedings engage in what many of us feel are absurd discovery excesses, you are–frankly–distracting the Judges from doing their job by making them focus on, well, bollocks. We’ll come back to this issue in future, but I think all members of the CRB bar–the dozens and hundreds of those putting children through college at the CRB bar–need to take a breath and realize that judicial resources at the CRB are a zero sum game. This behavior isn’t fair to the Judges and it’s definitely not fair to the real parties in interest–the songwriters.

Tell the Horse to Open Wider

The answer isn’t to get the judges more money, bigger courtroom, craft services and massages, like a financial printer. Some of that would be nice but it doesn’t solve what I think is the real problem. I’d say that the answer is that the participants remember that the main this is that the main thing has to be the main thing. Ultimately, it’s not about us in the phonorecords proceedings, it’s about the songwriters. How are they served?

A compulsory license in stagflationary times is an incredibly valuable gift, and when you not only look the gift horse in the mouth but ask that it open wide so you can check the molars, don’t be surprised if one day it kicks you.

Chronology: The Week in Review: TikTok has a Napster Problem; @Helienne on Spotify’s new free goods; @MarshaBlackburn’s tour de force

When Universal withdrew from TikTok, the social media company was suddenly thrown back to its pirate-site roots, at least for the Universal catalog of all sound recordings and many, many songs. The eponymous TikTok is now on the clock to take down or mute Universal’s entire catalog. So tick tock baby.

Universal head Lucian Grainge made the case for the company’s approach to terminating its TikTok license because his negotiators were unable to reach a meeting of the minds with the other side. Pretty simple, really. This is not a big deal, it happens every day. Because in a free market capitalist system, “fair” is where we end up. Which means you have to end up somewhere, including nowhere.

Lucian made that case in an open letter to artists and songwriters as a community. There are some great nuggets in that letter, but I like this section to explain the casus belli:

The terms of our relationship with TikTok are set by contract, which expires January 31, 2024. In our contract renewal discussions, we have been pressing them on three critical issues—appropriate compensation for our artists and songwriters, protecting human artists from the harmful effects of AI, and online safety for TikTok’s users.

We have been working to address these and related issues with our other platform partners.  For example, our Artist-Centric initiative is designed to update streaming’s remuneration model and better reward artists for the value they deliver to platforms.  In the months since its inception, we’re proud that this initiative has been received so positively and taken up by a range of partners, including the largest music platform in the world.  We’ve also moved aggressively to embrace the promise of AI while fighting to ensure artists’ rights and interests are protected now and far into the future.  In addition, we’ve engaged a number of our platform partners to try to drive positive change for their users and by extension, our artists, by addressing online safety issues, and we are recognized as the industry leader in focusing on music’s broader impact on health and wellness.

With respect to the issue of artist and songwriter compensation, TikTok proposed paying our artists and songwriters at a rate that is a fraction of the rate that similarly situated major social platforms pay.  Today, as an indication of how little TikTok compensates artists and songwriters, despite its massive and growing user base, rapidly rising advertising revenue and increasing reliance on music-based content, TikTok accounts for only about 1% of our total revenue.

Let’s not forget that TikTok does not have some statutory or other legal or theoretical right to use Universal’s recordings or songs.  Their rights come from one place–their contract with Universal. No Universal contract, no Universal content. (Sorry copyright infringer apologists in the professoriate.).

Contracts have a duration, and when contracts end you negotiate an extension. If you can’t get an extension or a new agreement, remember the clock is ticking and time is running out–fair is where we end up, so one place to end up is nowhere. Stuff happens. Contracts frequently address what happens when the contract is over and the relationship must be unwound, sometimes called post-termination conditions which are just as much of a promise as anything else in the contract even if the duration (or the “term”) of the agreement is over.

The answer to what happened with Universal is simple: TikTok couldn’t close. Mr. TikTok may be a lot of things, but he’s no Blake.

Now that TikTok allowed their Universal deal to spin out of control, the termination clause(s) of their agreement no doubt become effective. If I had to guess, I would guess that TikTok must immediately stop any new uses of Universal content. Then it would not surprise me if TikTok has about 30 days to take it all down so they are on the clock…so to speak. I would also guess (or hope) that Universal has some post term conditions that will protect them from having to take TikTok’s rube deal on DMCA takedowns. The difference between a post term DMCA take down and a bald take down with no pre-existing contract should be that TikTok has a unilateral obligation to police their network for at least a period of time after termination. Failing to do so could leave them open to breach of contract for failing to satisfy post-termination conditions. Or something like that.

Let’s not forget that TikTok started out as a pirate social media site that got retroactive and prospective licenses in settlement of potential copyright infringement lawsuits. If licenses terminate, TikTok is essentially in the same position as it was before the license–at least as to the content that is covered by the terminating license. 

But of course TikTok won’t be in exactly the same position as the status quo ante, because the company is dependent on passing itself off as this inevitable legitimate company, i.e., a licensed platform. That was not the case when TikTok began licensing to avoid mammoth copyright infringement lawsuits. And therein lies the rub. 

TikTok may have a Napster problem. Once you let unlicensed material into a platform, it’s deuced hard to get it out, even if you have license. And as Judge Patel said in granting an injunction against Napster, “I’m sure that anyone as clever as the people who wrote the software in the case are clever enough, as there are plenty or those minds in Silicon Valley to do it, [to] come up with a program that will help to identify infringing items as well.”  

Thank God for the smart people.

So what happens now? Looking to recent history, Spotify was in a similar pre-IPO position when David Lowery and Melissa Ferrick sued the company for massive use of unlicensed songs. This led Spotify to go to Congress to rewrite the copyright laws in order to stop future litigation (called the “Music Modernization Act” with its probably unconstitutional retroactive reach back safe harbor). They were able to do that because of compliant lobbyists and the hunger among the elites for cash money from a Spotify IPO (or more precisely DPO). Plus Congress got to hang out with famous people and generally felt good about it because dissenting views were strangely absent in the mainstream media.

What do you think will happen if TikTok also goes to Congress to change the law to protect their cash cow and undermine artists and songwriters like Spotify did? They may send lobbyists to Capitol Hill with some walking around money, but if you haven’t picked up on it yet, at least half of the Congress despises TikTok. How does TikTok thread that needle?

TikTok’s response reads like it was written by the editorial staff at the People’s Daily:

“It is sad and disappointing that Universal Music Group has put their own greed above the interests of their artists and songwriters.

Despite Universal’s false narrative and rhetoric, the fact is they have chosen to walk away from the powerful support of a platform with well over a billion users that serves as a free promotional and discovery vehicle for their talent.

TikTok has been able to reach ‘artist-first’ agreements with every other label and publisher. Clearly, Universal’s self-serving actions are not in the best interests of artists, songwriters and fans.”

Note to Mr. TikTok and his PR bagmen, that “exposure” angle is not a winner. Not to mention that artists drive their fans to TikTok in huge numbers which is the real “free” promotion as in “uncompensated”. Also, newsflash, there is no free lunch so don’t embarrass yourself by starting the old “free promotion” okie doke. Mr. Tok needs to go home, think about his priorities and try again.

Also, don’t forget that TikTok has to do “blind check” licenses because it lacks the functionality to track and pay royalties, even the broken market centric royalty deal. Blind check licenses are the rough equivalent of an agreement not to sue TikTok rather than an industry standard royalty deal. Over time, it’s likely that the amount of the blind check must increase to compensate for the blindness.

The Universal episode is revealing, however. If TikTok thought they were going to get away with jamming artists because “exposure”, they need to go home and reconsider their life. The situation is completely out of control for one reason–TikTok underestimated Universal’s resolve. And they broke one of the cardinal rules of Business Affairs.

Never let it get to the point that you can’t just write a check.

@helienne’s Panel with Streamers and Label reps about artist centric, streaming fraud and Spotify’s new free goods

I interview Helienne Lindvall about a panel she was on in Europe with reps from Spotify, Deezer and WMG about artist centric implementation, streaming fraud and the new free goods, aka, Track Monetization Eligibility. 

How do you say “Bless your heart” in Mandarin?

If you didn’t watch the Big Tech hearing at the U.S. Senate, you should at least watch Senator Marsha Blackburn’s grilling of Mr. TikTok. Must-see TV.

Chronology: The Week in Review, Eric Schmidt Spills on his “Bait” to UK PM, Musk on AI Training and other news

Elon Musk Calls Out AI Training

We’ve all heard the drivel coming from Silicon Valley that AI training is fair use. During his interview with Andrew Ross Sorkin at the DealBook conference, Elon Musk (who ought to know given his involvement with AI) said straight up that anyone who says AI doesn’t train on copyrights is lying.

The UK Government “Took the Bait”: Eric Schmidt Says the Quiet Part Out Loud on Biden AI Executive Order and Global Governance

There are a lot of moves being made in the US, UK and Europe right now that will affect copyright policy for at least a generation. Google’s past chair Eric Schmidt has been working behind the scenes for the last two years at least to establish US artificial intelligence policy. Those efforts produced the “Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence“, the longest executive order in history. That EO was signed into effect by President Biden on October 30, so it’s done. (It is very unlikely that that EO was drafted entirely at Executive Branch agencies.)

You may ask, how exactly did this sweeping Executive Order come to pass? Who was behind it, because someone always is. As you will see in his own words, Eric Schmidt, Google and unnamed senior engineers from the existing AI platforms are quickly making the rule and essentially drafted the Executive Order that President Biden signed into law on October 30. And which was presented as what Mr. Schmidt calls “bait” to the UK government–which convened a global AI safety conference convened by His Excellency Rishi Sunak (the UK’s tech bro Prime Minister) that just happened to start on November 1, the day after President Biden signed the EO, at Bletchley Park in the UK (see Alan Turing). (See “Excited schoolboy Sunak gushes as mentor Musk warns of humanoid robot catastrophe.”)

Remember, an executive order is an administrative directive from the President of the United States that addresses the operations of the federal government, particularly the vast Executive Branch. In that sense, Executive Orders are anti-majoritarian and are as close to at least a royal decree or Executive Branch legislation as we get in the United States (see Separation of Powers, Federalist 47 and Montesquieu). Executive orders are not legislation; they require no approval from Congress, and Congress cannot simply overturn them.

So you can see if the special interests wanted to slide something by the people that was difficult to undo or difficult to pass in the People’s House…and based on Eric Schmidt’s recent interview with Mike Allen at the Axios AI+ (available here), this appears to be exactly what happened with the sweeping and vastly concerning AI Executive Order. I strongly recommend that you watch Mike Allen’s “interview” with Mr. Schmidt which fortunately is the first conversation in the rather long video of the entire event. I put “interview” in scare quotes because whatever it is, it isn’t the kind of interview that prompts probing questions that might put Mr. Schmidt on the spot. That’s understandable because Axios is selling a conference and you simply won’t get senior corporate executives to attend if you put them on the spot. Not a criticism, but understand that you have to find value for your time. Mr. Schmidt’s ego provides plenty of value; it just doesn’t come from the journalists.

Crucially, Congress is not involved in issuing an executive order. Congress may refuse to fund the subject of the EO which could make it difficult to give it effect as a practical matter but Congress cannot overturn an EO. Only a sitting U.S. President may overturn an existing executive order. In Mr. Schmidt’s interview at AI+, he tells us how all this regulatory activity happened:

The tech people along with myself have been meeting for about a year. The narrative goes something like this: We are moving well past regulatory or government understanding of what is possible, we accept that. [Remember the antecedent of “we” means Schmidt and “the tech people,” or more broadly the special interests, not you, me or the American people.].

Strangely…this is the first time that the senior leaders who are engineers have basically said that they want regulation, but we want it in the following ways…which as you know never works in Washington [unless you can write an Executive Order and get the President to sign it because you are the biggest corporation in commercial history].

There is a complete agreement that there are systems and scenarios that are dangerous. [Agreement by or with whom? No one asks.]. And in all of the big [AI platforms with which] you are familiar like GPT…all of them have groups that look at the guard rails [presumably internal groups of managers] and they put constraints on [their AI platform in their silo]. They say “thou shalt not talk about death, thou shall not talk about killing”. [Anthropic, which received a $300 million investment from Google] actually trained the model with its own constitution [see “Claude’s Constitution“] which they did not just write themselves, they hired a bunch of people [actually Claude’s Constitution was crowd sourced] to design a “constitution” for an AI, so it’s an interesting idea.

The problem is none of us believe this is strong enough….Our opinion at the moment is that the best path is to build some IPCC-like environment globally that allows accurate information of what is going on to the policy makers. [This is a step toward global governance for AI (and probably the Internet) through the United Nations. IPCC is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.]

So far we are on a win, the taste of winning is there.  If you look at the UK event which I was part of, the UK government took the bait, took the ideas, decided to lead, they’re very good at this,  and they came out with very sensible guidelines.  Because the US and UK have worked really well together—there’s a group within the National Security Council here that is particularly good at this, and they got it right, and that produced this EO which is I think is the longest EO in history, that says all aspects of our government are to be organized around this.

While Mr. Schmidt may say, aw shucks dictating the rules to the government never works in Washington, but of course that’s simply not true if you’re Google. In which case it’s always true and that’s how Mr. Schmidt got his EO and will now export it to other countries.

It’s not Just Google: Microsoft Is Getting into the Act on AI and Copyright

Be sure to read Joe Bambridge (Politico’s UK editor) on Microsoft’s moves in the UK. You have to love the “don’t make life too difficult for us” line–as in respecting copyright.

Google and New Mountain Capital Buy BMI: Now what?

Careful observers of the BMI sale were not led astray by BMI’s Thanksgiving week press release that was dutifully written up as news by most of the usual suspects except for the fabulous Music Business Worldwide and…ahem…us. You may think we’re making too much out of the Google investment through it’s CapitalG side fund, but judging by how much BMI tried to hide the investment, I’d say that Google’s post-sale involvement probably varies inversely to the buried lede. Not to mention the culture clash over ageism so common at Google–if you’re a BMI employee who is over 30 and didn’t go to Carnegie Mellon, good luck.

And songwriters? Get ready to jump if you need to.

Spotify Brings the Streaming Monopoly to Uruguay

After Uruguay was the first Latin American country to pass streaming remuneration laws to protect artists, Spotify threw its toys out of the pram and threatened to go home. Can we get that in writing? A Spotify exit would probably be the best thing that ever happened to increase local competition in a Spanish language country. Also, this legislation has been characterized as “equitable remuneration” which it really isn’t. It’s its own thing, see the paper I wrote for WIPO with economist Claudio Feijoo. Complete Music Update’s Chris Cook suggested that a likely result of Spotify paying the royalty would be that they would simply do a cram down with the labels on the next round of license negotiations. If that’s not prohibited in the statute, it should be, and it’s really not “paying twice for the same music” anyway. The streaming remuneration is compensation for the streamers use of and profit from the artists’ brand (both featured and nonfeatured), e.g., as stated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and many other human rights documents:

The Covenant recognizes everyone’s right — as a human right–to the protection and the benefits from the protection of the moral and material interests derived from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author. This human right itself derives from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons. 

Spotify ESG fail: Governance

[This is an extension of Spotify’s ESG Fail: Environment and Spotify’s ESG Fail: Social. “ESG” is a Wall Street acronym often attributed to Larry Finkat Blackrock that designates a company as suitable for socially conscious investing based on its “Environmental, Social and Governance” business practices. See the Upright Net Impact data model on Spotify’s sustainability score. As of this writing, the last update of Spotify’s Net Impact score was before the Neil Young scandal.]

Spotify has one big governance problem that permeates its governance like a putrid miasma in the abattoir: “Dual-class stock” sometimes referred to as “supervoting” stock. If you’ve never heard the term, buckle up. I wrote an extensive post on this subject for the New York Daily News that you may find interesting.

Dual class stock allows the holders of those shares–invariably the founders of the public company when it was a private company–to control all votes and control all board seats. Frequently this is accomplished by giving the founders a special class of stock that provides 10 votes for every share or something along those lines. The intention is to give the founders dead hand control over their startup in a kind of corporate reproductive right so that no one can interfere with their vision as envoys of innovation sent by the Gods of the Transhuman Singularity. You know, because technology.

Google was one of the first Silicon Valley startups to adopt this capitalization structure and it is consistent with the Silicon Valley venture capital investor belief in infitilism and the Peter Pan syndrome so that the little children may guide us. The problem is that supervoting stock is forever, well after the founders are bald and porky despite their at-home beach volleyball courts and warmed bidets.

Spotify, Facebook and Google each have a problem with “dual class” stock capitalizations.  Because regulators allow these companies to operate with this structure favoring insiders, the already concentrated streaming music industry is largely controlled by Daniel Ek, Sergey Brin, Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg.  (While Amazon and Apple lack the dual class stock structure, Jeff Bezos has an outsized influence over both streaming and physical carriers.  Apple’s influence is far more muted given their refusal to implement payola-driven algorithmic enterprise playlist placement for selection and rotation of music and their concentration on music playback hardware.)

The voting power of Ek, Brin, Page and Zuckerberg in their respective companies makes shareholder votes candidates for the least suspenseful events in commercial history.  However, based on market share, Spotify essentially controls the music streaming business.  Let’s consider some of the  implications for competition of this disfavored capitalization technique.

Commissioner Robert Jackson, formerly of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, summed up the problem:

“[D]ual class” voting typically involves capitalization structures that contain two or more classes of shares—one of which has significantly more voting power than the other. That’s distinct from the more common single-class structure, which gives shareholders equal equity and voting power. In a dual-class structure, public shareholders receive shares with one vote per share, while insiders receive shares that empower them with multiple votes. And some firms [Snap, Inc. and Google Class B shares] have recently issued shares that give ordinary public investors no vote at all.

For most of the modern history of American equity markets, the New York Stock Exchange did not list companies with dual-class voting. That’s because the Exchange’s commitment to corporate democracy and accountability dates back to before the Great Depression. But in the midst of the takeover battles of the 1980s, corporate insiders “who saw their firms as being vulnerable to takeovers began lobbying [the exchanges] to liberalize their rules on shareholder voting rights.”  Facing pressure from corporate management and fellow exchanges, the NYSE reversed course, and today permits firms to go public with structures that were once prohibited.

Spotify is the dominant streaming firm and the voting power of Spotify stockholders is concentrated in two men:  Daniel Ek and Martin Lorentzon.  Transitively, those two men literally control the music streaming sector through their voting shares, are extending their horizontal reach into the rapidly consolidating podcasting business and aspire soon to enter the audiobooks vertical.  Where do they get the money is a question on every artists lips after hearing the Spotify poormouthing and seeing their royalty statements.

The effects of that control may be subtle; for example, Spotify engages in multi-billion dollar stock buybacks and debt offerings, but has yet makes ever more spectacular losses while refusing to exercise pricing power.  

So yes, Spotify is starting to look like the kind of Potemkin Village that investment bankers love because they see oodles of the one thing that matters: Fees.

On the political side, let’s see what the company’s campaign contributions tell us:

Spotify has also made a habit out of hiring away government regulators like Regan Smith, the former General Counsel and Associate Register of the US Copyright Office who joined Spotify as head of US public policy (a euphemism for bag person) after drafting all of the regulations for the Mechanical Licensing Collective;

Whether this is enough to trip Spotify up on the abuse of political contributions I don’t know, but the revolving door part certainly does call into question Spotify’s ethics.

It does seem that these are the kinds of facts that should be taken into account when determining Spotify’s ESG score.

Spotify’s ESG Problem: Environment Fail

Spotify has an ESG problem, and a closer look may offer insights into a wider problem in the tech industry as a whole. If a decade of destroying artist and songwriter revenues isn’t enough to get your attention, maybe the Neil Young and Joe Rogan imbroglio will. But a minute’s analysis shows you that Spotify was already an ESG fail well before Neil Young’s ultimatum.

Streaming is an Environmental Fail

I first began posting about streaming as an environmental fail years ago in the YouTube and Google world. Like so many other ways that the BIg Tech PR machine glosses over their dependence on cheap energy right through their supply chain from electric cars to cat videos, YouTube did not want to discuss the company as a climate disaster zone. To hear them tell it, YouTube, and indeed the entire Google megalopolis right down to the Google Street View surveillance team was powered by magic elves running on appropriate golden flywheels with suitable work rules. Or other culturally appropriate spin from Google’s ham handed PR teams.

Greenpeace first wrote about “dirty data” in 2011–the year Spotify launched in the US. Too bad Spotify ignored the warnings. Harvard Business Review also tells us that 2011 was a demarcation point for environmental issues at Microsoft following that Greenpeace report:

In 2011, Microsoft’s top environmental and sustainability executive, Rob Bernard, asked the company’s risk-assessment team to evaluate the firm’s exposure. It soon concluded that evolving carbon regulations and fluctuating energy costs and availability were significant sources of risk. In response, Microsoft formed a centralized senior energy team to address this newly elevated strategic issue and develop a comprehensive plan to mitigate risk. The team, comprising 14 experts in electricity markets, renewable energy, battery storage, and local generation (or “distributed energy”), was charged by corporate senior leadership with developing and executing the firm’s energy strategy. “Energy has become a C-suite issue,” Bernard says. “The CFO and president are now actively involved in our energy road map.”

If environment is a C-suite issue at Spotify, there’s no real evidence of it in Spotify’s annual report (but then there isn’t at the Mechanical Licensing Collective, either). “Environment” word search reveals that at Spotify, the environment is “economic”, “credit”, and above all “rapidly changing.” Not “dirty”–or “clean” for that matter.

The fact appears to be that Spotify isn’t doing anything special and nobody seems to want to talk about it. But wait, you say–what about the sainted Music Climate Pact? Guess who hasn’t signed up to the MCP? Any streaming service. There is a “Standard Commitment Letter” that participants are supposed to sign up to but I wasn’t able to read it. Want to guess why?

That’s right. You know who wants to know what you’re up to.

Next: Spotify’s “Social” Fail: Rogan, Royalties and The Uyghurs

The Return of the Ethical Pool: @marchogan on User Centric Royalties

Marc Hogan has an interesting post on Pitchfork about “user centric” royalties.  (“Is There a Fairer Way for Streaming Services to Pay Artists?”)

He echoes the common arguments about user centric.  These theories are mostly about  comparisons to the current model of the “big pool” and its hyper-efficient market share distribution of streaming service revenues.  Or as Mr. Hogan puts it, a direct democracy vs. electoral college approach.  (Let’s remember what happened when the Greeks tried direct democracy.)

It’s not just that user centric is fair.  Life ain’t fair.  It’s that the big pool model is wildly inaccurate and deceives fans.  The problem with user centric isn’t that it’s too complex, it’s that by comparison the “big pool” method isn’t complex enough.

And let’s also realize that when you pay artists’ at a royalty rate that starts several decimal places to the right, there is no measurable downside in “not playing”–or withdrawing from the service altogether.  So the alternatives are not direct democracy or electoral college, it’s the much simpler choice of in or out.  If you don’t give me a good reason to be in, and if by being in I cannibalize higher margin sales, then maybe I just sit this one out.  (Hundreds of Quebec artists made this point recently.)

Of course, I’m willing to be educated otherwise, but it seems that the really simple thing would be to have a fixed per-play rate.  That’s definitely not true now, which makes this statement a bit bizarre:

Spotify’s chief economist, Will Page, has raised a couple of points in defense of the existing model. Under the current system, every time you stream a song, it has the same value….

If by “value” they mean “same pennies”, that is definitely not true in the big pool model.  Some labels have complex greater-of formulas (not to mention breakage and minimum guarantees) so while the streams may be counted the same (no bonus plays), the per play rates are definitely not identical.  That’s a big reason it takes so long to close Spotify’s label deals.  (There are two ways to juice royalties–play with the units (the plays for streaming) or play with the royalties (the micro pennies for streaming).  Streamers play with the royalties.  So far.)

I don’t underestimate the complexity in running the big pool and the true user centric models side by side under the same roof.  That is what makes it complex.  I have a solution to this challenge I call the ethical pool that is an intermediate step between the two that allows both to co-exist if the fans and the artists elect it to be so.  The problem the ethical pool seeks to solve is best summarized by a fan:  “Sick of my money funding crap”.

Mr. Hogan also makes another interesting point courtesy of ex-Spotify economist Will Page:

The biggest argument against the user-centric model is that it could be too complex. Calculating payouts based on every individual user’s listening is, inevitably, more complicated than just adding up the total and divvying up the pot. The extra administrative cost—say, figuring out what each person’s streams are worth each quarter and then distilling that into a semi-coherent pay statement—could actually leave artists with less money to go around, Page has maintained in a paper co-authored with an executive from music-licensing giant ASCAP. Changing systems wouldn’t be the right decision if it ends up hurting the people it’s supposed to help.

So it appears that Will is making a fundamental error here (presumably on behalf of Spotify).  The question is not whether Spotify will pass through its administrative costs to the artists.   Those costs come out of Spotify’s share.  I simply cannot imagine Apple or Amazon trying to pass along their costs of accurate accountings to the artists.  Google would certainly, but not the real competition for Spotify.

The question is which floor of the World Trade Center is Spotify going to sacrifice to cover these costs?

@musically: Spotify CEO says Libra currency could help listeners ‘pay artists directly’ — Artist Rights Watch

Earlier this week, Facebook announced a new blockchain-powered currency called Libra, and a digital wallet for it called Calibra. Spotify was among the companies backing the plans by becoming a founder member of the independent Libra Association.

Now Spotify CEO Daniel Ek has been talking about his hopes for Libra, including the suggestion that it could one day facilitate direct payments to musicians from fans.

“I think like cryptocurrencies and blockchain are obviously two of the biggest buzzwords you can have today. And for me, I don’t think technology in itself is that interesting· What I do think is interesting is what we can do with that technology,” said Ek, in an interview for Spotify’s own Culture: Now Streaming podcast.

“What everyone who’s a part of Libra is trying to accomplish is: it’s interesting that we have all these different currencies, all of these different ways of doing things. But the reality is, there’s several billion people around the world that don’t even have access to a bank account,” he continued….(Whatever you think of Libra, the fact that Spotify is, right up to CEO level, even thinking about direct payments from fans to artists is a significant talking point for anyone mulling how the streaming service will evolve in the coming years.)

Read the post on MusicAlly

The Elusive Obelus: Streaming’s Problem With Denominators

“How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked.
“Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.”

Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises.

No matter how much people would like to deflect it, the unvarnished per stream rate is an ever diminishing income stream.  Given the number of calculations involved for both sound recording and song, it is likely that the total end-to-end cost of rendering the accountings for the streams costs more than the royalty earned on that stream by any one royalty participant.  Solving this problem is the difference between a short-term stock-fueled sugar high and a long-term return of shareholder value for all concerned.  So now what?

If you’re someone who receives or calculates streaming royalties, you’re already familiar with the  problem of the ever-decreasing per-stream rate.  The Trichordist’s definitive “Streaming Price Bible” for 2018 confirms this trend yet again, but simple math explains the problem of the revenue share allocation.

Remember that the way streaming royalties are calculated in voluntary agreements (aka “direct deals”) revolves around a simple formula (Formula A):

(Payable Revenue ÷ Total Service Streams) x Your Streams = Per Stream Rate

Which may also be expressed as Formula B:

Payable Revenue x (Your Streams ÷ Total Service Streams) = Your share of revenue

(Formula A and B are also known as “the big pool” in the user-centric or Ethical Pool models.)

Here’s the trick–it’s in the correlation of the rate of increase over time of the numerator and the denominator.  If you focus on any single calculation you won’t see the problem.  You have to calculate the rate of change over time.  Simply put, if the numerator in either Formula A or Formula B increases at a lower rate than the denominator, then the quotient, or the result of the division, will always decline as long as those conditions are met.  That’s why the Streaming Price Bible shows a declining per-stream rate–a contrarian fact among the hoorah from streaming boosters that sticks in the craw.

Services make these accounting calculations monthly for the most part, and they are calculated a bit differently depending on the service.  This is why the Streaming Price Bible has different rates for different services, rates that vary depending on the terms of the contract and also the amount of “Payable Revenue” that the service attributes to the particular sound recordings.

The quotient will also vary depending on the copyright owner’s deal.  If you add downside protection elements such as contractual per stream or per subscriber minimums, then you can cushion the decline.

This is also true of non-recoupable payments (such as direct payments that are deemed to be recoupable but not returnable, or “breakage”).  Nonrecoupable payments are just another form of nominal royalty payable to the copyright owner, and increase the overall payout.  And of course, the biggest nonrecoupable payment is stock which sometimes pays off as we saw with Spotify.  These payments may or may not be shared with the artist.  (See the WIN Fair Digital Deals Pledge.)

So each of the elements of both Formula A and Formula B are a function of other calculations. We’re not going to dive into those other elements too deeply in this post–but we will note that there are some different elements to the formulas depending on the bargaining power of the rights owner, in this case the owner of sound recordings.

So how is it that the per-stream rate declines over time in the Streaming Price Bible?

Putting the Demon in the Denominator

Back to Formula B, you’ll note that the function “Your Streams ÷ Total Service Streams” looks a lot like a market share allocation.  In fact, if the relevant market is limited to the service calculating the revenue share allocation, it is a market share allocation of service revenue by another name.  When you consider that the customary method of calculating streaming royalties across all services is a similar version of Formula B, it may as well be an allocation of the total market on a market share basis.

Note that this is very different from setting a wholesale price for your goods that implies a retail price.  A wholesale price is a function of what you think a consumer would or should pay.  When a service agrees to a minimum per stream or per subscriber rate, they are essentially accepting a price term that behaves like a wholesale price.

For most artists and indie labels, the price is set by your market share of the subscription fees or ad rates that the service thinks the market will bear based on the service’s business goals—not based on your pricing decision.

Why is this important?  A cynic might say it’s because Internet companies are in the free lunch crowd–they would give everything away for free since their inflated salaries and sky-high rents are paid by venture capitalists who don’t understand a thing about breaking artists and investing in talent.  You know, the kind of people who would give Daniel Ek a million dollar bonus when he hadn’t met his performance targets, stiffed songwriters for years and gotten the company embroiled in multimillion dollar lawsuits.  But had met the only performance target that mattered which was to put some cosmetics on that porker and push it out the door into a public stock offering.  (SPOT F-1 at p. 133: “In February 2018, our board of directors determined to pay Mr. Ek the full $1,000,000 bonus based on the Company’s 2017 performance though certain performance goals were not achieved…”)

But long-term, it’s important because one way that royalties will rise is if the service can only acquire its only product at a higher price.  Or not.  The other way that royalties will rise is if services are required to pay a per-stream rate that is higher than the revenue share rate.  How that increase is passed to the consumer is up to them.  Maybe a move from World Trade Center to Poughkeepsie would help.

The Streaming Price Bible is based on revenue for an indie label that did not have the massive hits we see on Spotify.  In this sense, it is the unvarnished reality of streaming without the negotiated downside protection goodies, unrecoupable or nonreturnable payments, and of course shares of stock.  While some may say the Bible lacks hits, that’s kind of the point–hits mask a thousand sins.  Ask any label accountant.

Will Consumption Eat Your Free Lunch?

Let’s say again: The simple explanation for the longitudinal decline of streaming royalties measured by the Streaming Price Bible is that the rate of change across accounting periods in the “Payable Revenue” must be greater than the rate of change in the total number of streams in order for the per-stream rate to increase–otherwise the per-stream rate will always decrease.  Another way to think of it is that revenue has to increase faster than consumption, or consumption will eat your lunch.

What if you left the formula the same and just increased the revenue being allocated?  Services will probably resist that move.  After all, when artists complain about their per-stream rate, the services often answer that the problem is not with them, it is with the artist’s labels because the services pay hundreds of millions to the labels.

We don’t really have much meaningful control over what goes in the monthly payable revenue number (i.e., the mathematical “dividend” or numerator).  What kinds of revenue should be included?  Here are a few:

–all advertising revenue from all sources
–e-commerce transactions
–bounties or referral fees, including  recoupable or non-refundable guarantees
–sponsorships
–subscription income
–traffic or tariff charges paid by telcos
–revenue from the sale of data

Services will typically deduct “small off the tops” which would include
–VAT or sales tax
–ad commissions paid to unaffiliated third parties (usually subject to a cap)

Indie labels and independent artists may not have the leverage to negotiate some of these revenue elements such as revenue from the sale of data for starters.  Other elements of the revenue calculation for indie labels and artists will also likely not include the downside protections, subscriber target top up fees and the like.

And of course the biggest difference is that indie labels (at least not in the Merlin group who may) typically do not get nonreturnable advances,  nonrecoupable payments, or stock.

Is That All There Is?

Why should we care about all this?  There is a story that is told of negotiations to settle a lawsuit against a well-known pirate site.  One of the venture capitalists backing the pirates told one of the label negotiators that he could make them all richer through an IPO than any settlement they’d ever be able to negotiate.

The label executive asked, lets’ say we did that, but then what happens?  You say we should adapt, but you’re still destroying the industry ecosystem so that there’s nothing left to adapt to.  The most we could make from an IPO would cover our turnover for a year at best.  And we would be dependent on your success, not our artists’ success.

Then what?

 

 

 

 

 

More Evidence of DPO Conflicts: Is Spotify’s Stock Buyback Plan Taking it to the Shorts?

Spotify is experiencing the joys of being a public company–or at least a quasi public company if you count public companies as ones whose shares are actually held by the public as in Mrs. & Mr. America.  But both analysts and investors have to always remember that Spotify did not conduct an IPO in the traditional sense where an underwriting syndicate of bankers bought a block of shares from the company that the syndicate then resold to the public.  This is why Spotify’s recently announced $1 billion stock buy-back program bears closer scrutiny.

Instead they conducted a DPO, a direct public offering which is unusual and radically different than an IPO.  The DPO has an essential conflict–the sellers of shares are insiders in the issuer and have an incentive to keep the stock price high and to manipulate that stock price however they can.  Like through a stock buy back after less than a year of trading, for example.

From a financial markets point of view, that DPO makes almost everything about Spotify’s stock a different analysis than a market traded IPO–including Spotify’s recently announced stock buy back.  Stock buy backs happen all the time, particularly in declining markets.  But what is unusual is for a company that’s still in its first year of operating as a public company whose shares are largely traded by insiders and is a money losing company to take the odd step of using $1 billion of the shareholders money to buy back stock.

Or maybe not so unusual if the shareholders whose money it is are both the sellers of those shares and the beneficiaries of the stock buy back–as they try to find a bigger fool to sell the shares to in the retail market.  Another core problem with DPOs is that you don’t have an independent body setting the opening price as you would with an underwriting syndicate.  DPOs have to get an opening price from somewhere–so Spotify’s pricing problem started with the SEC and NYSE allowing Spotify to price at its last privately traded price (as some shares of Spotify traded in what used to be called a “Rule 4(a)(1)1/2” exemption for resale of restricted stock, now codified in Section 4(a)(7) of the Securities Act by the FAST [Breakfast at Buck’s] Act–a bit of a gloss but OK for our purposes here).

So by letting Spotify use the private market for restricted stock as a proxy for a market price, at a minimum the SEC and the NYSE assume that the rights, preferences and privileges of an unregistered share of Spotify stock are the same as a share of registered SPOT.  They’re not.  They also assume there are no price distortions from the relatively low number of unlegended restricted shares available in the private market.  They also assume that there’s nothing odd about a company like Spotify–staring down relatively slam dunk infringement lawsuits of significant value and in a money-losing business run from 10 floors of the World Trade Center like it was Apple or something–pricing way above the opening prices of Amazon, Facebook, Google and so on.

If that sounds cynical, it really isn’t once you understand the dynamics of a DPO compared to an IPO.  The DPO produces a market effect that is similar to the business model of Larry Ellison’s famous 1999 “HeyIdiot.com” parody of an Internet company:

HEYIDIOT.COM is tightly focused on selling just one product. Elegantly enough, that product is the stock of HEYIDIOT.COM, which will be offered to you for sale on-line at our web site of the same name. Buying the stock is simple, you can buy as much stock as you want with the only rule being that each new purchase must be executed at a successively higher price.  We call it a cash portal.

We’re seeing the result of the DPO come home to roost in Spotifyland which looks something like this:

 

Spotify 11-16-18 Basic
SPOT 11-6-18

After a run up in the stock price–on low volume and with no meaningful news–the stock retraces its steps and suggests its testing lower lows.  It’s hard to say what “price support” there is for a stock that’s had less then a year of trading, but let’s just say that if it broke through $100 to the downside, there would be rending of garments and closer examination of executive compensation unless Spotify executives could continue to blame artists for “high” royalties.

Also note that three out of four of Spotify’s biggest volume days were to the downside, and that the stock has been trading down, essentially, since August.Spotify 11-16-18 Volume

 

We can also assume that at these low trading volumes, the shares have gradually been accumulating in the trading accounts of Mrs. & Mr. America which also means that there are potentially more and more shares available to short sellers–the buy high sell low crowd that I discussed back in March.

short_sell_example

In fact, there are a few November 30 puts in the $115 range already.  Daniel Ek has announced he’ll be selling Spotify shares with a value of about $20 million on a monthly basis for a while.  You have to notice that those board-approved sales are overlapping with the board-approved Spotify stock buy back that will help to support the higher price point while insiders dump their shares.  This is another inherent conflict problem with the whoe DPO concept–but when you have the 1:10 voting power over your board as does Mr. Ek, many things are possible.

It’s nice work for a “cash portal.”

See SPOT Fall–Does the Decline of Spotify’s Stock Price Mean Anything?

Stocks go up, stocks go down, what does it all mean?  In the very recent declines of the stock price of credible companies, you saw them punished for good quarters but guiding lower.  Even “big tech” stocks like Google and Amazon were punished for revenue misses and cloudy guidance.

And then there’s China–is the US in a trade war or a new cold war?  (Read Mike Pillsbury for the answer.)  Spotify’s has double whammy exposure to China trade woes plus the Ten Cent investment (itself getting hammered by China’s President for Life’s concerns about videogame addiction).

What’s happening with the Spotify stock price?  I would argue the main downward driver for SPOT is much more straightforward–the market is simply catching up to the Spotify DPO and its insider-heavy stock sales.  We won’t really know the hard numbers on insider trades until the SEC starts making those insider Form 4 sales more easily available online.  That should should happen any day now (and none of the mainstream music industry publications seem to be interested enough in the the truth setting them free to actually dig through the SEC Form 4 filings at the source).

But–there could be enough shares out there in the marketplace that SPOT may be starting to trade like an IPO as opposed to an insider cash-out (or DPO).  And once the market really becomes part of the Spotify trading day and trading volume increases, a few things start happening.  One is that as more shares are held by the public, there are an increasing number of shares available to allow the “buy high, sell low” short trading that can cause big swings in a stock’s price due to short covering if nothing else.

SPOT also starts to become more susceptible to the other stocks in its cohort as more retail investors have to answer the question, what will I sell to buy Spotify?  The answer will be different for different people, but if there are more sellers than there are buyers, we know what happens.  That’s why the majors, Sony in particular, were very smart to start selling their holdings almost immediately.

What would you sell to buy Spotify?  Probably not its competitor Apple–whose shares trade almost opposite to Spotify on a relative basis.

 

SPOT Apple Moving averages
SPOT-APPL 11-1-18

 

If you’re looking at the performance of SPOT, you have to ask yourself what about this chart says “buy”?

 

Spot moving averages
SPOT 50 and 100 Day Moving Averages 10-31-18

 

You have a stock that’s broken through both its 100 and 50 day moving averages to the downside as of yesterday, and so far in today’s action is testing lower lows.  And not surprisingly sank like a stone following a “head and shoulders” top technical chart pattern indicating a potential bearish trend that has now been confirmed (as I began watching in June on Music Tech Policy before the stock gave up almost $50 of its share price).

I guess the MMA safe harbor is priced in.

Keep asking yourself that question:  What would I sell to buy SPOT?  If you’re not an insider, that question will eventually guide you (and the market) to the right share price. That will have nothing to do with Spotify’s royalty payouts, how many floors of World Trade Center it rents, or competition with YouTube or Apple.  Don’t let the analysts (or the company) fool you–although some analyists are starting to face the Spotify reality.

That will be–I would suggest–a problem with the insider-controlled Direct Public Offering structure and the SEC’s decision to allow Spotify to price at a meaninglessly high number.  What goes up on fantasy comes down hard on reality.

Buckle your chin strap.